

Covert Action

INFORMATION BULLETIN

Number 37

\$5.00

New World Order: Tunnel at the End of the Light

- Views of Iraqi Victims
- Is Korea Next?
- Tehran's Double-cross
- Strong-arming the U.N.
- Manufacturing War and Consent



Editorial

"[W]e have 50 percent of the world's wealth, but only 6.3% of its population...In this situation we cannot fail to be the object of envy and resentment. Our real task in the coming period is to devise a pattern of relationships which will allow us to maintain this position of disparity...We should cease to talk about the raising of the living standards and democratization. The day is not far off when we are going to have to deal in straight power concepts."

— George Kennan, Dir. of Policy Planning, State Dept., 1948

"There are two hundred million of us and three billion of them. They want what we've got and we ain't going to give it to them."

— President Lyndon Johnson to U.S. troops in Vietnam

With William Webster's resignation and Robert Gates' nomination as head of the CIA, the press has been full of speculation about transformations of the Agency. By suggesting that the "death" of the Cold War implies a radical change, the media is complicit in perpetuating the myth that the real rationale behind post-World War II U.S. foreign policy was the defeat of the international communist conspiracy. In fact, the end of the East-West struggle and the removal of the ideological filter of anticommunism have revealed and institutionalized the dynamic which had consistently generated U.S. post-World War II policy—the North-South struggle.

Now the Cold War is declared over. And still (to the surprise of the media) there is no peace, no peace dividend, and no end in sight to U.S. aggression and support for brutal regimes. Globally, the world remains divided between the *haves* in the industrialized North and the *havenots* in the less developed South. Maintaining this distribution of wealth and power and protecting those who benefit from it underlie U.S. policy and the CIA's mission—while anticommunism merely provides expedient legitimization.

That is not to say that either the world dynamic or the CIA has remained static. Militarily, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union as a superpower, the U.S. has assumed undisputed world dominance. Economically, however, besieged by recession, a decaying infrastructure, and a staggering debt, the U.S. faces serious challenges from Asia and Europe. Bretton Woods has been turned into a parking lot filled with Japanese cars.

Increasingly the CIA will be called on to respond to attacks on the soft U.S. economic underbelly. The Agency will also

have to compete for funds and jockey for bureaucratic and ideological control with NSA, military intelligence, NED, and other defenders of the American way.

One of the few legacies of Webster's reign as Director of Central Intelligence is the "fifth directorate," as the Agency's announced focus on economic intelligence collection is known. The CIA has, of course, engaged in economic data gathering and industrial espionage for decades, thereby reflecting the official view that the interests of the U.S. public and those of its corporations are identical. Some observers, including Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY) and former Kissinger aide Roger Morris have also charged that this new emphasis is part of the Agency's attempt to sell its post-Cold War importance and bloated budget to Congress and the U.S. public.

In December 1988, when Bush nominated Gates to be his deputy national security adviser, the President called him "admirably suited," an assessment not universally shared within the Agency. Fueled by anticommunist fervor, driven by raw ambition, and enjoying the active support of his new patron William Casey, Gates rose rapidly from national intelligence officer analyzing Soviet affairs under Carter to chair the pivotal Deputies Committee of Bush's National Security Council. Word inside the Agency according to the *Washington Post* as early as 1987 was that "Webster has come to rely heavily on Gates, who runs day-to-day operations." Since 1988, a knowledgeable source told CAIB, Gates has been virtually running the CIA out of his NSC office.

He was tripped up in his first nomination for DCI in 1987 because he got caught during the Iran-Contra scandal blatantly lying to Congress. "...I think that lying to the Congress is just wrong," he lied.

He may be damaged this time around because of recent revelations that he facilitated arms sales to Iraq. In his favor is strong support from Bush, with whom he worked closely during the Gulf War. While Webster was excluded from the inner circle of Gulf War planners, Gates attended key meetings and had the president's ear.

With or without cosmetic changes or tactical refocusing of priorities, the CIA's mission remains unchanged—the protection of narrow, self-defined U.S. interests around the globe. The events of the last few years and the nomination of Gates, an apostle of the "old school," are evidence enough that although legitimations come and go, U.S. foreign policy objectives and the mission of the CIA remain depressingly consistent.

CovertAction Information Bulletin, (ISSN: 0275-309X) Number 37, Summer 1991 is published quarterly for \$17 per year by Covert Action Publications, Inc., 1500 Massachusetts Ave. N.W., Suite 732, Washington, DC 20005. Application to mail at second-class postage rates pending at Washington, DC and additional mailing offices. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to *CovertAction Information Bulletin*, 1500 Massachusetts Ave. N.W., Suite 732 Washington, DC 20005.

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The Gulf, February 10. Seaman Jim Hollis of Atlanta, Georgia greases a 16 inch gun aboard the battleship U.S.S. Wisconsin, in preparation for more shelling of Kuwait. AP/Wide World Photos

Back Cover:

Kuwait City, March 9. Crown Prince Sheik Saad al-Sabah and a radiant Jim Baker exchange pleasantries. The prince had just returned home, and Baker stopped by for a visit. AP/Wide World Photos

Correction: *CAIB* Number 36. The author of "FBI Targets Arab Americans" is Ann Talamas, not Ann Talamus.

Bush's Tool and Victim

Phyllis Bennis

In the unipolar world dominated by the United States, the apparent power of the United Nations Security Council is little more than a smoke and mirrors illusion.

For a while, in the months leading up to the shooting/bombing war in the Gulf, the U.N. Security Council seemed to be at the center of international decision-making, at the locus of international power. It was the Council, after all, that imposed sanctions and, shortly thereafter, authorized war against Iraq. It was the Council that decided deadlines, and refused to delimit the Pentagon's jurisdiction to carry out the battle in the Council's name however and wherever Washing-

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ton saw fit. It seemed to be the Security Council's war. In reality, however, the U.S. stranglehold on the Council's decision-making was an exercise in what one U.N. official privately called "raw power."

In a sense, the U.N. was returning to its post-World War II power configuration, when it was essentially an allied victors' club overwhelmingly dominated by the U.S. and Western Europe. In the 1960s, however, as decolonization spread, the number of members increased from 50 to 126 states. The General Assembly's democratic rules ensured

each country one vote, regardless of population, gross national product, or size of army — and the result was an organization dominated by a large Third World majority. As these newly independent countries, especially in Africa and Asia, took their seats in the General Assembly Hall, that body increasingly reflected its dominant Third World composition. In response, a succession of U.S. administrations disavowed the importance of the U.N. as a vehicle for international conflict resolution.

The enlarged membership of the Assembly did not intrude on the Security Council. In this bastion of the "Perm Five" — the U.S., Britain, France, the Soviet Union and China — the power balance remained essentially the same. The Security Council retained the actual power — that is, power to wage war or enforce peace. Only its resolutions, not those of the General Assembly, are binding on member states and only the "Perm Five" have veto power.

Over the years the U.S. has used its veto within the Council with a vengeance — most notably and consistently to prevent passage of resolutions criticizing Israel. Since 1967 alone, the U.S. has vetoed over 40 such resolutions. In the U.N. generally throughout those years, Washington remained a grudging and half-hearted participant in multilateral diplomacy. Throughout the years of the Reagan administration, the U.S. scorned the U.N. as a hotbed of Third World and/or socialist bombast, refused to pay almost \$200 million of its dues, and severely crippled UNESCO by cutting off support.

George Bush's view, perhaps shaped by his years as U.S. ambassador to the U.N. in the 1970s, proved to be somewhat more pragmatic. But even during Bush's presidency, the U.N.'s political "rehabilitation" made only incremental gains until the administration decided to use the organization to legitimate its Gulf invasion and shape its vision of the New World Order.

The real change in U.S. strategy toward the U.N. was apparent in the immediate wake of Iraq's August 2, 1990 invasion of Kuwait, when U.S. Ambassador Thomas Pickering called the Security Council into emergency session to condemn Baghdad, and kept the U.N. in diplomatic overdrive for the long months of the crisis. The Bush administration pulled out all the stops and bribed and bullied Council members into nearly unanimous compliance.

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Bushwhacking the U.N.

The reasons for the apparent sea change in Washington's view of the U.N. are bound up with the demise of the Soviet Union as a superpower capable of challenging U.S. intervention around the world, and with the emergence of Bush's "New World Order."

In this newly unipolar world, without the ideological justification of anti-Sovietism, the U.S. had to create a new public relations framework for continuing to carry out military and political interventions and validate its international hegemony. No longer could the Bush administration rely on the image of superpower Uncle Sam battling his Evil Empire counterpart. Instead, the propaganda makers created a vision of Uncle Sam/George—leader of a brave new Free World coalition, even including the Soviet Union—battling against tyranny in the name of all the "good" nations of the world. In order to maintain this Manichean fiction, Bush needed to present the lightning-fast military build-up in the Gulf as an action mounted by and on behalf of the coalition and supported by what Bush wanted everyone to see as the whole world against Saddam Hussein.

Yemen's Ambassador was informed that his would be "the most expensive 'no' vote you ever cast."

On both the international and domestic fronts, Security Council authorization to use force against Iraq was seen as a crucial piece in the Bush strategy. Internationally, a strong vote of support on Resolution 678 authorizing war against Iraq could counter potential resistance among uneasy U.S. allies in the Middle East and elsewhere. These countries were justifiably concerned about the destabilization Bush's war threatened to unleash in their own countries. (See p. 6 for partial list of demonstrations.) At home, Bush needed to squelch the emerging congressional opposition to going to war before sanctions had been allowed a decent interval.

Arms and Alms for U.N. Votes

To no one's surprise, the heaviest onslaught of U.S. pressure on the Council took place during November. That was the month that the U.S. held the rotating Council presiden-



U.S. Ambassador Thomas Pickering listens while Yemeni Ambassador to the U.N. Abdallah Saleh al-Ashtal addresses the Security Council.

cy.¹ The campaign for support for a resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq's occupation of Kuwait followed Bush's announcement—made only days after the November 2 congressional elections—that he was doubling U.S. troop strength in the Gulf to over 400,000. In doing so, he openly revealed the offensive intentions of what he had declared to Congress and the public to be a purely defensive force.


With military contingencies well underway, Washington turned to diplomacy, and the U.N. campaign went into high gear. To win enough Council votes to be able to claim an overwhelming victory (a bare minimum 9-vote majority would have looked embarrassingly equivocal), Washington brought to bear every pressure, threat and bribe in its considerable diplomatic, economic, and military arsenal.

Virtually every developing country on the Council was offered new economic perks in return for a favorable vote on the use of force resolution.² The U.S. used its considerable leverage with the World Bank and IMF to dispense these favors and bribes. Both institutions "made loans to the front-line countries of Jordan, Turkey and Egypt ostensibly to assist with resettlement efforts."³ The World Bank allocated soft-loan funds to some low-income African nations to help them

1. The chair of the Security Council rotates every month. The preceding president was Sir David Hanay of Great Britain. The ten rotating Council members each serve two-year terms; they have voting but not veto powers. During the months leading up to the deadline for war, Council members included Colombia, Cuba, Malaysia, Yemen, Ethiopia, Zaire, Cote d'Ivoire, Romania, Finland and Canada. On January 1, Malaysia, Finland, Ethiopia and Canada were replaced by India, Austria, Zimbabwe and Belgium.

2. Some of the economic gifts were dispersed to countries not even on the Security Council, apparently as part of an effort to win the recipients' support and encourage them to influence their allies on the Council to vote with the U.S. The \$7 billion in debt relief to Egypt was one such example.

3. "Iraq's Gift to the Poorer Nations," *Washington Post* (editorial), January 30, 1991, p. A20.



International Demonstrations

The New Liberation News Service reports that as of February 1, there had been 3,243 marches, vigils, blockades and other demonstrations against the Gulf War in the U.S.

Following is a partial listing of the international demonstrations during the war's first weeks. Millions of people protested around the world.

- **ALGERIA** More than 500,000 demonstrated.
- **ARGENTINA** 10,000 demonstrated on January 24.
- **AUSTRALIA** 60,000 demonstrated in Sydney on January 19, 15,000 in Adelaide, 20,000 in Melbourne on January 26.
- **BANGLADESH** 500,000 demonstrated in support of Saddam Hussein.
- **BELGIUM** 30,000 demonstrated in Brussels.
- **ENGLAND** 5,000 protested in London January 15; 10,000 in Glasgow; 5,500 in London on January 19.
- **CANADA** 10,000 demonstrated in Montreal.
- **FRANCE** 80,000 demonstrated around France on January 17 and 18.
- **GERMANY** 150,000 demonstrated in Berlin on January 17; at least 250,000 around Germany on January 19; 500,000 on January 26; 250,000 marched later in Bonn; 30,000 in Berlin.
- **GREECE** 10,000 demonstrated in Athens on January 24.
- **ITALY** 100,000 marched in Rome on January 19, with similar numbers in other cities; 200,000 marched later in Rome.
- **JAPAN** 15,000 demonstrated January 26 in Tokyo.
- **LIBYA** 1,000,000 demonstrated against the war and for Kuwaiti self-determination.
- **MOROCCO** 300,000 demonstrated on February 3.
- **SPAIN** More than 300,000 demonstrated.
- **SWEDEN** 20,000 demonstrated on January 26.
- **SWITZERLAND** 15,000 protested in Bern and 4,000 in Geneva on January 26.
- **YEMEN** 200,000 demonstrated over two days in Sana'a.

"The Free Press Goes to War," Brian Perkins, Burlington Media Action, Burlington, Vt. 1991.

"shoulder last year's oil price increases." Impoverished Ethiopia, and Zaire (already fully in thrall to the U.S.) were both offered new aid packages, access to World Bank credits, or rearrangements of International Monetary Fund grants or loans.⁴ In South America, Colombia was offered new aid packages. "The industrialized and Gulf nations, through the U.S.-formed Gulf Crisis Financial Coordination Group, have committed in excess of \$13 billion for economic assistance to the hard hit developing countries."⁵

Military deals were also cut. Ethiopia was given access to new military aid after a long denial of arms to that civil war-racked nation and Colombia was offered new military assistance.

China was the sole member of the Perm Five not toeing the U.S. line. It was common knowledge among U.N.-based journalists that China was looking for two major concessions in return for not opposing the U.S. resolution. One was Washington's support for Beijing's return to international diplomatic legitimacy after 18 months' semi-isolation following the Tienanmen Square massacre.

The second item on the Chinese wish list was economic development aid. The decision by the World Bank to award \$114 million in non-humanitarian aid came less than a week after China abstained rather than opposed the use of force resolution. The day after the vote, President Bush met with Chinese Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen in a high-profile White House conference.⁶ According to World Bank Vice President Atilla Karaosmaonoglu, other loans for China were also being prepared.⁷

But carrots were not the only tool; sticks were used as well. The U.S. would see that those countries which opposed the U.S. resolution, Cuba and Yemen, would, as much as possible, pay a high and very public price.

Washington's 30-year diplomatic and economic blockade against Cuba left few untried weapons in the State Department's arsenal. Cuba had shown it could not be intimidated.⁸

In an interesting example of just how far the U.S. was willing to go to gain support for its resolution, Washington agreed to its first foreign minister-level meeting with Havana in more than three decades. The brief meeting between Secretary of State James Baker and Cuban Foreign Minister Isidoro Malmierca was held at an east side Manhattan hotel on the eve of the pivotal November 29 use-of-force vote. The

4. Although owned by its 155 member governments, the World Bank has been headed by an American since its 1945 founding. The U.S. also effectively controls the institution by wielding its 20% control on all major votes. U.S. control of the IMF is even more direct. Both institutions were established, like the U.N. itself, soon after the end of World War II.

5. *Op. cit.*, *Washington Post* (editorial).

6. Stephen Labaton, "World Bank Lends China \$114 Million," *New York Times*, December 5, 1990.

7. Neil Henry, "War Fuels Africans' Sense of Alienation," *Washington Post*, January 28, 1991, p. A13.

8. While no countries openly support Cuba's defiance, some diplomats were angered by U.S. bullying and privately applauded the Cuban stand.

encounter received little publicity, and was deprecated by U.S. diplomats as nothing more than an ordinary meeting between a Council member and that month's Council president. On the surface this explanation was reasonable since Baker had come to New York to preside personally over the next day's session, and had asked all other Council foreign ministers to attend as well. A more likely interpretation, however, was provided by Non-Aligned Movement diplomatic sources who indicated that the unprecedented meeting was designed to assess the possibility of convincing Cuba to stop its efforts to win other countries away from Washington's war. To no one's surprise, the effort failed.

Washington has consistently used the U.N. to conduct its virulent anti-Cuba campaigns. In certain U.N. committees, including but not limited to the Human Rights Commission, countries are routinely pressured to vote against perceived or actual Cuban interests. The U.S. has answered the latest example of insubordination — Havana's high-profile Security Council role opposing the U.S. strategy — with increased efforts to discredit and destabilize its island enemy. Argentina's abstention on a recent anti-Cuba resolution in the Human Rights Commission, after years of voting no, was only one example of successful U.S. pressure. Last spring, for the first time, some Eastern European countries, eager for economic assistance, also fell into line with U.S. condemnation of Cuba.

But Cuba was not the only nation to vote no on the U.S. war against Iraq. The other, Yemen, the only Arab Council member, was far more directly vulnerable to U.S. pressure tactics. Although it has maintained cordial ties with Washington since its May 1990 unification, Yemen would now be made the example to the world of the consequences of violating U.S.-ordered consensus. Within minutes of the Council vote, Yemen's Ambassador Abdallah Saleh al-Ashtal was informed, in full earshot of the world via the U.N. broadcasting system, that his would be "the most expensive 'no' vote you ever cast." Three days later the U.S. cut its \$70 million aid package to Yemen, one of the poorest countries in the region. The cut off significantly worsened the country's economic crisis, caused by Saudi Arabia's expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Yemeni workers as punishment for Yemen's refusal to back the U.S.-led troop build-up in the Gulf.

Soviet Collapse

The payoffs and threats to the developing countries were not new. The crucial new relationship the U.S. had to forge in the Council was with the Soviets. If the Bush-Baker strategy of using the Security Council to create the appearance of an international consensus was going to work, the world would have to see Moscow fall into line as part of the U.S.-orchestrated "New World Order." The U.S.S.R., besieged by escalating political and economic crises, had collapsed as a superpower capable of checking U.S. influence around the world. The U.S. sweetened the deal by negotiating a \$4 billion aid package to be awarded by the Saudis to Moscow. The crucial factor, however, was diminished Soviet influence.



Associated Press

U.N. ambassador Thomas Pickering bullied, bribed and blackmailed a cashregister coalition to support the War.

Aside from a U.S.-scuttled effort to broker a negotiated solution, the U.S.S.R. offered little resistance to the U.S. juggernaut.

Reached by chance as he headed up a U.N. escalator on January 16, the night the U.S. bombardment of Baghdad began, Soviet Ambassador Yuli Vorontsov made a startling admission of this new weakness. Asked whether, since his government had no troops in the Gulf theater, he wasn't concerned that Pentagon officers alone were making all the decisions for a war to be waged in his government's name, Vorontsov paused. "Who are we," he answered, "to say they should not?"

Resolution 678 was designed to give Washington *carte blanche* against Iraq. It sanctioned force to remove Iraq from Kuwait, and to defend "lasting peace and security in the region." This language was increasingly relied on by the Bush administration and several of its allies, notably the British and the Kuwaitis, to justify military actions that went far beyond the removal of Iraq's army from Kuwait. "This authorization...is not limited as to duration, restricted in terms of destructive means relied upon, and is not even undertaken with accountability to and guidance from appropriate organs of the United Nations," wrote Princeton University international law expert Richard Falk. "It has been understood everywhere as giving Washington a free hand to do whatever it wants to do...In effect it is a warrant to wage war, completely at odds with the fundamental U.N. undertaking 'to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.'"⁹

9. Richard Falk, "UN Being Made a Tool of U.S. Foreign Policy," *Guardian Weekly*, January 27, 1991, p. 12.

Indeed, once the U.S. started bombing Baghdad, the U.N. was quickly sidelined and the center of gravity, even on the diplomatic side, shifted to Washington.

In mid-January, the U.S. unilaterally rejected as "insufficient" Iraq's offer to accept all U.N. resolutions and begin to withdraw. Yemen's Ambassador called the Council's refusal to defy the U.S. and accept the offer "the only time the Security Council has been reluctant to facilitate the withdrawal of an occupying force in compliance with its own resolution."¹⁰

Oil as a Weapon

In early March, three and a half months after Resolution 678 was pushed through, the U.S. introduced Resolution 686 which called for a temporary halt in hostilities, but not an explicit ceasefire. The U.S. mounted another campaign to pressure Security Council members. The vote was expected throughout the late afternoon hours, but two ambassadors were missing. As the meeting stretched into the early evening, journalists and diplomats alike were growing impatient.

The U.S. threatened unspecified but devastating political and economic consequences.

Finally, immediately after the tardy arrival of the ambassadors of Zimbabwe and Ecuador, two important Non-Aligned members of the Council, the vote commenced. According to knowledgeable diplomatic sources, both ambassadors had been closeted at their respective missions, getting last-minute instructions based on their government's responses to new U.S. pressures. Despite earlier predictions that they might abstain, both Zimbabwe and Ecuador voted with the U.S.

In Quito, the Bush administration's ambassador to Ecuador had brought to bear the classic kind of coercion so often used against Latin America: a meeting to remind Ecuadorean officials of the unspecified but devastating political and economic consequences that would result from a vote against Washington's non-ceasefire resolution.

Zimbabwe's vote was particularly significant. The African nation was a key member of the Non-Aligned Movement¹¹ and had often stood up to U.S. pressure tactics. Last year,

however, Zimbabwe spent nearly twice its budgeted \$180 million for oil imports and faced "wide suffering and possible political and social instability...as the regime struggle[d] to enact spending cuts in an economic-reform program."¹² The crisis, brought on in part by U.S.-controlled IMF austerity programs, and exacerbated by the economic assaults of the Gulf War, gave the U.S. added leverage to influence Zimbabwe's vote within the U.N.

The pressure came, not surprisingly, as promise of access to low-priced oil supplies to the impoverished African country. The oil was to be guaranteed by the just-restored government of the Kuwaiti Emir, in return for a pro-U.S. vote.

What seems clear is Bush's long-term intention to redraw the political map of the Middle East to better suit U.S. goals of strategic domination and control of oil access and pricing.

How the diplomatic twists and turns will sort themselves out is not yet certain. Saudi Arabia is militarily more dependent than ever. Egypt is politically and militarily dependent, and is verging on bankruptcy and potential social unrest. Syria is broke but believes it holds U.S. chips to be cashed in (such as return of the Golan Heights) in exchange for its anti-Iraq stance. Kuwait is completely dependent on U.S. military might, with its reconstruction presided over by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Iran is reemerging as a regional power but Washington has no interest in that process consolidating any further. And region-wide, part of the Bush administration's goal remains to undermine Palestinian aspirations and to undercut the possibility of an international peace conference focused on ending Israel's occupation.

U.S. Ambassador Pickering emerged from the Security Council chamber smiling broadly after his success at engineering the April 3rd vote on the final ceasefire resolution. He was asked whether, with his claimed new interest in a Palestinian-Israeli peace and the changing role of the Security Council, a Council-sponsored international peace conference might not be a useful next step. "We don't believe this is the appropriate time," he answered.

That rejection, along with the unprecedented harshness of the ceasefire terms imposed on Iraq, the continuing U.S. military presence in Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and (since the war) Bahrain, and U.S. efforts to control the tragic chaos of Kurdish and Shi'ite refugees on Iraq's borders with Turkey and Iran, will likely mean the U.N. as a whole remains out of the loop, and out of power.

When the smoke has cleared and the illusions of power have faded, the picture of the U.N.'s future in U.S. strategy will remain obscure. Washington has strengthened its grip on the institution and seemingly increased its use of the U.N. to control and shape events. The U.N.'s immediate role is as legitimator of unilateral U.S. power. Its struggle to transform itself to help shape a different kind of New World Order—one in which the U.N. becomes the multilateral locus for peace and development many of its founders envisioned—remains an international priority. ●

12. *Ibid.*

10. Comment to author, January 1991.

11. "Several African diplomats charged that the United Nations appeared to have been 'manipulated' by the United States to garner support for its war effort, and expressed chagrin over what one official called 'the death of the Non-Aligned Movement of Third World countries.'

"That movement in which Zimbabwe has played an active role for the last decade, has served as a political counterbalance to east and west and provided a vehicle for Third World views." (Neil Henry, "War Fuels Africans' Sense of Alienation," *Washington Post*, January 28, 1991, p. A13.)

Disinformation and Covert Operations

Ellen Ray and William H. Schaap

There has been considerable and convincing speculation that the U.S. sandbagged Iraq into invading Kuwait.¹ That may have been the first major covert operation of the whole affair. It is unclear, however, whether it was the CIA, the Pentagon, the State Department, or some combination which was the prime mover.² A senior CIA analyst, Charles Eugene Allen, warned his superiors—and officials of the State Department and the National Security Council—in July that such an invasion was imminent.³ Not only was he ignored by all three organizations, but superiors angered by his unauthorized disclosures to State and the NSC cut his staff and suspended his biweekly reports. A Kuwaiti military attaché who warned his government repeatedly in July 1990, has received essentially the same treatment.⁴

There may be a question whether the CIA or the State Department wanted a tilt away from Iraq; what is absolutely certain though, is that the Pentagon has for decades coveted a more substantial presence in the Middle East.⁵ Until the Gulf War there was no country in the region that would accept the permanent presence of large numbers of U.S. armed forces. Now it appears there will be troops in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait—and perhaps Iraq itself—as well as the small contingent which has been sent to Bahrain, for years to come.

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1. The most comprehensive analysis is Michael Emery's "How Mr. Bush Got His War: Deceptions, Double-Standards, and Disinformation," *Village Voice*, March 5, 1991. Algerian foreign minister Sid Ahmed Ghozali charged that Iraq has been under escalating U.S. attack for two years. (Algiers Domestic Service in French, 1800 GMT, February 14, 1991, FBIS-NES)

2. General Schwarzkopf participated in war games based on an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait months before it happened. General George Butler, a top military adviser to Colin Powell, recently stated: "[in late 1989]...we devoted a great deal of time and attention to the focus of future US military planning to preserve regional stability and access...Ultimately, consensus formed around the long-term threat posed by Iraq..." *Air Force Magazine*, March 1991, p. 82.

3. Michael Wines, "CIA Sidelines Its Gulf Cassandra," *New York Times*, January 24, 1991, p. D22.

4. William Claiborne "Envoy Recounts Warning in July of Invasion; Kuwaitis Cut Him Off," *Washington Post*, March 18, 1991, p. A26.

5. See, for example, Eric Rassi, "All the Slaughter That Money Can Buy," *Downtown* (New York), March 13, 1991, p. 1.

The Pre-War Disinformation Campaign

As soon as Iraq invaded Kuwait and became an instant enemy, a major disinformation campaign began. This was necessary to transmogrify a "friendly" into an "unfriendly" and on very short notice. As recently as May 1989, the *Washington Post* was referring to Saddam Hussein as "pragmatic."⁶ This is a term the Establishment reserves for the bad guys who usually do what we want them to. Hussein was certainly no U.S. vassal. He may well have attacked Iran with U.S. encouragement, but when arms sales to the Ayatollah became public knowledge, he was palpably angered by this "play both sides against the middle" strategy. Still, Washington studiously regarded him as "someone we can work with." Thus, after August 2, 1990, Americans had to be told a lot of horrifying tales about Iraq and Saddam Hussein.

Charges relating to the undemocratic nature of the Iraqi government were clearly valid. However, it was rarely pointed out that many of the neighboring countries—soon to comprise the "coalition"—were considerably worse. Iraq alone among the Gulf states has made serious efforts to reduce the traditional subjection of women. Indeed, the failure to describe the shortcomings of the two staunchest U.S. allies in the region, Saudi Arabia⁷ and Kuwait,⁸ was embarrassing. But the most serious U.S. allegations were of very questionable substance. They were described by *Newsday's* Washington reporter Knut Royce: "Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was unprovoked; Iraqi President Saddam Hussein also planned to invade Saudi Arabia; Iraq used chemical agents against its indigenous Kurds; Hussein may be on the verge of acquiring an atomic weapon."⁹


As Royce explained, these claims were all "based on unconfirmed, weak, or contradictory intelligence." The history of the Iraq-Kuwait dispute goes back many decades, and the notion that Iraq was not provoked is ludicrous, whether

6. Patrick E. Tyler, "Iraq Pursues Politics of Pragmatism," *Washington Post*, May 13, 1989, p. A13.

7. In Saudi Arabia, slavery was formally abolished in 1962, but the practice remains common. See Robert Lacey, *The Kingdom: Arabia and the House of Sa'ud*, (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1981).

8. Germaine Greer, "Our Allies the Slaveholders?" *New York Times*, November 14, 1990, p. A29.

9. Knut Royce, "A Trail of Distortion Against Iraq," *Newsday*, January 21, 1991, p. 21.



Donna Binder/Impact Visuals

Fort Dix, New Jersey, February 27, 1991. Throughout the Gulf War, the corporate media and the Pentagon seemed anxious to cooperate. Here, as Dan Quayle rallies the troops, a nightly-news inspired backdrop emphasizes the exciting, spectator sport atmosphere of war, American-style.

or not one believes that any provocation could justify an invasion.¹⁰ The notion that Iraq seriously considered going beyond Kuwait and invading Saudi Arabia is equally preposterous. Michael Emery interviewed King Hussein of Jordan who insisted that Saddam Hussein at no time had any intention of invading Saudi Arabia. Indeed, the King was in Saudi Arabia with King Fahd on August 7, when the Pentagon was warning that Iraq might "gobble up" the country, and King Fahd was confident that there was no threat.¹¹

There was no dispute that Kurdish residents of the Iraqi city of Halabja, near the border with Iran, suffered chemical warfare attacks killing hundreds in March 1988, during the Iraq-Iran war. At the time, the territory was held by Iran and the Iranians claimed that the gas attacks were Iraqi. This claim was generally accepted by most of the world's media, despite Iraqi denials. But a February 1990 U.S. Army War College report concluded that Iraq was not responsible for the Halabja massacre and "that it was the Iranian bombardment that had actually killed the Kurds."¹² U.S. propaganda, insisting that Saddam Hussein was the kind of person who would gas his own people, never mentioned the Army report.

Finally, the notion that Iraq was on the verge of having deployable nuclear weapons was sheer fantasy. As the war

made perfectly clear, their airforce was a mirage, and their missiles had difficulty delivering conventional warheads.

The Presidential Findings

Although press accounts generally point to a presidential order of January 1991 as the authorization for CIA-coordinated aid to Iraqi rebel groups,¹³ it appears that there was an earlier finding in September, and that significant covert CIA funding for the Iraqi opposition began with this first presidential finding and its call for "non-lethal" support. Such support continued throughout the pre-war period, during the air war and the ground war, and is still taking place. The aid has included training in propaganda and organization as well as in political leadership.

Some Covert Operations

Prior to the commencement of the air war there was a flurry of espionage operations inside Kuwait and Iraq. According to the *Los Angeles Times*, U.S. Special Forces were involved in a number of actions before and during the air war.¹⁴ These involved intelligence gathering by Green Berets who "went into Kuwait City and Baghdad and even to some Iraqi military encampments in the guise of third-country salesmen, peddling military spare parts and food then in short supply." Also according to the article, "many of Britain's elite Special Air Service commandos were wandering the Kuwaiti and Iraqi deserts in Bedouin garb."

The same article stated that "U.S. commando teams even planned and apparently executed 'snatches'—wartime kidnappings—of Iraqi soldiers...bringing vital human intelligence assets to planners in the rear." This suggests unlawful treatment of prisoners of war, to say the least. A rather different description appeared in *Newsweek* some two weeks after the *Los Angeles Times* article.¹⁵ "Within weeks of Saddam Hussein's invasion last August," the newsweekly said, "an American special-operations team crossed the border into Kuwait to observe the Iraqi buildup and conduct 'snatch operations,' stealing Iraqi electronic equipment and carrying it to Riyadh for analysis." Snatching people is rather different from snatching equipment.

10. See Michael Emery, *op. cit.*

11. *Ibid.*

12. Royce, *op. cit.* Three months after Royce quoted the War College report, the *New York Times* finally took note of it; Michael Wines, "Years Later, No Clear Culprit in Gassing of Kurds," *New York Times*, April 28, 1991, p. 13.

13. See, e.g., Susan Page and Knut Royce, "Bush Again Urges Coup To Overthrow Hussein," *Newsday*, April 4, 1991.

14. Melissa Healy, "Special Forces: U.S. 'Eyes' Deep in Enemy Territory," *Los Angeles Times*, February 28, 1991, p. A1.

15. Joshua Hammer, "Special Ops: The Top Secret War," *Newsweek*, March 18, 1991, p. 32.

Why Some Smart Bombs Were Smart

As everyone who was near a television set in January knows, a number of U.S. bombing raids in the first days of the air war seemed unbelievably accurate. Videotapes of "smart bombs" dropping down the central airshaft of the Ministry of Defense headquarters and the like were shown over and over. The impression given was that the air war was truly a surgical operation.

Actually, only a small percentage of the bombs dropped on Iraq were "smart," and only a small percentage of smart bombs hit their precise targets.¹⁶ Indeed, given all the subsequent reporting of extensive civilian damage and casualties,¹⁷ there is only one likely explanation for the high degree of accuracy of the very first raids, when contrasted to the imprecision of later raids: "The first bombs and missiles would have had an undisclosed advantage over those that followed; their ability to hit their targets would have been enhanced by homing devices at or near their targets, planted by U.S. agents in Iraq before the war started."¹⁸ Britain's prime minister John Major boasted publicly about the role played by British parachute commandos, armed with laser homing devices, in allied targeting of Iraq's mobile Scud launchers.¹⁹

The Navy Seals

U.S. commando teams, particularly Navy Seals, were dropped behind enemy lines at the time the air war commenced in order to flash hand-held lasers on certain targets, on which Hellfire missiles then homed in.²⁰ The Seals were the subject of an inordinately flattering segment of ABC-TV's *Primetime Live* on February 28, 1991.²¹ These "elite commandos...were conducting remarkable undercover missions." One admiral told ABC, "They're as close to the movie Rambo as anything we have in the military." As correspondent Chris Wallace told the viewers, "The Seals...were some of the first troops into Grenada, parachuting in to save the island's governor general. But four Seals were killed in heavy seas." (In fact, the governor general was never in danger.) The Seals "were also prepared to take Ferdinand Marcos out of the Philippines if he hadn't left on his own. And then there's Panama. The Seals were to block Manuel Noriega's escape."

16. See Edward S. Herman, "Smart Bombs and Dumb Bombs," *Lies Of Our Times*, March 1991, p. 4. The *Philadelphia Inquirer* suggested that perhaps 60 percent of smart bombs hit their targets (Earl Lane, "Smart Bombs May Be Dumb About 40 Percent of the Time," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, February 11, 1991, p. 12A).

17. The scale of Iraqi civilian casualties are the subject of intense debate as we go to press. The U.S. refuses to comment. Infant mortality, already up sharply, is projected to rise by 170,000 this year due to the demolition of Iraq's civilian infrastructure.

18. *Anti-War Briefing Week Four*, February 16, 1991, p. 1, from AWB, Box 122, Jackson, MS 39205-0122.

19. Michael Evans, "How the SAS took out the Scuds...by Major," *London Times*, May 15, 1991, p. 1.

20. See Michael R. Gordon, "Desert Missions By Commandos Aided in Victory," *New York Times*, March 1, 1991, p. A1.

21. All quotations from transcript, "Primetime Live," February 28, 1991.



After the "Turkey Shoot." It is a violation of the Geneva Conventions to attack a retreating army incapable of defending itself. That is precisely what the U.S. did in the last days of the war as it frantically bombed and strafed the gargantuan traffic jam on the highway to Basra. This television image recording the human reality is one of a handful which made it into U.S. living rooms.

But, while trying to disable Noriega's plane, they were ambushed by Panamanian soldiers and four Seals were killed and six seriously wounded.

The Helicopter Mission

There were many targeting missions. Perhaps the most bizarre was that presented to the world — albeit rather briefly — as the defecting Iraqi helicopter pilots. On January 7, a week before the U.S. air war began, the Pentagon announced that six Iraqi helicopter pilots had defected to Saudi Arabia, with their aircraft. The *New York Times* quoted "American officials" describing it as "one of the most significant defections of Iraqi military officers since Iraq's invasion of Kuwait."²² Iraq denied that there had been any such defections, and the next day the Pentagon retracted the story, confirming the Iraqi denials.²³ Pentagon spokesmen said they had been unable to confirm the incident, initially reported by a Saudi official in Dhahran.²⁴ The Pentagon retraction seemed puzzling, because its own intelligence digests had not only announced the defections as fact, but had also described the make of the helicopters (Soviet-built Mi-8-Hips helicopters) and unusual radio traffic at the time of the "defections." A senior official also said that U.S. electronic tracking confirmed the reports.²⁵ In fact, *Newsday* quoted "an informed

22. Michael R. Gordon, "Six Iraqi Pilots Defect and U.S. Claims a Psychological-War Gain," *New York Times*, January 8, 1991, p. A1.

23. *New York Times*, January 9, 1991, p. A9.

24. Barton Gellman, "U.S. Denies Iraqi Copter Defections," *Washington Post*, January 11, 1991, p. A13.

25. *Ibid.*



Associated Press

Homecoming salute, Tampa, Florida, May 5, 1991: Left to right: Mickey Mouse, Christian Schwarzkopf, Brenda Schwarzkopf, Norman Schwarzkopf, Cindy Schwarzkopf.

source in Dhahran" that the defection was "very significant." Sources told *Newsday* "the Iraqis were asked to identify themselves and their purpose while still outside Saudi territory. The pilots said they wanted to defect and asked permission to land in Saudi Arabia. Authorization was given 'in a matter of minutes,' said a well-placed source."²⁶

Despite such a wealth of details prior to the denials, after the Pentagon announced it had all been a mistake, the press not only accepted this explanation, but expanded upon it. *Newsday* said, "In a strange twist to an already theatrical incident, Saudi Arabia's defense minister sided with Iraq yesterday in denying reports that crews aboard Iraqi military aircraft landed in the kingdom late Monday night."²⁷ Michael Wines of the *New York Times* reported that his source in the Special Operations Command confided to him that apparently someone had accepted as fact a Saudi propaganda broadcast beamed at Iraq. The helicopter flights, his source assured Wines, "never happened."²⁸

But, we have learned, they *did* happen, and they involved clearcut war crimes—only the criminals were not Iraqis but Americans. The helicopters were not imaginary; in a mission coordinated with the CIA they were flown by U.S. Special Operations pilots disguised as Iraqi pilots, in U.S.-owned,

Soviet-built helicopters disguised as Iraqi aircraft.²⁹ They were returning from a secret mission, apparently involving, among other objectives, the installation of smart bomb homing devices. Apparently the mission was so secret that the U.S. troops who observed the helicopters returning to Saudi Arabia fired on them, causing at least one to crash and killing at least one Special Operations officer. Once news of "Iraqi" helicopters entering Saudi Arabia was out, the defector story was spread. Once the wreckage was removed and the other aircraft hidden, the story was denied.

It is a war crime for troops of one side in a conflict to disguise themselves as troops of their enemy, as it is

to disguise one's military craft as equipment belonging to the other side.³⁰ In its eagerness to accuse Saddam Hussein of war crimes, of course, the U.S. has not bothered to admit that it is guilty of such acts. *Newsweek*, referring to a later incident, said: "Three days before the ground invasion, commandos slipped into Kuwait in helicopters painted with Iraqi Army markings to perform a final reconnaissance."³¹ Here too, there was no indication that such an operation was illegal.

Other War Crimes

Evidence is accumulating regarding other U.S. war crimes, including violations of the Nuremberg Principles. Some of the more vicious of these include the deliberate destruction of water supply and sewage systems, bringing on cholera and other epidemics, and the destruction of bridges, power plants, and similar targets far from any areas of military significance.

The U.S. conduct at the end of the war, as tens of thousands of retreating soldiers and refugees were massacred, parallels in viciousness any operation of the Germans or Japanese in World War II. Few incidents in history can equal what the allied forces did on the "road to Hell," the 38 kilometers between Kuwait City and Basra.³² A seven-mile long, five-lane wide column of bumper-to-bumper traffic was

26. Susan Sachs, "Iraqi Pilots Defect to Saudi Arabia," *Newsday*, January 8, 1991, p. 7.

27. Susan Sachs, "Saudis Deny Pilot Incident," *Newsday*, January 9, 1991, p. 29.

28. Michael Wines, "CIA Joins Military Move to Sap Iraqi Confidence," *January 19, 1991*, p. 9.

29. Ellen Ray and William H. Schaap, "Minefields of Disinformation," *Lies Of Our Times*, March 1991, p. 7.

30. See Geneva Conventions.

31. Hammer, *op. cit.*

32. See Ellen Ray, "The Killing Deserts," *Lies Of Our Times*, April 1991.

halted in place by bombing the beginning and end of the gigantic caravan, and then every vehicle and every person in between was burned to a crisp by more endless, merciless bombing. Virtually no one was allowed out alive.³³ A U.S. military spokesperson referred to the incident as a "turkey shoot."

Recruitment of Prisoners

Although the extent of the problem was only hinted at in the press,³⁴ the Pentagon—along with the Saudi military—was involved in yet another war crime, the recruitment of Iraqi prisoners for rebel armies. Up until the ground war began, the allies separated prisoners whom they referred to as "deserters or defectors" from ordinary Iraqi prisoners of war. Such separation, according to American University professor Robert Goldman, is a violation of the Geneva Conventions governing treatment of POWs.³⁵

Although the International Committee of the Red Cross—which is notoriously circumspect in its statements and observations—did not indicate it had proof that such segregated prisoners were being recruited, this was clear to other human rights observers, some of whom have spoken to *CAIB*. As Andrew Whitley of Middle East Watch told the *Washington Post*, such separation "is invidious to the prisoners because it opens them up to charges by the home government that they had somehow collaborated or provided private information" to the enemy. Moreover, Whitley said "the separation also makes it more likely that the disaffected soldiers will refuse repatriation for fear of reprisals and turns them into 'a potential recruitment pool' for operations against the Saddam regime."³⁶

As of this writing (May 1991), according to ICRC, there remain some 15,000 POWs in allied custody and more than 1.1 million refugees, all of whom are likely targets for recruitment into the rebel Kurdish and Shiite groups.

33. The road was littered with charred bodies and scattered limbs, but few Americans saw anything of this. *CAIB* learned that salespeople at several major photo services, from which the vast majority of newspapers get their international pictures, were told by their supervisors to remove from sale all the most gruesome photos. Photos of destroyed vehicles were plentiful; photos of the human remains in those vehicles were virtually impossible to find. In the last few days of the land war, the offices of one leading photo house in New York City was crowded with researchers asking, unsuccessfully, for pictures "with bodies in them."

34. See George Lardner, Jr., and Steve Coll, "Some Iraqi POWs May Be Recruited by Saddam Foes," *Washington Post*, March 12, 1991.

35. *Ibid.*

36. *Ibid.*

PUBLICATION OF INTEREST

People Against Racist Terror (P.A.R.T.) has published a series of background reports on the outbreaks of racist violence attributable to the war. They also publish *Turning the Tide*, a monthly newsletter. Reports \$2, one year newsletter subscription \$5. P.O. Box 1990, Burbank, CA 91507.

Assassination as an Option

One rather chilling segment of the *Primetime Live* show noted above³⁷ was on the question of assassinating Saddam Hussein. ABC, and presumably many other media organizations, were frequently asking American citizens how they felt about assassinating the president of Iraq. On the February 28 show, Diane Sawyer noted that at the start of the war "nearly half" the people wanted the U.S. to try to kill Hussein, but by the end of February, "now that the war is over and tempers are cooling, only 23 percent think that would be wise." One can only wonder about such policy-making by telephone poll. It does not seem to bother ABC that the assassination of foreign leaders is, at least theoretically, still unlawful.

USA Today's lead story on April 15 was titled: "Nixon: I'd have the CIA kill Saddam." The media's favorite former president said to an audience of millions: "If I could find a way to get him out of there, even putting out a contract on him, if the CIA still did that sort of thing, assuming it ever did, I would be for it." This was a direct quote from Nixon's April 14 appearance on the CBS newsmagazine *60 Minutes*.

ABC was not content just to give the results of their latest poll. They also interviewed Henry Kissinger, Angelo Codevilla, William Kowen, and William Colby. Kissinger thought the Iraqis ought to be the ones to overthrow Hussein. Codevilla, a former legislative assistant to Sen. Malcolm Wallop (R-Wyo.), and who was on the staff of the Senate Intelligence Committee, stated, cryptically, "It is far easier to deal with dead evil heroes than with live ones." Kowen, a former Special Forces operative, suggested that "a chemical agent in his socks" would do the trick; "we have those kinds of capabilities," he said. Colby, that irrepressible liberal, confessed that assassination attempts were "counterproductive." Kowen complained that no matter how fast his group assassinated local leaders, "the Viet Cong were able to replace those people on a quick basis." Wrapping up the segment, Diane Sawyer lamented that "the U.S. is the only major power with a policy against assassination." Other nations are not so "squeamish."

We only killed between 100,000 and 200,000 people in a few weeks' time; terribly squeamish of us. ●

37. "Primetime Live," *op. cit.*

PUBLICATION OF INTEREST

Steven Hassan, *Combatting Cult Mind Control*, (Rochester, Vermont: Park Street Press, 1990), 220 pp.

Hassan, a former cult member and reputable exit counselor, examines some of the estimated 3,000 destructive cults in the U.S. (religious, political, psychotherapeutic, commercial and educational) and offers practical ways to:

- Recognize a destructive organization,
- Rescue a loved one without coercion,
- Overcome the after-effects of cult membership.

Available in Spanish. Reviewed in *CAIB* Number 33.

North Korea, The Next Target?

Mili Kang

At the end of January, while most Americans were glued to their television sets consuming the video version of the Gulf war, U.S. military brass quietly began a massive deployment of troops and sophisticated weaponry to the region surrounding the Korean peninsula. The annual "Team Spirit" military exercises¹ are one of the few which utilize live ammunition. It climaxed in mid-April with roughly 140,000 U.S. and South Korean troops engaging in ten days of high-intensity maneuvers simulating war against North Korea. Why, at the height of a massive and very real war in the Gulf, were U.S. military

weaponry."³ The report goes on to outline specific conflict scenarios ranging from counterinsurgency operations to a war in Europe. Under the heading "Major Regional Contingency," only two scenarios are given: SWA (Southwest Asia — the Defense Department's term for the Gulf region), and Korea.

The use of the Iraqi conflict as a model for future U.S. invasions, possibly including but not necessarily confined to Korea, is clearly stated. The JMNA report asserts that "Iraq is merely a proxy for a generalized class of threats," and then

"Iraq is merely a proxy for a generalized class of threats..." — JMNA report

"North Korea is the only Communist [country] left that everyone can love to hate."

forces and capabilities mobilized for "war games" on the Korean peninsula?

Staging "Team Spirit" 1991, in spite of pressing military activities elsewhere is neither, as it would seem on the surface, an exhibition of bureaucratic folly nor an example of simple military rigidity. And rather than just continuing the use of U.S. troops in South Korea as "forward deployment" for contingencies in the Pacific theater,² it illustrates the Bush administration's policy of extending the "New World Order," forged in the Gulf, to other regions of the world.

Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, in the 1991 Joint Military Net Assessment (JMNA), openly acknowledged changing U.S. policy. "The war against Iraq," he said, "presages a type of conflict we are likely to confront again in this new era...major regional conflicts against foes well-armed with elements of advanced conventional and unconventional

explicitly places Korea within that class.⁴ The parallels are chilling. Nearly identical assessments of Korea and SWA include the classification of the threat (heavy), the days of combat (120), and the intensity (mid to high), a category which includes the possible use by the U.S. of nuclear and biochemical weapons.

A rash of recent speculations by U.S. media and policymakers that Korea might be the next flashpoint have dangerously inflamed tensions. In particular, the issue of nuclear weapons has sparked intense hostility between North and South, just at a time when progress was being made in high-level prime ministerial talks. On April 13, South Korea's Defense Minister Lee Jong-koo, stated that Seoul might launch an "Entebbe-style" commando raid on North Korea's nuclear facilities if they were not opened to international inspection. The statement was quickly withdrawn, but not fast enough to stop a strong reaction by North Korea, which accused South Korea of a virtual declaration of war.

Steve Goose, congressional aide to Rep. Robert J. Mrazek (D-N.Y.),⁵ lamenting the current atmosphere, said, "Over

Mili Kang, a second-generation Korean-American, works at the Korea Coalition, a Washington-based advocacy organization, and edits the bi-monthly publication, *Korea Update*, which documents and analyzes current affairs related to Korea and U.S.-Korea relations.

1. This year's exercises were slightly scaled back from last year's, supposedly as a sign of goodwill toward the North Koreans. "Team Spirit" continues to be the most massive exercise regularly conducted by the U.S.

2. More than 44,000 U.S. troops are currently stationed in South Korea at a cost to U.S. taxpayers of \$3 billion a year. (*Defense Monitor*, Volume 19, Number 2, 1990.)

3. "Foreword by the Secretary of Defense," 1991 Joint Military Net Assessment, March 1991, p. ii.

4. *Ibid*, Chapter 9, p. 2.

5. Rep. Mrazek introduced a bill, defeated in the House last September, to require a ceiling of 30,000 U.S. forces in Korea as part of an arms control and peace process.

the past few years, I thought we were making some progress in the area of peace issues related to Korea, but that has certainly been struck a blow by events in the Mideast...North Korea is the only Communist [country] left that everyone can love to hate. We're pretty much down to Kim Il Sung and Castro, and it's hard to make a case that Castro is about to raid Florida."⁶

False Parallels

Recently Kim Il Sung, never Washington's favorite man, has joined the pantheon of international arch-villains alongside Castro, Qaddafi, Noriega, and most notably, Saddam Hussein. Kim is playing the new Stalin to Saddam's casting as Hitler.⁷ Both are depicted as demonic despots ready, willing

Combined U.S.-Republic of Korea Command) directly equated the military strengths of the two countries in a statement on March 13, 1991 to the Senate Armed Services Committee. "It might be helpful," he offered, "to analyze the north's capabilities in comparison to the forces of Iraq. The size of North Korea's ground forces are roughly equivalent to the size of Iraq's, and they share many of the same combat systems."⁸

One of these systems is, predictably, chemical and biological weaponry. "The north," warned Riscassi "also presents a significant chemical and biological threat." Another similarity is a supply of Scud missiles. In the midst of the Gulf War, the U.S. reported that North Korea had violated the U.N. sanctions by sending Scud missiles to Saddam Hussein.⁹



Associated Press

Waves of tear gas at Songyang University in Seoul in November as students call for Pres. Roh Tae Woo's resignation.

and able to wreak havoc on the New World Order which the U.S. is painstakingly mapping and enthusiastically policing.

While the Saddam/Kim typecasting is almost laughable, the lumping together of North Korea and Iraq cannot be so easily dismissed. If the Gulf War serves as any indication of the manner in which countries deemed hostile to U.S. security interests are to be dealt with in the "New World Order," the parallels being drawn between North Korea and Iraq are ominous. Since Bush declared an end to the Gulf War, the immense propaganda machine which so effectively laid the groundwork for war against Iraq has turned its sights toward North Korea.

One chord in the Gulf propaganda chorus which is resonating in Korea is composed of the inflated assessment of military capabilities, the exaggeration of hostile intentions, and the predictions of doomsday. Commander of U.S. Forces Korea General Robert W. Riscassi (who also serves as commander-in-chief of the United Nations Command and the

North Korea immediately issued a vehement denial and denounced the U.S. for circulating slanderous and provocative rumors. No sources have corroborated this U.S. attempt to establish direct military connections between North Korea and Iraq.

On May 21, the House of Representatives voted not to reduce defense spending or to place a cap of 30,000 on the number of U.S. troops in South Korea.

Although the voting pattern was similar to last year's, the rhetoric was "far more alarmist and rhetorical," according to the Korea Church Coalition (KCC). Last year, Rep. Stephen Solarz (D-N.Y.) considered re-evaluating U.S. commitment to South Korea and even raised the possibility of making the peninsula a nuclear free zone. This year, however, he warned of a "North Korean threat" and suggested that the U.S. troops

6. Interview by author, April 26, 1991.

7. United Press International sent out a wire story on April 16 entitled "North Korea's Kim Il Sung: The Next Saddam Hussein?"

8. General Robert W. Riscassi, statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 13, 1991.

9. "S. Korea put on Full Military Alert against N. Korea," Reuters, February 3, 1991: "[North Korea] is reportedly providing military assistance to Iraq in violation of the current U.N. arms embargo." See also: Leonard S. Spector and Jacqueline R. Smith, *Arms Control Today*, "North Korea: The Next Nuclear Nightmare?" March 1991, p. 8.

would never completely leave the peninsula.

"At a time when no one can preclude the possibility of another act of aggression by North Korea against South Korea," said Solarz, "the last thing we want to do intentionally or unintentionally is send a signal to Pyongyang that we might be in the process of withdrawing eventually all of our forces from South Korea."¹⁰

Rep. John Kasich (R-Ohio) was also concerned about sending the right message. "If trends remain as they are," he said fervently, "we may be looking at the next Saddam Hussein in North Korea... We do not want to give [Kim Il Sung] an April Glaspie-type message... The North Koreans are developing a nuclear capability with a nutcase as the head of that country... The entire world had better wake up to what is going on in North Korea before we have to put 500,000 troops over there at some point and subject them to what could be weapons of mass destruction."¹¹

lauded "democratic" gains under President Roh Tae Woo, the number of political prisoners under Roh's Republic has reached an all-time high, surpassing even his infamous predecessors, General Chun Doo Hwan and Park Chung Hee. Incidents of torture, labor repression, and crackdown on pro-reunification and democratization forces have sparked widespread protests. Since April 26 when a student demonstrator was bludgeoned to death by riot police, five students have self-immolated¹³ and thousands have filled the streets demanding Roh's resignation.

The Role of the Press

The U.S. media, fresh from its collaborative role in the Gulf War, seems intent not only on toeing the administration's line, but on pushing it to extremes. Suddenly, there is a proliferation of articles and opinion pieces warning about North Korea. The *New York Times* led off with an op-ed by

"The North Koreans are developing a nuclear capability with a nutcase as the head of that country... The entire world had better wake up to what is going on in North Korea before we have to put 500,000 troops over there..."

—Rep. John Kasich (R-Ohio)

Double Standard on Human Rights

Another parallel between North Korea and Iraq is that both are on the State Department's list of terrorist countries (which also includes Cuba, Syria, Libya and Iran). Both countries have been widely criticized for gross human rights violations. Given the manipulation of human rights reports in the days leading up to the Gulf War,¹² it is worth noting that U.S. media and policymakers have been showing increased interest in the human rights situation in North Korea. In a typical statement, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights Richard Schifter, at a February 2 press conference issuing the State Department's 1990 Human Rights Report, denounced North Korea as one of the world's "most systematically repressive countries."

Yet the U.S. has maintained an impressive silence on human rights abuses in South Korea. While the U.S. has

Leslie H. Gelb in which he branded North Korea "the next renegade state." "What country with 23 million people run by a vicious dictator," he queried, "has missiles, a million men under arms and is likely to possess nuclear weapons in a few years?"¹⁴ David Sanger raised the twin specters of a destabilized Asia and a nuclear war citing unattributed estimates putting North Korea four to five years away from developing a crude atomic bomb. "If true, Mr. Kim is already closer to becoming a nuclear power than Mr. Hussein ever was. And that prospect figures in virtually every disaster scene that the Americans, Japanese, and now even the Soviets dream up about the balance of power in Asia in the 1990s."¹⁵

A few days later, the *Times* editorial, "Don't Demonize North Korea," suggested that the U.S. could offer "reassurance, not threat" and help reduce tensions "by withdrawing a few American nuclear weapons." Any positive

10. *Congressional Record*, May 21, 1991, p. H3319.

11. *Op. cit.*, p. H3341.

12. After more than a decade of documenting Iraq's human rights abuses, Amnesty International's reports were assigned front-page importance only when they served the interests of the war machine in quieting dissent and influencing public sentiment in favor of the war.

13. Park Seung-hee, 19 (Kwang-ju) is still in critical condition. Kim Young-kyun, 19 (Andong), Chun Sei-yong, 20 (Seoul), Kim Ki-sol, 27 (Sogang University) and Yoon Young-su, 20 (Kwang-ju) all died of burns.

14. Leslie H. Gelb, "The Next Renegade State—It's in Asia, not the Mideast," *New York Times*, April 10, 1991.

15. David E. Sanger, "Building Secrets: Jittery Asia Has Visions of a Nuclear North Korea," *New York Times*, April 7, 1991.

statements were virtually negated by the lead sentence, repeating Gelb's terminology: "North Korea is fast replacing Iraq as the world's number one nuclear renegade."¹⁶

The *Wall Street Journal* and *Washington Post*¹⁷ echoed the warnings and the issue has trickled down through the media. Numerous reports have appeared noting North Korea's refusal to allow International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections of its nuclear facilities, as required under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) which it signed in 1985. While factually accurate, the media have failed to explain that the North's position (which on May 20 it hinted might be revised), is in protest against the massive nuclear arsenal in South Korea. "The exact nature of U.S. nuclear deployments in Korea is not openly acknowledged," said Selig Harrison. "Estimates suggest that the U.S. stores 60 nuclear gravity bombs for its F-16s at the Kunsan Air Base; 40 eight-inch and 30 155-millimeter nuclear artillery projec-

The Utility of Nuclear Threat

Recent hysterics over the North Korean nuclear threat should come as no surprise.²⁰ Real or not as a battlefield weapon, the nuclear issue legitimates U.S. policy and is an important weapon in the U.S. propaganda war. Recall the evolution of the Iraqi nuclear threat: In the early days of the Gulf crisis, the Bush administration tried to sell the U.S. public on the deployment of troops to Saudi Arabia as a defense of democracy, then as protection for U.S. jobs, and then, gropingly, as the savior of "the American way of life." After all these issues failed to whip up public support and pro-war frenzy, the administration finally hit a responsive chord when it raised the specter of Saddam as another Hitler with his finger on the nuclear button.

In the case of North Korea, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard H. Solomon went so far as to call "nuclear proliferation on the Korean penin-



Associated Press

May 1990. More than 20,000 rallied in Kwangju to protest Korean Government policies and U.S. intervention.

tiles and 21 atomic demolition mines. Although some Pentagon sources say privately that the number is smaller, none denies the existence of the arsenal."¹⁸

U.S. indignation over North Korea's failure to follow through on IAEA inspections is even more perplexing in light of recent history. In its November 1990 report, the IAEA determined that all Iraq's nuclear material was accounted for under safeguards and none had been diverted toward military use. This fact did not alter the U.S. assessment of Iraq's nuclear threat. North Korea is only one of several countries which has not followed through on inspection and China and France have refused to sign the NPT.¹⁹

sula...the number one threat to stability in East Asia."²¹ Nonetheless the Bush administration rejected North Korean feelers for negotiations on controlling nuclear weapons on the peninsula. "We cannot support," testified Solomon, "the creation of a nuclear free zone on the Korean peninsula, as proposed by the North Koreans."²²

While offering no serious proposals of its own, the U.S. has also rejected or ignored other North Korean suggestions for reducing tensions. These include reduction of forces in the North and the South in conjunction with a phased withdrawal of U.S. forces and a pullback of troops from the 38th

16. "Don't Demonize North Korea," *New York Times*, April 15, 1991.

17. "North Korean Nuclear Threat," *Wall Street Journal*, April 19, 1991; "Soviets Warn N. Korea on A-Controls," *Washington Post*, April 16, 1991.

18. Selig Harrison (Carnegie Institute for International Peace), "Political Alignments in the Two Koreas: The Impact of the American Presence," for a Conference on "The U.S.-South Korean Alliance: Time for a Change," sponsored by the Cato Institute, Washington, DC, June 21, 1990, p. 10.

19. Zachary S. Davis, "Non-Proliferation Regimes: A Comparative Analysis of Policies to Control the Spread of Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Weapons and Missiles," *Congressional Research Service Report for Congress*, April 1, 1991.

20. The most important point of contention among the three governments is a nuclear development facility at Yongbyon, roughly 50 miles north of Pyongyang. The U.S. alleges that satellite pictures have revealed the construction of a second reactor at the complex which, according to U.S. Undersecretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, will be used to extract plutonium from the reactor's uranium fuel, allowing the development of a crude nuclear weapon by the mid-1990s. (See Leonard S. Spector and Jacqueline R. Smith, "North Korea: The Next Nuclear Nightmare?," *Arms Control Today*, March 1991, p. 9.)

21. Gelb, *op. cit.*

22. House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Statement by Richard H. Solomon, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, March 6, 1991, p. 14.

Parallel by both sides.²³ Almost two months after Solomon's statement, Kim Il Sung renewed his proposal. "The test and production of nuclear weapons must be banned," he noted: "The existing nuclear weapons must be reduced and, further, all nuclear weapons must be completely abolished."²⁴

In place of negotiation and dialogue, the U.S. offered reassurances: "We pose no nuclear threat to North Korea," it soothed. Even Gelb, who called North Korea "perhaps the most dangerous country in the world today,"²⁵ admitted that the reassurance "was not much for President Kim to hang his hat on."²⁶ Furthermore, the projection by the JMNA report that any Korean conflict would fall under a mid-high intensity conflict designation directly contradicts the Bush promise. In

U.S. policy allows both Korean governments to maintain a siege mentality which justifies the use of dictatorial powers, the massive military buildup, and the suppression of popular dissent.

an inversion of reality, the administration blames the threat on North Korea, which at present possesses no nuclear weapons. "If there is a proliferation problem on the Korean peninsula," Solomon noted coyly — the U.S. neither confirms nor denies its own nuclear weapons — "the responsibility for it rests with the North Koreans."²⁷

North Korea is a country living under "ceaseless psychological assaults," notes Peter Hayes of Nautilus Pacific Research. "No other state has faced four decades of continuous nuclear threat — virtually the entire period of North Korea's

23. These proposals are documented in *Dialogue With North Korea*, Report of a Seminar on "Tension Reduction in Korea," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, 1981, Appendix 3, pp. 48-50.

24. The remarks, made at a conference in Pyongyang which included 25 South Korean representatives (the first legislative delegation to visit the North since the division in 1945), were quoted by both South Korean pool reporters and the official North Korean news agency, reported by C.W. Lim, Associated Press, "Korea-Nuclear," April 29, 1991.

25. Gelb, *op. cit.*

26. *Ibid.*

27. House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Statement by Richard H. Solomon, Assistant Secretary of State Bureau for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, March 6, 1991, p. 14.

The inconsistencies of the U.S. position are further compounded in its policy toward the development of nuclear energy. Rev. Ki-yul Chung, international secretary of the International Committee for Peace and Reunification of Korea, commented on the "utter hypocrisy" of the U.S. and South Korea, which he says has nine nuclear reactors and plans to build 50 more in the next 40 years.

independent existence — without a countervailing nuclear retaliatory capability of its own or allied deployments in its own territory."²⁸

The Real Parallels

The Gulf War is the first U.S. adventure in the New World Order. As such it establishes a precedent for subsequent handling of perceived threats to U.S. interests with a show of massive force. Given the short-term "success" of the operation, few doubt that other adventures will follow.

It seems preposterous at first to think that the world could be on the verge of witnessing a second Korean War, but when such a conflict is viewed by Washington movers and shakers

"No other state has faced four decades of continuous nuclear threat without a countervailing nuclear retaliatory capability of its own or allied deployments in its own territory."

as a second *Gulf War*, the prospects become far less inconceivable. In order to grasp the full significance of U.S. policy toward North Korea, however, it is necessary to consider the context not only of the Persian Gulf war but also of the Korean War and of the subsequent 40 years of Cold War hostilities.

Of several Korean/Gulf war analysts, former officer and now critic of the CIA, Philip Agee placed the issues in the most comprehensive framework, drawing not only parallels between the two wars but examining both their impact on U.S. foreign and domestic policy. "Bush is trying to use the Gulf crisis, as Truman used the Korean War," he argued, "to justify what some call military Keynesianism as a solution for U.S. economic problems. This is using enormous military expenditures to prevent or rectify economic slumps and depressions, while reducing as much as possible spending on civilian and social programs."²⁹

Bruce Cumings, professor of East Asian and International History at the University of Chicago, argues that in the years immediately following the end of World War II, as the U.S. came to define the Korean peninsula as vital to its security interests, a policy current emerged which "sought its national solution in a separated southern Korean state, behind which

28. Peter Hayes, *Pacific Powderkeg: American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1991), p. 123.

29. Philip Agee, "Producing the Proper Crisis," *Z Magazine*, November, 1990, p. 56.

could be drawn lines of containment and confrontation and within which could be shaped a society whose *raison d'être* would be anticommunism.³⁰

Cumings' most recent attempt to document the U.S. role in Korea, the six-part PBS documentary "Korea: The Unknown War" aired in November 1990. It encountered right-wing pressure, censorship and CIA intervention. "Under pressure from Reed Irvine's 'Accuracy in Media,' Austin Hoyt [executive producer for WGBH, the public television station which was responsible for the program], vetted our film for 'accuracy' through Mr. Stilwell."³¹ This process was, according to Cumings, "rather like vetting a Vietnam War documentary through William Colby or another CIA operative in Vietnam."³²

The CIA, no doubt, keeps its watchful eye on its Korean interests. It can hardly be dismissed as coincidence that the present U.S. Ambassador to South Korea, Donald Gregg,³³ and his predecessor, James Lilley,³⁴ are both longtime CIA men. They spent a combined 57 years in the Agency. The CIA hand in disinformation and propaganda at home regarding Korea has recently shown itself in the controversy surrounding the building of a Korean War Veterans' Memorial in Washington, DC.³⁵

Domestic Dissent

The same motives for U.S. intervention in Korea in the 1950s apply in the 1990s. The U.S. continues to require South Korea, its only foothold on the Asian mainland, as a virtual client state to guarantee a hospitable home for permanent bases. Access to South Korea's markets and cheap labor are added perks. The relationship requires not only the maintenance of the *status quo* division and North/South hostilities, but also elevating North Korea to the level of world menace.

At the same time, U.S. policy allows both Korean governments to maintain a siege mentality which justifies the use of

dictatorial powers, the massive military buildup, and the suppression of dissent.

Strong opposition in South Korea to this growing belligerence has all but been ignored by the U.S. The *Hankyoreh Shinmun*, an independent South Korean daily, gave front-page coverage to the JMNA report. The April 13, 1991 story sparked immediate widespread citizen protests. On April 15, five major opposition groups held a joint news conference in which they criticized the U.S. and

South Korean governments for "an archaic way of thinking which is crushing the Korean people's desire for reunification" at a time when there are "some bright possibilities for improvement in south-north relations." The group, which included labor, students, and democratization groups, wanted an apology from the U.S. government and the firing of the South Korean defense minister. It launched a mass campaign to gather 10 million signatures demanding a nuclear free zone on the Korean peninsula. Each of the three major South Korean opposition parties also issued a statement that any policies which increase tensions on the Korean peninsula must be revoked.

Various organizations in the U.S. have also addressed the role of the U.S. in the 40-year war on the Korean peninsula and have taken up the call to work for peace. The Korea Coalition, the Korea Support Network, the International Committee for Peace and Reunification of Korea, and Young Koreans United represent various efforts by peace and anti-nuclear activists, churches, and concerned Korean-Americans to educate and mobilize action around the Korean issue. Ongoing projects include collecting endorsers for a resolution to change U.S. policy toward Korea (for lobbying Congress), sponsoring a peace march across the 38th Parallel, and constantly struggling to raise awareness and keep Korea from disappearing from the peace agenda.

"We do not want a war in Korea, the Mideast, or anywhere else in the world," said Helen Beichel, of the Korea Coalition in Washington, DC. "We must take preventive measures now by working to change U.S. domestic and foreign policies which perpetuate the use of force by our government." ●

For more information contact: *Korea Support Network*, 33 Central Ave., Albany, NY 12210 (518)434-4037.



Department of Defense
Operation Team Spirit parachutes
into Korea for annual war

30. Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), p. xxiv.

31. Gen. Richard Stilwell, Far East chief for the CIA's covert arm in the 1950s and 1960s, and Under-Secretary of Defense under Reagan.

32. "Cumings Comments on 'Korea: The Unknown War' and the Gulf Conflict," *Korea Update*, No. 102, Nov.-Dec., 1990, p. 26.

33. Donald Gregg was Vice-President Bush's National Security advisor. Under Reagan he was implicated as a key player in the Iran-Contra scandal. Gregg had close personal relations with Felix Rodriguez, the CIA's and Oliver North's operative in El Salvador.

34. From 1951-1964, Lilley was a CIA officer in Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, Cambodia, and Thailand. He was station chief in Beijing 1973-75 and was ambassador to Korea from 1986 until Gregg took over that position. He recently resigned as U.S. ambassador to China and was being seriously considered for the post of Director of Central Intelligence.

35. Four architects from Pennsylvania State University have sued to prevent government efforts (spearheaded again by former CIA Far East Chief of covert operations Gen. Richard Stilwell) to alter their prize-winning design. They issued a statement on Dec. 13, 1990, saying that "a small group of powerful individuals is attempting to dismiss the truth of the Korean War and to substitute a persuasive false commodity." (See *Korea Update*, No. 103, p. 25.)

The Bush Administration and U.S. Exports to Iraq

Trading With the Enemy

Jack Colhoun

For over the last decade, Saddam strengthened the sinews of his war machine through a sophisticated network of front companies and agents. Through it he got weapons, spare parts, machine tools, and raw materials necessary to sustain his militarized state.¹

— John Robson, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury

It's hard to believe that the U.S. intelligence community or that of our allies did not know about the application of technology being transferred to Iraq.²

— Henry Gonzalez, Chair of the House Banking Committee

United States policy in the Persian Gulf over the last decade has been a breeding ground for scandal. At the same time as Ronald Reagan was reviling Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and the Iranian revolution, his administration was secretly providing arms to that country. George Bush has continued the tradition. Only shortly before condemning Saddam as "worse than Hitler," his administration was helping Iraq build its military-industrial infrastructure. In fact, right up to August 1, 1990, the day before Iraqi troops moved into Kuwait, the Bush administration approved the export of U.S. high technology with dual—civilian or military—applications.

House Banking Committee chair Rep. Henry Gonzalez (D-Texas) charges the Reagan and Bush administrations did little to stop the export of U.S. technology to build the Iraqi war machine because of the pro-Baghdad tilt of U.S. policy in the Gulf prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

The Bush administration inherited its pro-Baghdad policy from the Reagan administration, which considered Iraq a critical geopolitical counterbalance to Iran. In both cases, support for Iraq was designed to contain the spread of Islamic fundamentalism in the Gulf in the wake of the consolidation of the Khomeini regime in Tehran. Under the rule of the Shah, Iran had been Washington's chief geopolitical ally in the Gulf.

Although it played both sides, Washington quietly allied itself with Baghdad in the bloody Iran-Iraq war (1980-88), in which as many as one million Iranians and Iraqis were killed or injured. Then CIA Director William Casey began to pass U.S. satellite intelligence to Iraq in 1984 to aid Iraqi bombing raids in Iran. The Reagan administration re-established diplomatic relations with Iraq in 1984. A U.S. naval armada in 1987 escorted Kuwaiti tankers carrying Iraqi oil through the Gulf to protect the ships from Iranian attacks. This policy of escorting Kuwaiti vessels reflagged with U.S. colors continued even after an Iraqi missile hit the USS Stark on May 17, 1987, killing 37 U.S. sailors.³

The Reagan administration took Iraq off its list of countries alleged to sponsor terrorism in 1982. "As a result of the 1982 policy change, Iraq was treated like all other "Free World" countries and became eligible for a range of U.S. high technology items including a broad category of computer equipment generally denied to other countries remaining on the terrorist list," according to Dennis Kloske, Under-Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration in the Bush administration.⁴

Stephen Bryen, former deputy undersecretary of defense for trade and security policy and director of the Defense Technology Security Administration, summed up the Reagan administration's policy toward Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war. "The U.S. was eager to develop good relations with Iraq, and

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1. John Robson, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, statement, April 1, 1991.

2. Statement on the floor of the House of Representatives, February 4, 1991.

3. Jack Colhoun, "Congress Irked as Iraq Reveals U.S. 'Kid Gloves,'" *Guardian*, October 3, 1990.

4. Dennis Kloske, statement, hearings before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, April 8, 1991.

trade was the keystone of that policy," asserted Bryen.⁵

The Bush administration continued to view Baghdad as a force for geopolitical stability in the Gulf after Iraq emerged in August 1988 as "victor." When Iraq used poison gas against a Kurdish uprising in August and September 1988, the administration fought off a move in Congress to impose economic sanctions on Iraq.

President Bush continued Reagan's emphasis on good trade relations. In October 1989, he signed National Security Directive 26 "the thrust of [which]...was that the U.S. should keep trying to moderate Iraq's behavior and increase American influence. Specifically, U.S. companies would be encouraged to participate in the postwar reconstruction of Iraq."⁶

As late as July 25, 1990, as Iraq was massing troops on the Kuwaiti border, April Glaspie, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, told Saddam "I have a direct instruction from the President to seek better relations with Iraq." Glaspie added, "We have no opinion on Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait."

The Revolving Door

The relationship between U.S. foreign policy strategists and commercial planners was a cooperative one and the mesh of their respective goals was close. The two sets of interests intersected in the Washington-based U.S.-Iraq Business Fo-

"The U.S. was eager to develop good relations with Iraq, and trade was the keystone of that policy."

rum. Set up by Marshall Wiley in 1985 with the encouragement of Iraqi ambassador to the U.S. Nizar Hamdoon, the Forum became a "revolving door" for former U.S. diplomats with experience in the Middle East. It lobbied in Washington on behalf of Iraq to promote U.S. trade with Iraq. Wiley was U.S. ambassador to Oman and served in the U.S. Interests Section in Baghdad in 1975-77.

5. Stephen Bryen, testimony, hearings before the House Banking Committee, April 9, 1991.

6. Don Oberdorfer, "Missed Signals in the Middle East," *Washington Post Magazine*, March 17, 1991.



UPI/Bettmann

President Reagan meets with Bechtel officials including Bechtel Group President George Shultz (second from right) and lobbyist Charles Walker (far right). September 1980, Middleburg, Virginia.

"I started the Forum. It wasn't the Iraqis' idea. But when I put it up to the Iraqis, they said they liked the idea and said they'd cooperate with me," Wiley explained. "I went to the State Department and told them what I was planning to do, and they said 'Fine. It sounds like a good idea.' It was our policy to increase our exports to Iraq."⁷

The Forum, which worked closely with the U.S. Embassy in Iraq, sponsored a trade mission for member companies and twice rented booths at the U.S. pavilion at the Baghdad International Fair. Wiley, an annual visitor to Iraq, arranged in 1989 for senior U.S. executives to meet with Saddam.⁸

U.S. companies wanting to do business with Iraq were required by the Iraqi government to join the Forum. Member companies (including Amoco, AT&T, Caterpillar, First City Bancorporation of Texas, General Motors, Mobil Oil, Pepsi Cola International and Westinghouse) were mobilized on different occasions to lobby Congress in support of pro-Iraq policies. Wiley wrote a letter to the editor of the *Washington Post* in one lobbying effort opposing economic sanctions against Iraq for gassing the Kurds.⁹ Member dues funded the operating budget for the Forum.

The relationship between the U.S. government and the Forum was strengthened by close ties to the State Department. Wiley, who served as president of the Forum, was joined by former State Department officials Richard Fairbanks and James Placke, who acted as "advisers" to the Forum. Fairbanks' last assignment at the State Department

7. Marshall Wiley, interview with author, April 9, 1991.

8. Marshall Wiley, statement, hearings before the House Banking Committee, April 9, 1991.

9. Marshall Wiley, letter to the editor, *Washington Post*, October 20, 1988.

was to head Operation Staunch. (Although this operation was set up during the Iran-Iraq War to enforce a U.S.-led arms embargo against Iran, with the cooperation of the Israelis, the U.S. began secret arms deals which led to the Iran-Contra scandal.) Placke last served as a deputy assistant secretary of state for near eastern affairs. Fairbanks, who had a contract with the Iraqi Embassy, also served as an official representative of the Iraqis in Washington.¹⁰

The National Interest

The close relationship between private enterprise and government is being examined anew in light of an extensive pattern of sales of U.S. military technology which ended up being aimed back at U.S. troops. In a February 21, 1991 speech on the House floor, Rep. Gonzalez raised questions about the role of the State Department and former Secretary of State Shultz with regard to Iraq. The Texas representative

"...something is going to go very wrong in Iraq...if Bechtel were there it would get blown up, too."

cited an interview in the *Financial Times* of London in which Shultz explained his involvement with the Bechtel Corporation's contract to manage the construction of Iraq's Petrochemical 2 (PC2) plant. Bechtel was one of many U.S. businesses which contributed to the development of Iraq's military-industrial infrastructure.

Shultz left his job as a top Bechtel executive when he became Secretary of State in the Reagan administration and returned to Bechtel in 1989. Shultz said that he looked into the PC2 project in 1989 and was assured that it had nothing to do with chemical weapons. But Bechtel's PC2 project was built to manufacture ethylene oxide, a substance with civilian applications, which is also a chemical precursor for mustard gas. An unnamed Bechtel official in London indicated that Bechtel had received "direct encouragement" from the U.S. Commerce Department to take on the job.

"But I thought about it a little more and I gave my advice [that Bechtel] should get out," Shultz told the *Financial Times*. At a Bechtel board meeting in the spring of 1990, Shultz stated, "I really hit it very hard and I said something is going to go very wrong in Iraq and blow up and if Bechtel were there it would get blown up, too. So I told them to get out."¹¹ Bechtel subsequently left Iraq.

10. Marshall Wiley, statement, April 9. See also: Joe Conason, "The Iraq Lobby," *New Republic*, October 1, 1990; Murray Waas, "What We Gave Saddam for Christmas," *Village Voice*, December 18, 1990; *Los Angeles Times*, February 13, 1991; and *Wall Street Journal*, December 7, 1990.

11. *Financial Times*, February 21, 1991.

The BNL-Atlanta Connection

The Bechtel contract for the PC2 project provides a direct link to the Atlanta branch of the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL), the largest in Italy. Rep. Gonzalez' House Banking Committee is now investigating the BNL-Atlanta scandal and has identified it as the hub of a clandestine Iraqi arms procurement network operating in the U.S. "Our client, the government of Iraq, told us we would be paid through letters of credit from the BNL-Atlanta branch," the Bechtel official in London noted.¹² House Banking Committee investigators have discovered Bechtel was paid \$10 million by BNL-Atlanta for a "technical service agreement - PC2."¹³

Christopher Drougal, manager of BNL-Atlanta, and two other officials of the Atlanta bank were indicted by a federal grand jury in Atlanta on February 28, 1991 on charges of making more than \$4 billion in unauthorized loans to Iraq between 1985 and 1989. The three officials were also charged with conspiring to keep two sets of books in order to conceal the unauthorized loans from auditors of BNL in Italy and the Federal Reserve Board in the U.S. BNL was Iraq's biggest source of private credit.

BNL-Atlanta, the Matrix-Churchill Corporation in Cleveland, Ohio,¹⁴ and Bay Industries, Inc., in Santa Monica, California, were identified by the Treasury Department April 1, 1991 as part of an international network of front companies utilized by Iraq to procure arms and military technology.

BNL-Atlanta provided \$2.2 billion in loans to Iraq between February 1988 and April 1989, designated for the purchase of western equipment and high-technology products. "Much of this technology transfer went into civilian projects. Much did not," asserted a House Banking Committee background paper on BNL. "The full truth behind the uses of this technology may never be known. One thing is sure: BNL money was the lifeblood of Iraqi efforts to establish an industrial base and to become self-sufficient in the production of various armaments."¹⁵ The main function of the Iraqi network, which exported products to Iraq directly, was to identify businesses able to provide Iraq with needed technology. The front companies would put U.S. or European corporations in touch with key people in Iraq responsible for various projects. BNL loaned funds directly to the members

12. *Ibid.*

13. "Background on the BNL Loans to Iraq," House Banking Committee report, distributed at April 9, 1991 hearing.

14. A House Banking Committee report cited Matrix-Churchill as an example of how the Iraq arms network functioned: "Upon gaining control of...Matrix-Churchill, a procurement division was established within the company. The procurement side of the company received its orders, mostly in Arabic, directly from Baghdad. It was apparently charged with finding other U.S. companies that would build industrial plants in Iraq. Matrix-Churchill would help find U.S. contractors to build a fiberglass plant and [a] sophisticated cutting tool plant in Iraq. The tool plant may have been used to manufacture parts with nuclear applications, while reports link the fiberglass plant with the production of missiles." (Staff Report, "The Role of Banca Nazionale Del Lavoro in Financing Iraq," House Banking Committee, February 1991.)

15. "Background on the BNL Loans to Iraq," *op. cit.*

of the Iraqi network, but most BNL loans were extended to companies recruited by the network to export goods and services to specific projects in Iraq.¹⁶

An Italian intelligence report dated September 14, 1989, shared with the Bush administration, linked BNL-Atlanta money to Iraq's Condor 2 missile program. "It should be underlined that various domestic and foreign companies involved in the Condor 2 missile project have been helped thanks to the financial operations conducted by the BNL-Atlanta branch" concluded a September 14, 1989 report by SISMI, the Italian intelligence service, to Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti.¹⁷

"It's hard to believe that the U.S. intelligence community or that of our allies did not know about the application of technology being transferred to Iraq," Gonzalez declared. "It is also hard to believe BNL escaped the attention of the intelligence community. These organizations monitor overseas telexes and phone conversations. Did they fail to discover the over 3,000 telexes between BNL and Iraqi government agencies, many providing information detailing loans to companies that were building the Taji [weapons] complex and other military-related projects within Iraq."¹⁸

Milo Minderbinder in Charge

The commercial links between the U.S. and Iraq operated through both private financial and governmental networks and were extensive in both the Reagan and Bush administrations. From January 1, 1985 through August 2, 1990, the Commerce Department approved 771 license applications for exports of U.S. products to Iraq—many with possible military applications—valued at \$1.5 billion.

With the end of the Iran-Iraq war, the U.S. was well positioned to cash in on Iraq's ambitious post-war reconstruction plans. A Commerce Department report on economic trends in Iraq, dated September 1989, encouraged U.S. businesses to do just that: "The best prospects for American firms in the near term will include agricultural products, health care products and equipment, pharmaceutical, oilfield and refinery equipment, computers and other high-technology goods and services... The procurement of military hardware will continue to be a major import item as Iraq replenishes its military hardware and attempts to maintain its technical superiority through state-of-the-art weaponry and logistical supplies."¹⁹

16. *Ibid.*

17. Quoted in Lionel Barber and Alan Friedman, "A Fatal Attraction: Arms to Iraq," *Financial Times*, May 3, 1991.

18. Rep. Henry Gonzalez (D-Tex.), chair of the House Banking Committee, in a statement on the floor of the House of Representatives, February 4, 1991. See also: Jack Colhoun, "Secret U.S. Arms Network Built Iraqi Arsenal," *Guardian*, March 20, 1991 and Jack Colhoun, *U.S.-Iraq Scandal: Will Victory Flag Cover Bush?* *Guardian*, March 27, 1991.

19. "Foreign Economic Trends and Their Implications for the United States," Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, September 1989.

U.S. exports to Iraq grew to nearly \$1.5 billion a year by 1989, including about \$1 billion in agricultural products underwritten by loans and credit from the Agriculture Department's Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC).²⁰

An October 16, 1989 memorandum by the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta dramatically underscored how Iraq was using the CCC's farm export program to augment its military arsenal. "Iraq admitted that it routinely receives

BNL money was the lifeblood of Iraqi efforts to establish an industrial base and to become self-sufficient in the production of various armaments.

internal 'after sales services' such as armored trucks from suppliers," the memo warned. "These after sales services might be construed as kickbacks which the U.S. Agriculture Department warned Iraq in 1988 were in violation of the CCC program."²¹

Some trade, such as the \$695,000 sale of sophisticated computer equipment approved by the Bush administration on August 1, 1990, was dual-use technology. Other deals were overtly military. One particularly blatant example was a sale involving ballistic missiles. A.M. Doud (consignee in Iraq) was approved for an export license on March 22, 1990 by the Commerce Department. "Description: photographic equipment (specified). End use: scientific research on projectile behavior and terminal ballistics. \$10,368."²²

A list of Commerce Department-approved exports to Iraq reveals that a total of \$154,124,068 of U.S. products were sold to the Iraqi military. For example, U.S. exports were sold to the Ministry of Defense (\$62,988,678), the Iraqi Air Force (\$49,035,079) and the Government of Iraq (\$8,200,000). These products included aircraft, helicopters and engines (\$87,592,533), compasses, gyroscopes and accelerometers for aircraft (\$1,036,530) and navigation, radar and airborne communications equipment (\$516,758).

The Commerce Department list of approved U.S. exports to Iraq indicates \$226,235,416 worth of U.S. technology was sold to Iraqi Airways, which was later identified by the Treasury Department as a front company for a clandestine Iraqi

20. "Approved Licenses to Iraq," March 11, 1991, Department of Commerce, Bureau of Export Administration.

21. *Financial Times*, *op. cit.*, May 3, 1991.

22. A Commerce Department list of export licenses approved to Iraq, released March 11, 1991. An asterisk notes: "State Department determined that no foreign policy controls applied; returned without action."

arms procurement network. The Commerce Department approved the sale of \$178,230,073 to Iraqi Airways of aircraft, helicopters and engines, \$148,199 of navigation, \$28,463,241 of aircraft parts, boats, diesel engines, underwater cameras and submersible systems and \$246,455 of navigation, radar and airborne communications equipment.²³

The Commerce Department will not release the names of companies which exported goods to Iraq, but news reports shed light on the role U.S. businesses played in helping Iraq develop its military-industrial infrastructure.

- **Lummus Crest** of Bloomfield, N.J. worked on the PC2 chemical project.²⁴
- **Alcolac International** of Baltimore sold **NuKraft Mercantile Corporation** of Brooklyn, NY, thiodiglycol, which it in turn sold to Iraq. Thiodiglycol is used in the production of mustard gas.²⁵
- **Hughes Aircraft Co.** of Los Angeles exported battlefield night vision devices to **Delft Instruments of Holland**, which in turn delivered the equipment to the Iraqi government. Hughes is a division of **General Motors**.²⁶
- U.S. companies played a significant role in the development of Saad 16, an Iraqi complex which designed missiles and conducted nuclear weapons research. As much as 40% of the equipment used at Saad 16 was manufactured in the U.S.: computers sold by **Hewlett-**

Packard Co., oscilloscopes from **Tektronix Inc.** and microwave measuring devices from **Wiltron Co.**²⁷

- Among other materials now at Saddam Hussein's disposal are \$200 million of helicopters supplied — ostensibly for civilian use, the company says — by the **Bell Helicopter** unit of **Textron Inc.** There's a plant that makes machine tools capable of weapons making, built by **XYZ Options Inc.**, of Tuscaloosa, Alabama. In addition, the company last year sent Iraq a powder press that according to a confidential Customs Service document is "suitable for the compaction of nuclear fuels," the *Wall Street Journal* commented.²⁸

Staying the Course

When the National Advisory Council met in the White House November 8, 1989, Under-Secretary of State Robert Kimmitt stressed the need to stay the course. Iraq was "very important to U.S. interests in the Middle East," Kimmitt stated, adding Baghdad was "influential in the peace process" and was "a key to maintaining stability in the region, offering great trade opportunities for U.S. companies."²⁹

By that time, evidence that Iraq was using U.S. exports to build Saddam Hussein's war machine could no longer be ignored. But on orders from the State Department, and the White House, the administration maintained its trade-based tilt toward Baghdad until Iraqi troops occupied Kuwait. •

23. *Approved Licenses to Iraq*, *Op. cit.*

24. *Washington Times*, April 27, 1990. See also: Jack Colhoun, "Before War, Iraq Was 'Irresistible,'" *Guardian*, March 13, 1991.

25. *New York Times*, January 31, 1989.

26. *Associated Press*, February 21, 1991.

27. *Wall Street Journal*, December, 7, 1990. See also: *Wall Street Journal*, February 28, 1985.

28. *Ibid.*

29. *Ibid.*

Walkie-Talkie Mischief

CAIB has learned that during a visit to Washington earlier this year, Arkady Murashev, Boris Yeltsin's lieutenant, was taken to a Washington, DC *Radio Shack* store to buy walkie-talkies. His guide was John Exnicios, executive director of the Washington-based far right Center for Freedom and Democracy. Through its parent, the Free Congress Foundation (FCF), the U.S. right wing has developed close working relations with Yeltsin's opposition grouping, the Inter-Regional Deputies Group (IRG).

On March 28 in Moscow, the four walkie-talkies were used to coordinate a large demonstration promoting Boris Yeltsin and calling for Gorbachev's resignation.

While relatively insignificant in itself, this purchase exemplifies two trends: the alliance between the U.S. right and Yeltsin, and the pattern of U.S.-organized political and economic destabilization used against the Soviet Union. (See CAIB, Fall 1990)

Since IRG's founding in mid-1989, Yeltsin has been propelled from relative political insignificance to the presidency of the Russian Republic. As CAIB reported, "IRG has also served as a source of right-wing pressure on Gorbachev to

dismantle socialism and the Soviet Union itself." In several intensive training sessions held in various Soviet cities, FCF has provided IRG's leadership and followers a broad range of "intensive indoctrination [including:] levels of tactics, strategy, goals, and decision making," and about "how free enterprise operates," and much more.

An AP article in the Christmas Day 1990 *Washington Post* repeated charges by Soviet officials that the U.S., while officially supporting Gorbachev and *perestroika*, was at the same time undermining his position. Headlined "U.S. Rejects Charges by KGB Chief," the undated story cited State Department deputy spokesperson Richard Boucher. He rejected as "unfounded and inaccurate" charges made three days previously by the KGB chairman, Vladimir Kryuchkov.

"There are attempts from abroad," he told the Soviet Congress, "to exert overt and covert pressure on the Soviet Union and to impose doubtful ideas and [derail] plans to pull the country out of the difficult situation. All these efforts often screen a desire to strengthen not so much us but their own position in our country."

The walkie-talkies were purchased with a 1990 grant to the Free Congress Foundation from the National Endowment for Democracy.

— Louis Wolf •

Sowing Disorder, Reaping Disaster

Jane Hunter

Voice of Free Iraq (VOFI) began broadcasting on New Year's Day.¹ Media accounts said that thousands of small radios were being smuggled into Iraq under an authorization signed by President Bush in August for the conduct of psychological warfare operations.² On January 24, ABC's "Nightline" reported that psyops teams from Fort Bragg were handing out radios and leaflets.

Even as he bombed their cities, George Bush called on Iraqis to rise up and overthrow Saddam Hussein. VOFI, a clandestine radio station established by the CIA and Saudi intelligence near Jiddah, Saudi Arabia,³ cheered on the uprising. Then, on March 26, as Iraqi helicopter gunships quashed the sporadic revolts, the Bush administration said it would not interfere.⁴ VOFI continued advocating insurrection.

It is unclear why the broadcasts continued. *The Nation* suggested that the administration wanted to grind down the Iraqi government without attaching itself to any particular faction.⁵ It is even less clear why transcriptions of VOFI's broadcasts were published in the Foreign Broadcast Information Service's (FBIS) daily reports, available at libraries across the U.S.⁶ FBIS reports are distributed by the Commerce Department, but it is widely known and even officially acknowledged that their contents—radio, television and newspaper reports from around the globe—are translated, compiled and often judiciously edited by the CIA.

Just days after Bush's March 26 announcement of a ceasefire, anyone reading the FBIS "Daily Report" for the Near East and South Asia could discover that VOFI was still on the air. On April 3, as over a million panicked Kurds fled their homes, "NBC Nightly News" said it had confirmed that VOFI was a CIA operation.

Asked April 7 about the reports of psychological warfare on "Meet the Press," National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft stonewalled: "I'm not going to talk about intelligence operations but I will say that the policy was consistent in all its aspects."⁷

A VOFI broadcast two days later suggested that the administration was, if not repentant, at least embarrassed: "The revolution erupted spontaneously, without any organization or grouping and without any organized leadership to instigate or steer the masses," asserted a VOFI commentary, aired so that "the people's intifadah against Saddam and his gang should be clearly defined...free from the image which the coverage of some of the Western information media sometimes tends to give it."⁸

April 17, Bush said: "...do I think that the United States should bear guilt because of suggesting that the Iraqi people take matters into their own hands with the implication being given by some that the United States would be there to support them militarily? That was not true. We never implied that."⁹

Dr. Firiad Hiwaizi, a Kurdish expatriate, admitted he was recruited by Saudi intelligence to work for the station, which he said was managed by Ibrahim al-Zubaidi, a former head of Iraqi state radio who had been living in the U.S.¹⁰ Hiwaizi also said he would not have accepted the job without assurances of Saudi and U.S. backing. His Saudi recruiters told him: "we will support you financially, and when the time comes, we will support you militarily."¹¹ Iraqi opposition leader and former foreign minister Talib al-Shibib said, "This is a CIA-British-Saudi operation."¹²

VOFI might have been a collective enterprise, but it was seldom out of sync with Washington. Following the bombing of the Amariya shelter in Baghdad, it quoted a U.S. military source in Riyadh saying that the U.S. was reconsidering its targets to prevent a recurrence of the tragedy.¹³

On April 12, VOFI changed its name: "Out of desire for increased cohesion of our masses who are opposed to the defeated regime, and to affirm the opposition of all Iraqis to the rule of the despot Saddam Husayn [sic] and his clique, it has been decided to change the name of this radio to Voice of the Iraqi Opposition..." The announcer claimed to be broadcasting from Baghdad. At press time in late May, transcripts of the "Voice" were still appearing in FBIS. ●

1. AP, January 2, 1991.

2. *New York Times*, January 19, 1991.

3. *Ibid.*, April 6 and April 16, 1991.

4. *Ibid.*, March 27, 1991.

5. *The Nation*, April 15, 1991.

6. Other VOFI broadcasts, especially those in the days following the administration's disavowal of the uprising, were published by the British counterpart of FBIS, the BBC Monitoring Service, according to the April 6 *New York Times*.

7. "Meet the Press," April 7, 1991.

8. VOFI 1500 UCT, April 9, 1991, FBIS-NES, April 11, 1991, p. 17.

9. "Excerpts From Bush's News Conference: Relief Camps for the Kurds in Iraq," *New York Times*, Wednesday, April 17, 1991, p. A12.

10. *Op. cit.*, n. 8, April 6, 1991.

11. Barton Gellman, "Kurds Contend U.S. Encouraged Rebellion Via 'Voice of Free Iraq'," *Washington Post*, April 9, 1991, p. A17.

12. *Op. cit.*, n. 8, April 16, 1991.

13. *Ibid.*, 1500 UCT, Feb. 14, 1991; FBIS-NES February 15, 1991, p. 28.



Associated Press

The Myth of the Clean War

Paul Rogers

Operation Desert Storm lasted six weeks, with almost the whole of that period comprising an air assault against targets in Iraq and Kuwait. When the ground war started, on February 24, the Iraqi forces soon attempted to retreat, but many were destroyed in the process, especially on two roads leading north out of Kuwait City towards Iraq.

Alongside the "precision war" of the laser-guided bombs and pinpoint missiles, there was a second type of war. It was fought with munitions specifically designed to kill and injure people on the widest scale possible. There has been almost as great a revolution in these so-called "area-impact munitions"—the successors to napalm—as in precision-guided weapons. Their use was largely censored during the war—sometimes *by* and sometimes *from* the media. Some details, however, are now emerging. Also becoming apparent are the huge implications that further development and proliferation of these weapons will have for the future conduct of war.

This Time, No Body Count

Throughout the war, coalition military emphasized the low level of casualties. Indeed, while detailed figures were given

for the destruction of tanks, artillery and other equipment, little was said about the loss of life. Strenuous efforts were made to present a picture to the media of a war which destroyed equipment rather than human beings. Reporting concentrated on the use of high-technology, precision-guided munitions which could hit individual missile sites, runways or other military targets but which caused little or no "collateral damage."¹ (See p. 28)

The basis of much of this reporting—since pooled reporters were unable to view the damage—was extensive video footage made available by the military. Invariably these clips showed the destruction of targets which appeared completely deserted. By the end of the air war, most viewers in the United States and Britain had become convinced that the use of precision-guided warfare presaged a new, "clean," and more civilized form of warfare. In reality, the footage released to the media was carefully selected to promote this view, primarily to ensure continuing public support for the war. If it were known that Iraqis were being killed by the thousands each day, such support might well have waned.

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1. "The new Stealth aircraft and precision munitions made it possible to devastate military targets while sparing citizens alongside. The limitation of collateral damage is surely to be encouraged." *Wall Street Journal* editorial, "Collateral Damage," March 27, 1991, p. 14.



Associated Press

The photo on the left, widely disseminated, revealed the extent of damage to military materiel. Missing were bodies and evidence of the thousands of casualties shown in the photo above—one of the few that slipped through Pentagon censorship to document clearly the horrific devastation to human beings as well as to machines.

On only two occasions during the air war were there well publicized indications of the high level of casualties. One was the bombing of the Amariya shelter in Baghdad on February 13 when more than 500 civilians were killed. The other was a report of a British raid on a bridge at the city of Falluja, where a bomb missed its target and hit a market area. In the former case, the Pentagon made strenuous efforts to insist that the shelter had a military function, and in the latter case there was little publicity given in the United States.

There were occasional incidents when this media control slipped. One example was an interview on BBC-TV's main evening news bulletin when its Defense Correspondent, David Shukman, mentioned that he had seen footage of an attack on a bridge in which vehicles were destroyed, but noted that this film was not being released by the military for showing to the public.²

Only after the war ended were there indications that many tens of thousands of people had been killed and injured. While this revelation had some impact in Europe, it was submerged in the euphoria and triumphalism that gripped the United States for several weeks.

2. BBC-TV1 Nine O'Clock News, Saturday, February 16, 1991. A feature of the BBC's war coverage was the practice of interviewing specialist correspondents live during major news bulletins. On occasion, these were particularly informative as some of the more knowledgeable correspondents were able to give their personal assessments in unscripted interviews.

The Extent of Casualties

For the first two weeks of the war, both Iraqi and coalition sources played down the extent of casualties. The coalition aim was probably to minimize humanitarian concern among its own populations. The Iraqis, hoping to maintain domestic morale, were intent on giving the impression that they were standing up well to the air assault.

By about the fourth week of the war, there were indications of considerable Iraqi civilian casualties, including Iraqi Red Crescent estimates of at least 7,000 killed. While these were frequently discounted by coalition sources, there were persistent reports from refugees arriving in Iran of heavy damage to cities in southeast Iraq, especially Basra.³

As the war came to an end, estimates of casualties among the Iraqis rose rapidly, not just because of the intensity of conflict in the closing four days, but also because some coalition sources were starting to give briefings on the effects of the war, not least to indicate the extent of the victory.

On March 1, immediately after the cease-fire, a Saudi military source quoted a casualty figure of 65,000 to 100,000

3. In January, months before the extent of the refugee problem became public and elicited surprise from the Bush administration, the United Nations Disaster Relief Office (UNDRO) issued a report. It cited Turkish sources that 200,000 Iraqis were massed at the border with Turkey awaiting entry. Another 80,000 were reported enroute. UNDRO had requested \$175 million for refugee camps. As of late January only \$56 million had been pledged, including \$38 million by Japan and \$3 million by the U.S. ("Agencies Brace for Tide Of Refugees From Iraq," *Washington Post*, January 30, 1991, p. A26.)



Of Men And Machines

With few exceptions, the horror of war emerged in the mainstream press only after the conflict had ended. On April 8, the *New York Times* reported on a battle which had occurred on February 27, a day before the ceasefire.

Accounting of materiel destroyed was precise. "When the 40 minute battle was over, American tanks and aircraft had destroyed 60 T-72 tanks, 9 Iraqi T-55 tanks and 38 Armored personnel carriers."

This accuracy was not extended to casualties. Col. Montgomery Meiggs gave the only indication of the extent of death: because the tanks "exploded and burned fiercely," he said, "it means there were not a whole lot of bodies."

The *Times* article described the massacre as "a showcase for the superiority of American-made weapons and tactics over Iraq's Soviet-designed arms and static defense...a one-sided victory...an impressive tableau of destruction." It portrayed a battle in which the Iraqis stayed and fought with "bravery," but were slaughtered in position since their weapons did not have the range of the U.S. arsenal. According to a U.S. Sergeant, they "didn't have a chance to return our fire."

Many U.S. soldiers were horrified by the slaughter — a reaction missing from reports published during the war. "Young American soldiers," wrote the *Times* two months after the event, "accustomed to destroying wooden tank targets at test ranges said they were astounded to see the Iraqi tanks turn into fireballs."

Another soldier evoked images of Hell. "It was like driving through Dante's inferno," said Lieut. Bill Feyk. Sergeant First Class Larry Porter commented: "We have all had a chance to call our wives and most of the guys could not talk about it to them. I don't think my wife needs to know what took place out here. I do not want her to know that side of me."

Nor, apparently, was it a side of the war that the Pentagon was eager to let the public know. — T. Allen

(Quotes are from: Michael Gordon, "G.I.'s Recall Destruction of Powerful Iraqi Force," *New York Times*, April 8, 1991, p. A6.)

Iraqis⁴ and two days later, the London *Observer's* Middle East correspondent put the figure at 100,000 killed and injured.⁵ By mid-March, these estimates were being revised upwards, with the *Christian Science Monitor* reporting estimates of 100,000 to 200,000 Iraqi dead⁶ and the London *Independent* suggesting that up to 190,000 Iraqi soldiers were not readily accounted for.⁷

Although no official counts have yet been made public, four things are reasonably clear: the Iraqis suffered many tens of thousands of casualties; military casualties are more clearly documented than civilian casualties; the full extent of those civilian casualties is still extremely difficult to judge but may be well over ten thousand; and possibly hundreds of thousands more people may die in the coming months as a result of the evisceration of the infrastructure.

Use of Ordnance

While some casualties were caused by precision-guided ordnance, these "smart weapons" made up a very small proportion of the total ordnance used. According to Air Force Chief of Staff General Merrill McPeak, 6,520 out of 88,500 tons of bombs dropped by U.S. planes on Iraq and occupied

**Alongside the "precision war,"
was a second type of war fought
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on the widest scale possible.**

Kuwait were precision-guided weapons, barely 7 percent of the total. Of these, 90 percent hit their intended targets whereas only 25 percent of the conventional bombs did so.⁸

Figures for the British forces show a rather higher proportion of precision-guided munitions. Some 3,000 tons of ordnance were dropped including 6,000 bombs of which 1,000 were laser-guided.⁹

The intensity of coalition bombing on Iraqi forces was substantially greater than that inflicted by the U.S. in the

4. Unnamed officer reported on BBC Radio News bulletins, March 1, 1991.

5. Julie Flint, "The Real Face of War," *The Observer*, London, March 3, 1991, p. 9.

6. "The Gulf Success," editorial in *Christian Science Monitor* (weekly edition), Boston, March 15-21, 1991, p. 20.

7. Christopher Bellamy, "Arithmetic of death in the wake of the Gulf conflict," *Independent*, London, March 20, 1991, p. 7.

8. Barton Gellman, "About 70 Percent of Coalition's Bombs Missed Their Targets," *International Herald Tribune*, Paris, March 18, 1991, pp. 1 and 4.

9. "Proceedings of the House of Commons Defence Select Committee," London, March 6, 1991, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London.

Vietnam War. While most of the ordnance was free-fall bombs, area-impact munitions were used on a far larger scale than in any previous conflict and were highly effective in an anti-personnel mode.

Area-Impact Munitions

Like napalm and the early cluster weapons, modern area-impact munitions are designed to spread their destructive force over a wide area rather than concentrate their energy on a precise target. This objective is normally achieved in one of two ways: by producing a cloud or mist of explosive potential which is then detonated, such as a fuel-air explosive (FAE), or by dispersing a large number of sub-munitions or "bomblets" from a container prior to being detonated, as with a cluster bomb.¹⁰

Although napalm and fuel-air explosives were used in the conflict, the main area-impact munitions were cluster bombs and multiple-launch rocket systems fitted with sub-munitions. A new form of the Tomahawk sea-launched Cruise missile was also used, which was fitted with sub-munitions rather than a single high-explosive charge.

Fuel-Air Explosives

Reports that the coalition dropped napalm and fuel-air explosives emerged right at the end of the war. In an FAE, high-energy fuels such as butane, propylene oxide or propadiene are dispersed from canisters to produce aerosol clouds which then explode rather than just burn. The blast overpressures are several times greater than those for similar weights of conventional explosives and FAEs have a devastating effect on bunkers and silos, and also on people. Typical FAE blast overpressures are 200 pounds per square inch (psi). Humans can withstand up to 40 psi.

FAEs were reportedly used in the war to detonate mines. Unofficial sources indicated that the production of aerosol clouds which could penetrate into trenches made them especially useful in killing infantry. Their use against troops is corroborated by a normally well-informed defense source¹¹ which reported that they were first used on February 14 by the U.S. Marine Corps against an Iraqi Army position. In this instance, the FAEs were probably the CBU-72 200 kilogram bombs made of three BLU-73B canisters of ethylene oxide.

In addition to FAEs, U.S. forces also dropped the massive 15,000 pound BLU-82/B slurry bomb, known as "Big Blue" or the "Daisycutter." This weapon contains the specialized explosive, DBA-22M composed of ammonium nitrate, pow-



Associated Press

Ground crews worked round the clock loading bombs (including these 500-pound bombs) and missiles headed for Iraq and Kuwait.

dered aluminum and a polystyrene soap binding agent in an aqueous solution. It can produce blast overpressures of up to 1,000 psi, a force exceeded only by nuclear weapons.

Cluster Bombs and Missiles

Cluster bombs and missiles—most commonly the U.S. Rockeye and the British BL755—were much more widely used in the conflict than FAEs. The Rockeye II Mk 20 is a free-fall weapon weighing 222 kilograms. It spreads 247 bomblets over more than an acre, generating a devastating hail of nearly 500,000 high-velocity shrapnel fragments.

The British BL755 cluster bomb, produced by British Aerospace, was used extensively in the Falklands/Malvinas War in 1982 as well as in the recent Gulf War. This 277-kilogram weapon dispenses 147 bomblets over slightly less than an acre producing 300,000 anti-personnel fragments.

Cluster bombs have several advantages over napalm—now considered obsolete in most circumstances. Without the negative overtones of napalm in the public mind, they cause destruction and death on a larger scale with more control.

Full details of the U.S. use of cluster bombs in the Gulf are not yet available, although F-16As were reported to carry four Rockeye cluster bombs per sortie.¹² Those based at the Al-Kharg Air Base in Saudi Arabia as part of the 4th Tactical Fighter Wing (Provisional) were also reported to carry the CBU-52 cluster bomb unit and the more recent CBU-87 combined-effects cluster bomb in which the sub-munitions have a combined effect against armor and against people.¹³

Cluster bombs were also used extensively by the most modern long-range strike aircraft in the U.S. Air Force in-

10. The subsequent descriptions of area-impact munitions are taken from: Paul Rogers and Malcolm Dando, "Directory of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms and Disarmament, 1990" (especially Chapter 8 on Conventional Weapons of Mass Destruction), Tri-Service Press, London, 1990.

11. Caleb Baker, "Allies Lay Ground for Land Combat," *Defense News*, Washington, February 18, 1991, pp. 1 and 45.

12. Jeffrey M. Lenorovitz, "Air National Guard Unit's F-16 Pilots Say Small Arms Fire is Primary Threat," *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, Washington, February 25, 1991, pp. 42-44.

13. "F-16As Prove Useful in Attack Role Against Iraqi Targets in Desert Storm," *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, April 22, 1991, pp. 62-63.

ventory, the F-15E Strike Eagle. A typical patrol pattern against Scud missiles and their support vehicles involved two F-15Es, one equipped with four BGU-10 laser-guided bombs and the second carrying either six CBU-87 cluster bombs or 12 Mk 82 conventional high-explosive bombs. If the vehicles were spotted, the first plane would attempt to hit them with the laser-guided bombs. If this attack failed, the second plane would saturate the target with cluster bombs or high-explosive bombs. On other raids, F-15Es used three other types of cluster bomb including the Rockeye Mk 20.¹⁴

The trade of killing has been given a huge boost by the large-scale use of area-impact munitions in the Gulf War.

The cluster-munition version of the sea-launched Tomahawk Cruise missile (TLAM-D) was also used. It carried a total of 166 Aerojet BLU-97/B fragmentation sub-munitions which could be dispensed in three packages on different targets. Two hundred ninety-seven Tomahawks were fired during the war¹⁵ although most are believed to have been the non-cluster variant.

In addition to the U.S. Air Force and Marine Corps, the British Royal Air Force used BL755 cluster bombs as well. RAF Jaguar strike aircraft dropped the BL755 cluster bomb repeatedly. Targets included anti-aircraft artillery, communications facilities, Republican Guard units and even patrol craft.¹⁶

After the war, the Commander of the Marine Air Wing 3, Major General Royal N. Moore, Jr., singled out 2,000-pound conventional high-explosive bombs and Rockeye cluster bombs as being the ordnance which was of most value to the Wing during the war, not precise-guided munitions. "I'm afraid [analysts] will concentrate on the smart weapons, but without question it was the sustainability that won this one," he said, defining sustainability as the continuous accurate delivery by disciplined pilots of massive amounts of conventional, unguided "green bombs."¹⁷

14. "Air Crew Training, Avionics Credited for F-15E's High Target Hit Rates," *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, April 22, 1991, pp. 92-93.

15. "Tomahawks Strike 85 Percent of Their 242 Intended Targets in Gulf War," *Defense Daily*, April 3, 1991.

16. "United Kingdom Takes Key Role in Attacks Against Iraqi Targets," *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, Washington, February 18, 1991, pp. 47-48.

17. "Marines Attribute Success to Conventional Bombing," *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, April 22, 1991, pp. 92-93.

The Multiple-Launch Rocket System

The area-impact weapon with the most devastating effect is the Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS). Deployed by the U.S. and British armies, it consists of a self-propelled launcher-loader, a tracked vehicle which carries two pods of six missiles. The entire load of 12 missiles can be ripple-fired in less than 60 seconds with the fire control system allowing re-targeting between launches at approximately five second intervals. The 227 mm.-calibre solid-fuel rocket has a length of nearly 13 feet and a maximum range of about 20 miles.

The most common warhead used in the Gulf War was the M77 sub-munition, a grenade-sized bomblet with an anti-personnel and anti-armor capability. One salvo of 12 missiles from a launcher delivers nearly 8,000 bomblets over 60 acres. The system is the most devastating single conventional weapon in existence and was used in large numbers during the war.

A very recent variant is the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), also fired from an MLRS launcher, but at a rate of just two much larger missiles per launcher. The two can deliver nearly 2,000 sub-munitions to a range of up to 80 miles.

During the war, the U.S. Army fired more than 10,000 MLRS rockets,¹⁸ almost entirely in the Kuwait area. The British fired a further 2,500 rockets.¹⁹ The ATACMS system had not been deployed prior to the crisis, but some were rushed to the Gulf and 30 were fired.²⁰

Prospects for Proliferation

The public impression was that the war was fought with great precision, primarily against "real estate" rather than people. This distortion ignores the extensive use of area-impact munitions. Although less reported, this militarily significant aspect of the Gulf War contributed substantially to the very high level of Iraqi casualties.

Indeed, the trade of killing has been given a huge boost by the large-scale use of area-impact munitions in the Gulf War. One of the major military lessons learned will concern the use of these weapons. Their effectiveness in the Gulf is likely to lead to a much greater deployment of them in the future. Apart from major industrialized nations, countries such as Brazil, Chile, Argentina, South Africa, India and Iraq already produce cluster bombs and similar ordnance, and they, too, can understand and apply the lessons of the Gulf. The prospects for exercising arms control over these systems are small. We must expect them to proliferate, in the Middle East and elsewhere. One result will be that future major conflicts, wherever they may occur, are likely to be even more costly to human life.

18. Sarah A. Christy, "Army Says Its Weapons Worked Like Charms Against Saddam," *Defense Daily*, Washington, March 18, 1991.

19. Bellamy, *Op. cit.*

20. Bellamy, *Op. cit.*

Evangelicals for Nuclear War

Larry Jones

The "end of the world" has been an element of Christian mythology since before Christ's death. Most contemporary mainline churches in the U.S. and elsewhere have long since moderated this heavenly expectation, concentrating instead on the daily lives of believers. But the "end time" idea has retained all its fascination and power in a variety of U.S. protestant churches, primarily evangelical and fundamentalist in outlook. In the "Scopes Monkey Trial" of 1925, fundamentalism was made a national laughingstock by defense counsel Clarence Darrow's eloquence and *Baltimore Sun* reporter H.L. Mencken's whiplash sarcasm.

By 1980, fundamentalist evangelicalism had made a stunning cultural comeback. The Moral Majority's claims about its contribution to the Reagan/Bush presidential victory were overblown but based on demographic facts. Once in office, Reagan himself spoke casually of nuclear armageddon as possible because "it's in the Bible..." The close of the second millennium, or thousand years, since the first coming is certain to provoke an outpouring of end time expectation for the second coming of Christ. The reactions engendered by the Gulf War may offer a prelude of things to come.

Well before August 1990, many U.S. evangelical leaders were declaring the 1990s a "decade of destiny" or "the last decade." The war sparked a temporary upsurge in these millennial expectations. The ferment fits a pattern common in the post-World War II period: revivals followed the founding of Israel in 1948, the "Six-Day War" of 1967, and Israel's fortieth birthday in 1988.

Propheteering Today

During the last week in January, apocalyptic tracts and images incorporating Iraq and Saddam Hussein were prominently on display at the 1991 National Religious Broadcasters (NRB) Convention in Washington, DC. Apocalyptic writers with books in print had quickly recycled old work, updating it for the new war. This annual trade show of religious broadcasting, less than two weeks after the U.S. attack on Iraq, hosted more than 200 evangelical organizations marketing their products and services in a huge exhibition hall.

Religious entrepreneurs displayed sweatshirts emblazoned: "Get Ready for the Big One; Jesus is Coming." A couple in fatigues hawked copies of the 91st Psalm bound in desert camouflage titled: "The Ultimate Shield." Plastic "Old Glory" lapel pins and stickers that read "Support Our Troops," both distributed free by exhibitors, were worn with pride.

The convention showcased the U.S. evangelical response to the Gulf crisis. Many of the broadcasters in attendance were convinced that the war was the prelude to Armageddon; some thought the "tribulation period" had already begun; others expected imminent "rapture;" the prudent cautiously avoided speculation.

The published materials on sale fleshed out the reaction of evangelical leaders, and thus offered a preview of how the larger evangelical community would probably understand the war. For many evangelical writers, Iraq became the instantaneous equivalent of biblical Babylon—not the Babylon of history, but the Babylon of Daniel and the Apocalypse—a new cipher in their end-of-the-world calculus. Among the titles on display were: *I Predict the World in 1991; Armageddon, Oil, and the Middle East; Toward a New World Order; The Countdown to Armageddon; The Mid-East Wars—Who Will Win?; Storm in the Desert: Prophetic Significance of the Crisis in the Gulf; and Islam, Israel, and the Last Days.*

The New Focus of Evil in the World

As if to please, Saddam Hussein had conveniently identified himself with Nebuchadnezzar. His propaganda fit nicely with the evangelical obligation to interpret current events within the framework of biblical prophecy. As the new "Nebuchadnezzar," Saddam earned himself, virtually overnight, a starring role in evangelical expectations for the "Last Days."

In *The Rise of Babylon*,¹ Charles H. Dyer wrote:

God declares that he will destroy Babylon when he "will punish the world for its evil, the wicked for their sins" (Isaiah 13:11). From shortly after the time of the flood,

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1. Charles H. Dyer and Angela Elwell Hunt, *The Rise of Babylon; Sign of the End Times* (Wheaton, Illinois: Tyndale House, 1991).



In 1987, Jimmy Swaggart denounced Jim Bakker of the PTL Club as "a cancer in the body of Christ." A year later he was at the center of his own sexual scandal. He cultivates the friendship of dictators in U.S. client states, ignoring their human rights records and applauding their anti-communism.

Babylon has symbolized humanity's rebellion against God. When God destroys Babylon, he will destroy all of the evil in the world.²

Similar imagery and language were broadcast widely over evangelical networks during the war. Member organizations of the NRB control 90% of all religious broadcasting in the U.S., and some 80% of religious broadcasting worldwide.³ Within a few months, evil Iraq/Babylon became a part of U.S., and perhaps, worldwide evangelical culture. Although Iraq cast as evil Babylon fell neatly into the evangelical end-time melodrama, the United States stubbornly continued to resist a biblical role. The absence of any explicit reference to the U.S. in Isaiah, Daniel or other prophetic books has long troubled patriotic evangelicals, but has posed no major obstacles for their singularly circular logic. Pat Robertson, in *The Secret Kingdom*,⁴ suggested a possible reference in Ezekiel 38:13, which mentions the traders of Tarchish.

Dyer's response to the dilemma shows plodding determination: "But the United States is a major world power —

how could it not play a major role in the last days?" How indeed? Dyer offers several possible explanations, one of which is that because of the "rapture," which will whisk away "28 million American believers," the U.S. will suffer a sudden and total moral and geopolitical collapse, thereby rendering it irrelevant to the writers of biblical prophecy. While all his explanations suffer the ignominy of acknowledging the decline of U.S. power, directly contradicting the official view, they balance the believer's disappointment with the consolation fantasy of a "rapture," sparing evangelicals from the most unpleasant earthly realities.

One wonders whether the overwhelming U.S. victory may have provoked a considerable confusion of emotions among evangelicals, since patriotism and prophecy—both of fundamental importance—stand in near total contradiction. But the contradiction was not universal: although before Saddam took center stage the U.S. was often cast as Babylon, sunk in the satanic bogs of a vile secular humanism, in the current crisis some writers seemed to equate the U.S. with a wrathful Jehovah come to dispense divine retribution to the evil Babylon.

Prophecy prepared believers for an extremely violent Gulf War. A video called "Saddam Hussein, The Persian Gulf, and The End Times," produced in the fall of 1990 before the war began, predicted chemical and nuclear warfare and the final destruction of Iraq.

Bible verses about "Babylon" were cited as well as many more news clips about Saddam Hussein and Iraq. The lecturer, a mechanical engineer named Dr. Rob Lindsted, said he believed that the Bible predicted the destruction of "Babylon," by which he meant the annihilation of Iraq. The rather dull but bloody-minded presentation ended with the promise of rapture and a final altar call to anyone who had not yet "received Christ" during this "great time of excitement."

Evangelicals quickly became the chief religious apologists for the war against Iraq. Other Christian churches, Catholic and Protestant, refused to justify and support the war. Televangelist and 1988 Republican presidential hopeful Pat Robertson was already calling for air strikes against Iraq in August 1990. Robertson has visited the White House to consult with President Bush several times since the Iraqi invasion. Billy Graham stayed the night at the White House, praying with the commander in chief as the bombs began falling in Baghdad.

Welcoming Nuclear War

Evangelical apocalyptic literature after the Second World War has shown a casual disregard for the world. The earth is viewed as disposable, its destruction imminent. Apocalyptic writers seem to relish wars and environmental catastrophes as signs from God. Such a hostile attitude toward the world has clearly had political consequences. Following the agenda of U.S. political elites, this hostility has usually focused on one or two, or even a list, of official enemies. Communism, as a vast international (and supernatural) conspiracy, has served

2. *Ibid.*, p. 165.

3. Marjorie Stevens, ed., *The Directory of Religious Broadcasting* (Morristown, New Jersey: National Religious Broadcasters, 1990) p. 9.

4. Pat Robertson and Bob Slosser, *The Secret Kingdom; a Promise of Hope and Freedom in a World of Turmoil* (Nashville, Tennessee: Thomas Nelson, 1982) p. 214.

as the chief enemy of God in the post-war era.

The typical apocalyptic scenario often includes a nuclear war, triggered by a crisis in the Middle East. Nuclear war becomes the mechanism for resolving the conflict (between the believer and the world) at the heart of this end-time drama. It is also a possible mechanism for fulfilling prophecies of world destruction in the Apocalypse of John. Looked at this way, evangelical ideology can be understood as a religious response to nuclear weapons. As in the title of Jerry Falwell's 1983 tape set and pamphlet, "Nuclear War and the Second Coming of Jesus Christ,"⁵ the two events had become, Falwell wrote, "intimately intertwined." For Swaggart, prophecies of the apocalypse were also difficult to distinguish from contemporary politics. One of Swaggart's end of the world pamphlets was entitled *When God Fights Russia*.⁶

For believers, even the terrifying cloud of nuclear destruction has a silver lining: the Second Coming of Christ and the Millennial Kingdom. Belief in the rapture provides a magical escape from nuclear war, the cleansing fire needed to free the neighborhood of unrepentant backsliders, sinners and unbelievers. Popular dispensationalism thus retained its 19th century structure but took on a new, distinctly sinister emotional content after the Second World War.

Evangelical apocalyptic ideology embraces nuclear weapons as a potential source of salvation. Any guilt or remorse from U.S. use of nuclear weapons was projected onto the enemy (the evil Japanese Empire, "Communism," and in 1991 "Babylon"). Nuclear weapons were seen as a reasonable response to the satanic intentions of official enemies. Demonization justified the construction of huge nuclear arsenals. Huge arsenals made war seem inevitable. And the looming threat of war counted as yet another sign of the End Times.

Evangelicals were the first to call for the use of nuclear weapons against Iraq. Representative Dan Burton, (R-Ind.) a graduate of the Cincinnati Bible Seminary, urged that tactical nuclear weapons be used to destroy the Iraqi army in Kuwait. Cal Thomas, a Washington-based journalist who once worked for Jerry Falwell and the Moral Majority, echoed the congressman's call for nuclear war in syndicated newspaper articles and on television talk shows. For evangelical opinion leaders, the utter destruction of Iraq seemed not only



Doug Mills/Associated Press

Kennebunkport, September 2, 1990. Girding their loins. Reverend Billy Graham, spiritual counsellor to Richard Nixon through much of the Vietnam War, accompanies the president to the First Congregational Church.

likely but desirable because it could be construed as a fulfillment of prophecy and a godly act.⁷

Evangelicalism and fundamentalism constitute the fastest growing segment of the U.S. religious community, and have for some time. The ideology they promote, while limited in its appeal, vigorously disseminates one of the most virulent and implacable strains of U.S. militarism and xenophobia. Their "biblical" messages have injected an element of extreme irrationality into U.S. political discourse, and it would be shortsighted to discount the utility of these messages for those who are wielding real power. ●

7. Thomas writes a syndicated column for the *Los Angeles Times*, and the *Washington Times*, both of which published his "let's go-nuclear" views.

PUBLICATION OF INTEREST


Sara Diamond, *Spiritual Warfare; The Politics of the Christian Right* (Boston: South End Press, 1989), 292 pp.

Diamond examines the political clout of the Christian Right, from its multi-billion dollar broadcast industry to its counterinsurgent "missionary" work in the Third World. The book includes a thorough description of authoritarian "shepherding" churches, as well as analyses of Christian Right activism in the Republican Party, the mobilization of anti-feminist women, and efforts to delegitimize progressive Christianity. Required reading.

5. Jerry Falwell, pamphlet and tape set, *Nuclear War and the Second Coming of Jesus Christ* (Lynchburg, Virginia: Old Time Gospel Hour, 1983) introduction.

6. Jimmy Swaggart, *When God Fights Russia* (Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Jimmy Swaggart Ministries, 1983).

Iraqi Voices: The Human



Iraqi soldier begs for his life after capture at a roadblock on March 8 in Kuwait City. He was taken to an abandoned building.



Same man as at left. Moments after this photo was taken, the photographer was asked to leave by a Kuwaiti officer.

"My husband is a soldier in Basra. Since the war started, I haven't heard a word. I don't know if he is dead or alive.... I have three children and I pray no harm will befall their father. None of us is safe even in the city. I shudder at the thought of losing my husband. What will become of my children? Men wage war and don't care that we women have to endure its consequences." — Selma, housewife



"Oh God! I only wish the noise could stop. Even in a lull, it stays in my ears. I feel so sorry for my grandmother. I'm afraid she has gone insane. There is a vacant look in her eyes, which changes into accusation when the planes resume bombing. I'd never heard my grandmother curse. Now she curses Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the U.S., Bush, even God." — Hamida, student

"Since my husband was drafted into the army four months ago, my life has never been the same. When the bombardment started, it was as if the gates of hell were let loose and thousands of volcanic eruptions pounded our city [Baghdad] everywhere. My two daughters began crying and screaming. Although I was stunned, I jumped from my bed and took my frightened daughters to the corner of the room. I tried to protect them with my body and we huddled together. This became a routine, a daily ritual for us and for all Iraqi people." — Ghada, teacher



Human Cost of the Gulf War

"I think that the United States is testing its high-tech weapons on us. They do not care if they kill thousands of us because what is good for the military-industrial complex is good for the U.S. government. They do not understand, however, that this carnage will not bring peace to the Middle East. On the contrary, the Arab people will always speak about how the United States slaughtered thousands of Iraqis." — Huda, economist



"If the Americans want to liberate Kuwait, why are they destroying Iraq and killing our children? I am angry at the pilots who bomb our civilians. I think they'll be haunted by the slaughter they are causing. I have watched in stunned horror as the bodies of one neighborhood family—the parents and their five children—were pulled out of the rubble of their house. The bodies were badly disfigured and we could hardly identify the people. I don't know if the house was knocked down by a bomb or a missile. Let the American companies take all our oil. They just should stop this daily carnage." — Nawal, engineer



"Sometimes I turn on Voice of America for any sign of peace. God! I am dumbfounded to hear that 80% of Americans support the war. Why? Have we invaded the U.S.? Is Kuwait part of the U.S.? What have we done to the American people that they treat us as wild animals and do not care how many thousands of us die? I

was really angry when I heard that the Americans and British are sending teams to treat birds affected by the oil spill. My God! They have denied us food and medicine for seven months now and they go on slaughtering us, and yet they want to appear as soft-hearted and civilized. I do not understand their logic" — Mary, teacher



"The U.S., Great Britain and France made huge profits by selling us weapons. Now they are killing our people, ruining our homeland, and destroying those weapons they sold us. Believe me, when and if this bloody war ends, these countries will once again sell us their merchandise of death. I have no education and I just say what I think is common sense. Weapons are meant for war. Look at the Israelis. They have huge weapons; they always wage wars against the Arab people. Why does Bush support them?" — Umm Awni, housewife:

The photos in this essay are illustrations and do not show the individuals who are quoted. Their voices are from "Iraqi Women's Chronicle of War: Late January-Early February 1991," from information filtering out of Iraq via Jordan and from personal interviews. Excerpted from translations prepared by: Committee for the Defense of Human Rights in Iraq, P.O. Box 568, Spring Valley, CA 9176. Photos clockwise from top left: Associated Press (AP); AP; victim of Amiriya bombing; homes destroyed by bombing in Baghdad, Rick Reinhard; Kurdish refugees, Physicians for Human Rights; cormorant in Saudi Arabia, AP; casualty of U.S. bombing, AP; Iraqi mother pleads for release of her son taken away by Kuwaitis, AP.



Andrew Lichtenstein / Impact Visuals

Domestic Consequences of the Gulf War

Diana Reynolds

A war, even the most victorious, is a national misfortune.

—Helmuth von Moltke, Prussian field marshal

George Bush put the United States on the road to its second war in two years by declaring a national emergency on August 2, 1990. In response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Bush issued two Executive Orders (12722 and 12723) which restricted trade and travel with Iraq and froze Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets within the U.S. and those in the possession of U.S. persons abroad. At least 15 other executive orders followed these initial restrictions and enabled the President to mobilize the country's human and productive resources for war. Under the national emergency, Bush was able unilaterally to break his 1991 budget agreement with Congress which had frozen defense spending, to entrench further the U.S. economy in the mire of the military-industrial complex, to override environmental protection regulations, and to make free enterprise and civil liberties conditional upon an executive determination of national security interests.

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The State of Emergency

In time of war a president's power derives from both constitutional and statutory sources. Under Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution, he is Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. Although Congress alone retains the right to declare war, this power has become increasingly meaningless in the face of a succession of unilateral decisions by the executive to mount invasions.

The president's statutory authority, granted by Congress and expanded by it under the 1988 National Emergencies Act (50 USC §1601), confers special powers in time of war or national emergency. He can invoke those special powers simply by declaring a national emergency. First, however, he must specify the legal provisions under which he proposes that he, or other officers, will act. Congress may end a national emergency by enacting a joint resolution. Once invoked by the president, emergency powers are directed by the National Security Council and administered, where appropriate, under the general umbrella of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).¹ There is no requirement that Congress be consulted before an emergency is declared or

1. The administrative guideline was established under Reagan in Executive Order 12656, November 18, 1988, *Federal Register*, vol. 23, no. 266.



Commission of Inquiry for the International War Crimes Tribunal

The photo on the left was taken on New York's Lower East Side; above is the market at Basra, Iraq after U.S. bombings.

findings signed. The only restriction on Bush is that he must inform Congress in a "timely" fashion—he being the sole arbiter of timeliness.

Ultimately, the president's perception of the severity of a particular threat to national security and the integrity of his appointed officers determine the nature of any state of emergency. For this reason, those who were aware of the modern development of presidential emergency powers were apprehensive about the domestic ramifications of any national emergency declared by George Bush. In light of Bush's record (see p. 38) and present performance, their fears appear well-founded.

The War at Home

It is too early to know all of the emergency powers, executive orders and findings issued under classified National Security Directives² implemented by Bush in the name of the Gulf War. In addition to the emergency powers necessary to the direct mobilization of active and reserve armed forces of the United States, there are some 120 additional emergency powers that can be used in a national emergency or state of

war (declared or undeclared by Congress). The *Federal Register* records some 15 Executive Orders (EO) signed by Bush from August 2, 1990 to February 14, 1991. (See box, p. 40)

It may take many years before most of the executive findings and use of powers come to light, if indeed they ever do. But evidence is emerging that at least some of Bush's emergency powers were activated in secret. Although only five of the 15 EOs that were published were directed at non-military personnel, the costs directly attributable to the exercise of the authorities conferred by the declaration of national emergency from August 2, 1990 to February 1, 1991 for non-military activities are estimated at approximately \$1.3 billion. According to a February 11, 1991 letter from Bush to congressional leaders reporting on the "National Emergency With Respect to Iraq," these costs represent wage and salary costs for the Departments of Treasury, State, Agriculture, and Transportation, U.S. Customs, Federal Reserve Board, and the National Security Council.³

The fact that \$1.3 billion was spent in non-military salaries alone in this six month period suggests an unusual amount of government resources utilized to direct the national emergency state. In contrast, government salaries for one year of the state of emergency with Iran⁴ cost only \$430,000.

2. For instance, National Security Council policy papers or National Security Directives (NSD) or National Security Decision Directives (NSDD) have today evolved into a network of shadowy, wide-ranging and potent executive powers. These are secret instruments, maintained in a top security classified state and are not shared with Congress. For an excellent discussion see: Harold C. Relyea, "The Coming of Secret Law," *Government Information Quarterly*, Vol. 5, November 1988; see also: Eve Pell, "The Backbone of Hidden Government," *The Nation*, June 19, 1990.

3. "Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on the National Emergency With Respect to Iraq," February, 11, 1991, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents: Administration of George Bush*, 1991 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office), pp. 158-61.

4. The U.S. now has states of emergency with Iran, Iraq and Syria.

Bush Chips Away at Constitution

George Bush, perhaps more than any other individual in U.S. history, has expanded the emergency powers of presidency. In 1976, as Director of Central Intelligence, he convened Team B, a group of rabidly anti-communist intellectuals and former government officials to reevaluate CIA in-house intelligence estimates on Soviet military strength. The resulting report recommended draconian civil defense measures which led to President Ford's Executive Order 11921 authorizing plans to establish government control of the means of production, distribution, energy sources, wages and salaries, credit and the flow of money in U.S. financial institutions in a national emergency.¹

As Vice President, Bush headed the Task Force on Combatting Terrorism, that recommended: extended and flexible emergency presidential powers to combat terrorism; restrictions on congressional oversight in counter-terrorist planning; and curbing press coverage of terrorist incidents.² The report gave rise to the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986, that granted the President clear-cut authority to respond to terrorism with all appropriate means including deadly force. It authorized the Immigration and Naturalization Service to control and remove not only alien terrorists but *potential* terrorist aliens and those "who are likely to be supportive of terrorist activity within the U.S."³ The bill superceded the War Powers Act by imposing no time limit on the President's use of force in a terrorist situation, and lifted the requirement that the President consult Congress before sanctioning deadly force.



Pres. Bush and National Security Advisor Scowcroft chat about the war, in Kennebunkport Aug. 25, 1990.

From 1982 to 1988, Bush led the Defense Mobilization Planning Systems Agency (DMPSA), a secret government organization, and spent more than \$3 billion upgrading command, control, and communications in FEMA's continuity of government infrastructures. Continuity of Government (COG) was ostensibly created to assure government functioning during war, especially nuclear war. The

Agency was so secret that even many members of the Pentagon were unaware of its existence and most of its work was done without congressional oversight.

Project 908, as the DMPSA was sometimes called, was similar to its parent agency FEMA in that it came under investigation for mismanagement and contract irregularities.⁴ During this same period, FEMA had been fraught with scandals including emergency planning with a distinctly anti-constitutional flavor. The agency would have sidestepped Congress and other federal agencies and put the President and FEMA directly in charge of the U.S. planning for martial rule. Under this state, the executive would take upon itself powers far beyond those necessary to address national emergency contingencies.⁵

Bush's "anything goes" anti-drug strategy, announced on September 6, 1989, suggested that executive emergency powers be used: to oust those suspected of associating with drug users or sellers from public and private housing; to mobilize the National Guard and U.S. military to fight drugs in the continental U.S.; to confiscate private property belonging to drug users, and to incarcerate first time offenders in work camps.⁶

The record of Bush's fast and loose approach to constitutionally guaranteed civil rights is a history of the erosion of liberty and the consolidation of an imperial executive. ●

1. Executive Order 11921, "Emergency preparedness Functions, June 11, 1976. Federal Register, vol. 41, no. 116. The report was attacked by such notables as Ray Cline, the CIA's former Deputy Director, retired CIA intelligence analyst Arthur Macy Cox, and the former head of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Paul Warnke, for blatantly manipulating CIA intelligence to achieve the political ends of Team B's rightwing members. See Cline, quoted in "Carter to Inherit Intense Dispute on Soviet Intentions," Mary Marder, *Washington Post*, January 2, 1977; Arthur Macy Cox, "Why the U.S. Since 1977 Has Been Mis-perceiving Soviet Military Strength," *New York Times*, October 20, 1980; Paul Warnke, "George Bush and Team B," *New York Times*, September 24, 1988.

2. George Bush, *Public Report of the Vice President's Task Force On Combatting Terrorism* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office), February 1986.

3. Robert J. Walsh, Assistant Commissioner, Investigations Division, Immigration and Naturalization Service, "Alien Border Control Committee" (Washington, DC), October 1, 1988.

4. Steven Emerson, "America's Doomsday Project," *U.S. News & World Report*, August 7, 1989.

5. See: Diana Reynolds, "FEMA and the NSC: The Rise of the National Security State," CAIB, Number 33 (Winter 1990); Keenan Peck, "The Take-Charge Gang," *The Progressive*, May 1985; Jack Anderson, "FEMA Wants to Lead Economic War," *Washington Post*, January 10, 1985.

6. These Presidential powers were authorized by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Public Law 100-690: 100th Congress. See also: Diana Reynolds, "The Golden Lie," *The Humanist*, September/October 1990; Michael Isikoff, "Is This Determination or Using a Howitzer to Kill a Fly?" *Washington Post National Weekly*, August 27-September 2, 1990; Bernard Weintraub, "Bush Considers Calling Guard To Fight Drug Violence in Capital," *New York Times*, March 21, 1989.

Even those Executive Orders which have been made public tend to raise as many questions as they answer about what actions were considered and actually implemented. On January 8, 1991, Bush signed Executive Order 12742, National Security Industrial Responsiveness, which ordered the rapid mobilization of resources such as food, energy, construction materials and civil transportation to meet national security requirements. There was, however, no mention in this or any other EO of the National Defense Executive Reserve (NDER) plan administered under FEMA. This plan, which had been activated during World War II and the Korean War, permits the federal government during a state of emergency to bring into government certain unidentified individuals. On January 7, 1991 the *Wall Street Journal Europe* reported that industry and government officials were studying a plan which would permit the federal government to "borrow" as many as 50 oil company executives and put them to work streamlining the flow of energy in case of a prolonged engagement or disruption of supply. Antitrust waivers were also being pursued and oil companies were engaged in emergency preparedness exercises with the Department of Energy.⁵

Wasting the Environment

In one case the use of secret powers was discovered by a watchdog group and revealed in the press. In August 1990, correspondence passed between Colin McMillan, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Production and Logistics and Michael Deland, Chair of the White House Council on Environmental Quality. The letters responded to presidential and National Security Council directives to deal with increased industrial production and logistics arising from the situation in the Middle East. The communications revealed that the Pentagon had found it necessary to request emergency waivers to U.S. environmental restrictions.⁶

The agreement to waive the National Environmental Policy Act (1970) came in August. Because of it, the Pentagon was allowed to test new weapons in the western U.S., increase production of materiel, and launch new activities at military bases without the complex public review normally required. The information on the waiver was eventually released by the Boston-based National Toxic Campaign Fund (NTCF), an environmental group which investigates pollution on the nation's military bases. It was not until January 30, 1991, five months after it went into effect, that the *New York Times*, acting on the NTCF information, reported that the White House had bypassed the usual legal requirement for environmental impact statements on Pentagon projects.⁷ So far, no

specific executive order or presidential finding authorizing this waiver has been discovered.

Other environmental waivers could also have been enacted without the public being informed. Under a state of national emergency, U.S. warships can be exempted from international conventions on pollution⁸ and public vessels can be allowed to dispose of potentially infectious medical wastes into the oceans.⁹ The President can also suspend any of the statutory provisions regarding the production, testing, transportation, deployment, and disposal of chemical and biological warfare agents (50 USC §1515). He could also defer destruction of up to 10 percent of lethal chemical agents and munitions that existed on November 8, 1985.¹⁰

Bush used emergency powers to go "off budget," incur a deficit, and make the budget agreement a first casualty of the war.

One Executive Order which was made public dealt with "Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation." Signed by Bush on November 16, 1990, EO 12735 leaves the impression that Bush is ordering an increased effort to end the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. The order states that these weapons "constitute a threat to national security and foreign policy" and declares a national emergency to deal with the threat. To confront this threat, Bush ordered international negotiations, the imposition of controls, licenses, and sanctions against foreign persons and countries for proliferation. Conveniently, the order grants the Secretaries of State and the Treasury the power to exempt the U.S. military.

In February of 1991, the Omnibus Export Amendments Act was passed by Congress compatible with EO 12735. It imposed sanctions on countries and companies developing or using chemical or biological weapons. Bush signed the law, although he had rejected the identical measure the year before because it did not give him the executive power to waive all sanctions if he thought the national interest required it.¹¹ The new bill, however, met Bush's requirements.

Going Off-Budget

Although some of the powers which Bush assumed in order to conduct the Gulf War were taken openly, they received little public discussion or reporting by the media.

5. Allanna Sullivan, "U.S. Oil Concerns Confident Of Riding Out Short Gulf War," *Wall Street Journal Europe*, January 7, 1991.

6. Colin McMillan, Letter to Michael Deland, Chairman, Council on Environmental Quality (Washington, DC: Executive Office of the President), August 24, 1990; Michael R. Deland, Letter to Colin McMillan, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Production and Logistics (Washington, DC: Department of Defense), August 29, 1990.

7. Keith Schneider, "Pentagon Wins Waiver Of Environmental Rule," *New York Times*, January 30, 1991.

8. 33 U.S. Code (USC) §1902 9(b).

9. 33 USC §2503 1(b).

10. 50 USC §1521(b) (3)(A).

11. Adam Clymer, "New Bill Mandates Sanctions On Makers of Chemical Arms," *New York Times*, February 22, 1991.

BUSH'S EXECUTIVE ORDERS

- EO 12722 "Blocking Iraqi Government Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Iraq," Aug. 2, 1990.
- EO 12723 "Blocking Kuwaiti Government Property," Aug. 2, 1990.
- EO 12724 "Blocking Iraqi Government Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Iraq," Aug. 9, 1990.
- EO 12725 "Blocking Kuwaiti Government Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Kuwait," Aug. 9, 1990.
- EO 12727 "Ordering the Selected Reserve of the Armed Forces to Active Duty," Aug. 22, 1990.
- EO 12728 "Delegating the President's Authority To Suspend Any Provision of Law Relating to the Promotion, Retirement, or Separation of Members of the Armed Forces," Aug. 22, 1990.
- EO 12733 "Authorizing the Extension of the Period of Active Duty of Personnel of the Selected Reserve of the Armed Forces," Nov. 13, 1990.
- EO 12734 "National Emergency Construction Authority," Nov. 14, 1990.
- EO 12735 "Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation," Nov. 16, 1990.
- EO 12738 "Administration of Foreign Assistance and Related Functions and Arms Export Control," Dec. 14, 1990.
- EO 12742 "National Security Industrial Responsiveness," Jan. 8, 1991.
- EO 12743 "Ordering the Ready Reserve of the Armed Forces to Active Duty," Jan. 18, 1991.
- EO 12744 "Designation of Arabian Peninsula Areas, Airspace and Adjacent Waters as a Combat Zone," Jan. 21, 1991.
- EO 12750 "Designation of Arabian Peninsula Areas, Airspace and Adjacent Waters as the Persian Gulf Desert Shield Area," Feb. 14, 1991.
- EO 12751 "Health Care Services for Operation Desert Storm," Feb. 14, 1991.

In October, when the winds of the Gulf War were merely a breeze, Bush used his executive emergency powers to extend his budget authority. This action made the 1991 fiscal budget agreement between Congress and the President one of the first U.S. casualties of the war. While on one hand the deal froze arms spending through 1996, it also allowed Bush to put the cost of the Gulf War "off budget." Thus, using its emergency powers, the Bush administration could:

- incur a deficit which exceeds congressional budget authority;
- prevent Congress from raising a point of order over the excessive spending;¹²

12. 31 USC §10005 (f); 2 USC §632 (i), 6419 (d), 907a (b); and Public Law 101-508, Title X999, sec. 13101.

- waive the requirement that the Secretary of Defense submit estimates to Congress prior to deployment of a major defense acquisition system;
- and exempt the Pentagon from congressional restrictions on hiring private contractors.¹³

While there is no published evidence on which powers Bush actually invoked, the administration was able to push through the 1990 Omnibus Reconciliation Act. This legislation put a cap on domestic spending, created a record \$300 billion deficit, and undermined the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act intended to reduce the federal deficit. Although Congress agreed to pay for the war through supplemental appropriations and approved a \$42.2 billion supplemental bill and a \$4.8 billion companion "dire emergency supplemental appropriation,"¹⁴ it specified that the supplemental budget should not be used to finance costs the Pentagon would normally experience.¹⁵

Lawrence Korb, a Pentagon official in the Reagan administration, believes that the Pentagon has already violated the spirit of the 1990 Omnibus Reconciliation Act. It switched funding for the Patriot, Tomahawk, Hellfire and HARM missiles from its regular budget to the supplemental budget; added normal wear and tear of equipment to supplemental appropriations; and made supplemental requests which ignore a planned 25% reduction in the armed forces by 1995.¹⁶

The Cost In Liberty Lost

Under emergency circumstances, using 50 USC §1811, the President could direct the Attorney General to authorize electronic surveillance of aliens and American citizens in order to obtain foreign intelligence information without a court order.¹⁷ No Executive Order has been published which activates emergency powers to wiretap or to engage in coun-

13. 10 USC §2434 /2461 9F.

14. When the Pentagon expected the war to last months and oil prices to skyrocket, it projected the incremental cost of deploying and redeploying the forces and waging war at about \$70 billion. The administration sought and received \$56 billion in pledges from allies such as Germany, Japan and Saudi Arabia. Although the military's estimates of casualties and the war's duration were highly inflated, today their budget estimates remain at around \$70 billion even though the Congressional Budget Office estimates that cost at only \$40 billion, \$16 billion less than allied pledges.

15. Michael Karnish, "After The War: At Home, An Unconquered Recession," *Boston Globe*, March 6, 1991; Peter Passell, "The Big Spoils From a Bargain War," *New York Times*, March 3, 1991; and Alan Abelson, "A War Dividend For The Defense Industry?" *Barron's*, March 18, 1991.

16. Lawrence Korb, "The Pentagon's Creative Budgetry Is Out of Line," *International Herald Tribune*, April 5, 1991.

17. Many of the powers against aliens are automatically invoked during a national emergency or state of war. Under the Alien Enemies Act (50 USC §21), the President can issue an order to apprehend, restrain, secure and remove all subjects of a hostile nation over 13 years old. Other statutes conferring special powers on the President with regard to aliens that may be exercised in times of war or emergencies but are not confined to such circumstances, are: exclusion of all or certain classes of aliens from entry into the U.S. when their entry may be "detrimental to the interests of the United States" (8 USC §1182(f)); imposition of travel restrictions on aliens within the U.S. (8 USC §1185); and requiring aliens to be fingerprinted (8 USC §1302).

The military often staged events solely for the cameras and would stop televised interviews when it did not like what was being portrayed.



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ter-terrorist activity. Nonetheless, there is substantial evidence that such activities have taken place. According to the New York-based Center for Constitutional Rights, the FBI launched an anti-terrorist campaign which included a broad sweep of Arab-Americans. Starting in August, the FBI questioned, detained, and harassed Arab-Americans in California, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Maryland, and Colorado.¹⁸

A CIA agent asked the University of Connecticut for a list of all foreign students at the institution, along with their country of origin, major field of study, and the names of their academic advisers. He was particularly interested in students from the Middle East and explained that the Agency intended to open a file on each of the students. Anti-war groups have also reported several break-ins of their offices and many suspected electronic surveillance of their telephones.¹⁹

Pool of Disinformation

Emergency powers to control the means of communications in the U.S. in the name of national security were never formally declared. There was no need for Bush to do so since most of the media voluntarily and even eagerly cooperated in their own censorship. Reporters covering the Coalition forces in the Gulf region operated under restrictions imposed by the U.S. military. They were, among other things, barred from traveling without a military escort, limited in their forays into the field to small escorted groups called "pools," and required to submit all reports and film to military censors for clearance. Some reporters complained that the rules limited their ability to gather information independently, thereby obstructing informed and objective reporting.²⁰

Three Pentagon press officials in the Gulf region admitted to James LeMoyne of the *New York Times* that they spent significant time analyzing reporters' stories in order to shape the coverage in the Pentagon's favor. In the early days of the deployment, Pentagon press officers warned reporters who asked hard questions that they were seen as "anti-military" and that their requests for interviews with senior commanders and visits to the field were in jeopardy. The military often staged events solely for the cameras and would stop televised interviews in progress when it did not like what was being portrayed.²¹

Although filed soon after the beginning of the war, a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of press restrictions was not heard until after the war ended. It was then dismissed when the judge ruled that since the war had ended, the issues raised had become moot. The legal status of the restrictions—initially tested during the U.S. invasions of Grenada and Panama—remains unsettled.

A National Misfortune

It will be years before researchers and journalists are able to ferret through the maze of government documents and give a full appraisal of the impact of the President's emergency powers on domestic affairs. It is likely, however, that with a post-war presidential approval rating exceeding 75 percent, the domestic casualties will continue to mount with few objections. Paradoxically, even though the U.S. public put pressure on Bush to send relief for the 500,000 Iraqi Kurdish refugees, it is unlikely the same outcry will be heard for the 37 million Americans without health insurance, the 32 million living in poverty, or the country's five million hungry children. The U.S. may even help rebuild Kuwaiti and Iraqi civilian infrastructures it destroyed during the war while leaving its own education system in decay, domestic transportation infrastructures crumbling, and inner city war zones uninhabitable. And, while the U.S. assists Kuwait in cleaning up its environmental disaster, it will increase pollution at home. Indeed, as the long-dead Prussian field marshal prophesied, "a war, even the most victorious, is a national misfortune." ●

18. See: Ann Talamas, "FBI Targets Arab-Americans," *CAIB*, Spring 1991, p. 4.

19. *Anti-Repression Project Bulletin* (New York: Center for Constitutional Rights), January 23, 1991.

20. Jason DeParle, "Long Series of Military Decisions Led to Gulf War News Censorship," *New York Times*, May 5, 1991.

21. James LeMoyne, "A Correspondent's Tale: Pentagon's Strategy for the Press: Good News or No News," *New York Times*, February 17, 1991.

Disposable Asset Burned by North's Network

"Not the America I Knew"

David S. Fallis

Kansas: Memorial Day weekend, 1990. The station wagon erupted in flames, shattering the twilight Sunday calm. The brilliant orange pulled Joe Dunlap out of his chair, out to his daughter's car ablaze in the driveway. The acrid smell of plastic and metal hung in the air.

Dunlap, a federal investigator for the Topeka Public Defender's office, believed someone was getting nervous about damage control and arson was their way of warning him to back off his client's case.

Dunlap was starting to believe that Little Rock businessman Terry Reed was involved with far more than simple insurance fraud.

Reed's claims about "Oliver North taking my plane" and "that Iran-contra stuff" gained credibility in the light of the fire. "I'm innocent," Reed had told him. "I've got nothing to hide." And that's something nobody considered when they set out to frame a former CIA operative for saying no.

Project Donation

A patriotic Terry Reed left the Air Force in 1976 amid the year-long bicentennial hoopla. Working with the CIA's Air America, Reed had cut his teeth on covert operations. To him, intelligence work had been "something more" to offer his country and he was proud of two "enjoyable" tours in Thailand. His years of red, white and blue training and his top security clearance had ripened him for exploitation as a stateside operative.

So, naturally, Reed was honored when in 1980, he received a phone call from Agency contacts he had fostered in Thailand. They were pitching the now family man with three kids,


David S. Fallis is a freelance journalist from Oklahoma. He has worked in research at the *Village Voice* and is currently writing for the *Tulsa World*.

[Editors' note: If Terry Reed's charges are true, he was indeed shabbily treated by the Agency and people he trusted. His story sheds light on how covert operations use and then dispose of assets who become liabilities or are insufficiently cooperative. Seemingly motivated to join the Agency out of a banal combination of patriotism and desire to make a profit, Reed may be seen as a victim. On a larger scale, however, the real victims in this story are those people, including the people of Nicaragua, and those principles, including the right to democratic government, which are routinely betrayed by covert, often illegal operations.]

an intelligence offer guaranteed to boost his Oklahoma City machine tool business. "You're in the position to make a little money," he was told, "because we're in a position to kick a lot of business your way." All Reed had to do was to help the Agency monitor Oklahoma's dusty, red clay for trade-secret leaks to communist bloc industries. Reed, whose business connections in Hungary could prove useful, gave the Agency contact the nod and restored himself to the unseen fold.

Business mushroomed as promised. FBI and CIA contacts dropped in on the family to pick Reed's sharp mind. As Reed's involvement deepened, so did his knowledge of domestic and international intelligence operations. He was immersed—and trustworthy—and that made him the perfect candidate to help Oliver North take care of business at a time when America wouldn't.

In early 1982, sitting at Capistrano's, a small, dark Oklahoma City restaurant, Reed met with a new, unfamiliar Agency contact. The man, with boyish good looks, a sincere folksy manner, and ears that stuck out from his military-style haircut, flashed CIA identification and seemed well-versed in complex operations. Smiling so that the gap between his front teeth showed, the man introduced himself as John Cathey and gave Reed the big patriotic sell, telling him how he was needed to help gather intelligence concerning Toshi-



Terry Reed displays his FBI file. This cover page describes him as "armed and dangerous."

ba. Reed was working with that company at the time. Over the year, several meetings and a multitude of phone calls took place between Reed and this new contact. They culminated in March 1983 when Cathey paid a visit to Reed's office. The Boland Amendment to restrict aid to the contras was imminent, and Cathey was patiently explaining some alternatives to Reed including a new covert operation tagged "Project Donation." Private, truly patriotic citizens, Cathey explained, could "donate" certain items to the Nicaraguan "anti-communist" effort and later receive reimbursement.

Cathey called it "loss brokering." If people wanted to consider "donated" items "lost," certain insurance companies could be made aware that a claim would be filed. "If you're in a position to know which houses are going to burn," Reed explained, "which policies to go out and buy, to take the tax credits, you're in a position to make money." As one source said: "Nobody stood to lose a thing."

**Reed was the perfect
candidate to help North take
care of business at a time
when America wouldn't.**

A Steal of a Deal

Less than two weeks after the meeting with Cathey, Reed received a phone call from Mizzou Aviation in Joplin, Missouri where Reed had left his Piper turbo-prop the month before. Mizzou was calling to say the plane had been stolen. On the way to a Florida air show, Reed claimed he had developed engine trouble and set down at the small field for emergency repairs. "The company," Reed related, "pushed the plane outside for storage and put the log books in the plane, and didn't lock the aircraft."

Reed—a part-time flight instructor—said he was out a business necessity. Reporting the theft, he filed a \$33,000 claim on the Piper, on which he still owed \$26,500. He eventually collected \$6,600.

Two years passed without a word on the plane, other than a coy hint from Cathey as to its whereabouts a few months after the theft. Late in 1985 however, Reed, now living in Little Rock, Arkansas, received a bizarre phone call from his

old Air America buddy, William Cooper. Cooper was quite active under the CIA's aegis flying questionable payloads to Nicaragua via Southern Air Transport and working with the likes of lumbering, soon-to-be assassinated DEA informant Barry Seal. "There was a lot of contra stuff going on in Arkansas," said Reed; "it was the hub." Indeed, Reed — while ostensibly running his manufacturing business out of Little Rock — was quite active training would-be contra pilots on a small airstrip outside Mena, some 82 miles due south of Fort Smith.¹

Reed had realized the CIA agent he'd been meeting in Oklahoma City was actually Oliver North.

Cooper, Reed said, was phoning to give him a short lesson in theft. The stolen Piper had actually been taken for Oliver North and Project Donation, and would be returned soon. Reed claims that until this time he hadn't known what had happened to his plane. Cooper instructed Reed to rent a hangar and to store it until things had cooled off. Shortly thereafter, Oliver North — identifying himself as such — called to reiterate Cooper's advice.

By then, Reed had realized that the CIA agent he'd been meeting in Oklahoma City, and speaking with numerous times by phone, John Cathey, was actually North, Reagan's National Security Council pin man.

Mexico Bound

Reed's deft handling of intelligence matters and the basic fact that he played the Agency like a hobby, made him an exploitable asset. In mid-1986, the CIA advised Reed that if he wanted to expand his machine tool business into Mexico, he would have the financial blessing of U.S. intelligence. Part of his responsibility, however, would be to help further the channels of contra support by setting up a Mexican arms export company for North. Honored, Reed agreed and placed himself under the direction of such super-patriots as Felix Rodriguez, the zealous anti-Castro veteran who was overseeing the contra air-support operation in El Salvador.²

Reed and family had been in Guadalajara for only a few months when, on October 5, his pal Cooper was shot down

over Nicaragua on an illicit C-123 arms run. The crash killed pilots Cooper and Wallace Sawyer. Cargo-kicker Eugene Hasenfus, however, parachuted safely into the Sandinistas' waiting arms, giving network news video images that would finally force at least a superficial discussion of U.S. covert policy.

"It sort of put everything on hold and so for a year we were just floundering," said Reed describing the scrambled Mexican intelligence network. Reed's machine tool business was suffering, the CIA was subsidizing the family's existence, and things were becoming overtly criminal. "Stuff our government was doing...were criminal acts. Things you and I would go to jail for in a New York second...Things that they were doing quite openly." These "things" included, according to Reed, using the same arms export network to run drugs back to the U.S.

Reed told his contacts that he wanted out but had to delay departure until his wife Janis finished teaching in the summer of 1987. "I told them this was a grandiose, fun scheme, but I am not going to do this anymore...we don't want to hurt you — we just want out. [But] once you've seen it, you're in." And sure enough, as Reed prepared to leave that October, somebody was hurriedly directing the Arkansas State Police to a certain Piper turbo-prop that had been missing five years.

Lapse of Treason

As Reed and his family prepared to leave Mexico, the CIA was quietly dangling him like raw meat in front of local police, the FBI, and Customs. The Little Rock businessman was now described in his FBI file as "armed and dangerous...hiding out in Mexico...[and] may be involved in running drugs." It couldn't hurt if someone was a little trigger-happy.

The Reeds learned of their wanted status from Janis' parents who were visited by FBI agents at their Carthage,

"I told them this was a grandiose, fun scheme, but...we just want out. But once you've seen it, you're in."

Missouri home. The agents intimidated the couple with a good cop/bad cop routine. After they interrogated Reed's elderly mother, she required hospitalization, according to Reed, as a result of the stress. Stunned, the Reeds hired an attorney and walked into the U.S. Marshal's office in Kansas City to surrender.

For the next seven months, the FBI effectively destroyed the Reeds' reputations, coloring them outlaws, and collecting useless information from soon to be ex-friends and associates in Arkansas and Oklahoma. The FBI files were filled with

1. John Cummings, *Boston Phoenix*, November 23, 1990.

2. Rodriguez was deeply implicated in the illegal efforts to supply the contras. Through Donald Gregg, then Vice President George Bush's National Security Adviser, Rodriguez maintained close links with Bush. This association gave credence to accusations that Bush was not only knowledgeable of but also actively involved in circumventing the Boland Amendment.

phrases like "I knew Janis and Terry lived beyond their means," and "[they kept] strange hours." These suggestive interviews were to become the core of the prosecution's case against the Reeds.

So, in June 1988, armed with innuendoes from Reed's associates and a Turbo-prop with a checkered past and a good paint-and-number job, the government made its case official. Four counts of federal postal fraud based on receipt of an insurance payment under a false claim were leveled against Terry, with corollary charges of aiding and abetting thrown at Janis for good measure.

"Over a six-year period—from the time of my initial contacts with these guys, until everything went to hell—as I got in deeper and deeper, we realized that they are sort of building things around you. If they want to pull the plug they can, which they did," Reed said. "You are the deniable link."

Despite the risks inherent in confronting the Company, an angry Reed countered the charges in a court motion. In a February 1989 document, he outlined how his plane had been "borrowed" by North's illegal contra support network for "Project Donation" in March 1983. He claimed that its sudden re-appearance was in retaliation for his trying to leave the Agency. Although the government wanted this to be a case of "simple mail fraud," Reed's story begged issues of national security.

"When I pissed the guys off down in Mexico they set out to burn me... They set up this crime," Reed said.

Indeed, it seems North's relaying to Reed the existence of "Project Donation" in 1983 had been bait; tantalizing Reed with the possibilities, while setting him up for the later fall if necessary. Reed—wary of self-incrimination—maintains that "When I was approached initially, it had nothing to do with this airplane fiasco. No one asked me specifically to use my airplane in the contra re-supply operation."

**"When I pissed the guys off
down in Mexico they set out to
burn me...they set up this crime."**

Deciding to fight back, the Reeds claimed they went bankrupt paying two ineffectual lawyers \$175,000 before turning to the Public Defender's office in Topeka. With absolutely no experience in disinformation and contra supply lines, Reed's appointed counsel—the aforementioned Joe Dunlap and Federal Public Defender Marilyn Trubey—labored to build a defense. Their efforts culminated in a witness list some 54 names long, headed by snake-charmers such as Ollie North and Felix Rodriguez. Actually getting North to the witness

stand would be a different story. From day one, according to Reed's attorney Marilyn Trubey, North's lawyer Brendan Sullivan made it clear that if the Reed case came to court, North would take the fifth.

Because of the location of the insurance company's bonding agent, the trial was set in Kansas and prosecuted by Robin Fowler who tended to question the mere existence of the Iran-contra scandal. For the U.S. Government, there was less chance of incrimination if the case could be prosecuted as cut and dried fraud and kept out of the national media.

**When the harassment started,
however, they started to see
Reed's claims in a different light.**

Indeed, Reed's case sparked no peripheral interest, other than a keen, and strangely abrupt, inquiry from Washington. Two months before the 1988 presidential election, Reed was flown to Washington where he met for two days with Jack Blum, chief investigator under Sen. John Kerry's subcommittee on drug trafficking and foreign policy. Blum, jointly working under special prosecutor Lawrence Walsh for the Iran-contra hearings, showed considerable interest in Reed's extensive cognizance of the who, what and when of the U.S. side of Contraland.

Reed said that he was told by the investigators that his first-hand knowledge "was going to expose some of these people we've been wanting to expose." Reed flew back to New Mexico, where he moved after Arkansas, with assurances of further support, and as directed, sent the necessary documentation back to Walsh in Washington. Given the fact that Sen. Kerry's contra/drug hearings set the pace for a lackluster Iran-contra investigation—continually stopping short of the CIA's role—it was no surprise Reed's call-back never came. Lack of Senate interest was cited as the reason. In any case, legal advisers suggested, the meetings with Blum may have served to tip Washington to Reed's defense.

Intimidation and Inconsistency

Joe Dunlap's southern drawl made him ironically fit to defend Terry Reed against a basically good-ol' boy network. In the Bible-belt, Ollie For President bumper stickers were once as common as cowboy hats remain. Public Defender Dunlap and Trubey, like most people, had no reason to think of "government" invasiveness as anything more serious than taxation. Therefore, they approached Reed's dramatic tale with initial skepticism. When the harassment started, however, they started to see Reed's claims in a different light.

Incidents included:

- **Firebombing:** On Memorial Day 1990, on the eve of the first trial date, Dunlap's daughter's car was torched as it sat in his driveway.
- **Confrontation:** Three weeks later, Dunlap's wife's car was rammed in a seemingly deliberate hit-and-run accident. It was, she said, "like he wanted to make sure he hit me." When each of the two possible versions of the other car's tag—supplied by witnesses—was checked, each of the implicated automobiles were found to have been far away from the scene of the accident.
- **Evidence theft:** In April 1990, the Reeds' secret storage unit was broken into. Reed's meticulous files dating back to the plane's disappearance were rifled and six boxes of financial and personal records were stolen.
- **Intimidation:** Counsel and client regularly encountered surveillance cars outside their homes. All have suspected monitoring of day-to-day communications since the case began. "I think my phone is tapped," Trubey said last summer, and started changing phones for sensitive calls with her client.
- **Vandalism:** On September 14, 1990, four days before one of Reed's delayed court dates, the windows on Dunlap's car were smashed.

The defense case was built around Reed's assertion that he was set up. "The government knows what my plane was being used for, let's put it that way," he said. An educated

The Classified Information Procedures Act was activated because of Reed's spooky witness list, and a federal gag order slapped on all involved.

guess would place one of North's other flyboys—perhaps the deceased Cooper—in the cockpit, running guns to contra rebels, for at least part of its almost five-year absence. The defense pointed out a series of irregularities and inconsistencies surrounding the plane's bizarre and sudden discovery which suggested Fourth Amendment violations. Police documents on the plane's seizure were manufactured almost a year after the fact; key evidence (in Reed's favor) sat closeted in Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton's mansion long after it was to be in the federal Court's possession. And, although the

hangar where the plane turned up was rented in Reed's name, his signature never graced the lease.

Overdue Process

Sixteen tense months prefaced Janis Reed's November 1989 court date. From the start, her connection to the case had been tenuous. Reed charges that her inclusion was an intimidation tactic challenging the welfare of their children. Finally at her hearing, the elderly federal Judge Frank Theis, (whose main claims to fame include the Silkwood trial and the definitive toxic-shock syndrome lawsuit), remarked that Janis' only connection with the indictment seemed to be a wedding band. The charges were subsequently dismissed.

For Terry Reed a trilogy of court dates was set and each delayed at the eleventh hour. The Classified Information Procedures Act was activated because of Reed's spooky witness list, and a federal gag order slapped on all involved—even though Reed's "Ollie defense" had been court record for more than a year at that point.

Knowledgeable sources said federal prosecutor Fowler was specifically warned by the CIA that information in Reed's defense dealing with Rodriguez, North, Southern Air Transport, William Cooper, *et al.* was "Top, Top Secret." The prosecution's shots were being called east of Wichita, as a befuddled Fowler predicted from the outset: "I'm sure we'll be working with Washington on this."

The fragile logistics of prosecuting Reed, however, should have been obvious. Unlike other "disposable" operatives, Reed isn't a former drug dealer, a hardened criminal or a mercenary. He's a family man who saw stateside intelligence a patriotic extension of his eight-year military stint. He now sees himself as a textbook example of a disposable, manipulated civilian who knows too much. Reed sits on his couch, disillusioned and angry, gesturing to his FBI file with its silly list of fabricated, cryptogramic—and unused—aliases: "This is not the America I knew."

With another trial date looming, Trubey submitted one last brief which excluded mention of covert operations. It asked for a dismissal on the basic premise that when the plane was stolen, Reed was in Kansas City and in no way connected to its disappearance. On November 9, 1990 Judge Theis—informed by the prosecution that there was insufficient evidence to continue—told Reed that in return for waiving a jury trial, he would be acquitted. Reed agreed, and a few days later, on November 12, the *U.S. v. Reed* became another in the dusty annals of murky legal history.

"What I was involved with was embarrassing," Reed says. "It's sort of like you're this thing they drag in and out of their life when they want to. They browbeat you, call you some names, fingerprint you and threaten you. You're basically a convict—and you haven't even been tried."

Today, Reed is reconstructing family life, his professional reputation, and considering legal retribution against the United States. ●

Dismantling the War On Libya

Jane Hunter

U.S. operatives in Chad must have been appalled last December when they were forced to hurriedly end their secret war against Libya. Launched in 1987, this conflict was the sequel to the Reagan administration's 1986 bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi, which had failed to kill or topple Col. Muammar Qaddafi.¹ The operation ended when the French stood aside, allowing Chad's U.S. puppet president, Hissène Habré to fall to a dissident force. No longer would Chad provide a base of operations against its neighbor.

The U.S. guerrilla-masters must also have been perplexed. This time it was not the leakers or the activists at home causing them problems. In fact it is likely that among other factors, the constant monitoring of the U.S. war against Nicaragua by activists and journalists favored the choice of Libya for the next secret war. For about two years, the operation remained largely unknown in the U.S.

Yet when the CIA, "Defense Department and intelligence advisers" decided to organize their "contra" force in Chad, they forgot that unlike Central America—their own "backyard"—they would be operating in someone else's neighborhood and the neighbors might complain.²

Another Quisling Absconds

Over the remarkably short span of three weeks, former Chadian chief of staff Idriss Déby, preferred by France and Libya, and his Patriotic Salvation Movement (MPS) advanced across the breadth of Chad from Sudan.³ President Hissène Habré fled the country on December 1, a day before Déby entered Ndjamena, Chad's capital. The U.S. was forced to evacuate its 700-man Libyan National Liberation Army (NLA) from a "well-armed" camp six miles north of Ndjamena while fighting a rearguard public relations action against the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the international media, in Chad to record Déby's takeover of power.⁴

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1. *New York Times*, March 12, 1991.

2. *Ibid.*; *Newsweek*, March 25, 1991. On December 1, the *New York Times* noted "about 200 Americans, including a dozen U.S. military personnel who are training the Government's army."

3. MPS is the French acronym for *Mouvement Patriotique du Salut*.

4. Associated Press (AP), December 10, 1990.

In a number of ways, the operation was a direct descendant of the Reagan administration's secret war against Nicaragua. The Libyan "low intensity" war resembled its Central American forerunner not least in the involvement of Israel in the contras' training and Saudi Arabia's contribution of money.

Tel Aviv and Riyadh, Again

Saudi Arabia reportedly set up a bank account in Libreville, Gabon, under the control of Dr. Mohammed Yusuf Al-Margariaf.⁵ Since 1981, Margariaf, once Libya's auditor general and, until 1980, its ambassador to India, has been secretary-general of the National Front for the Salvation of Libya (NFSL).⁶ When asked about the source of the NFSL's funds, Margariaf said they came from Libyan businesspeople and "unnamed Arab governments."⁷ A 1981 National Intelligence Estimate said funding for Qaddafi's opponents came from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Morocco and Iraq.⁸

Some observers believe the NFSL was created by the CIA in the early 1980s. Morocco provided the NFSL training in 1981 and 1982 as well as a venue for its first congress in 1982. In 1984 the front was based in Sudan.⁹ After the overthrow of President Jaafar Niemery, the organization found a home in Egypt, but in 1989, when Cairo and Tripoli became friendlier, President Hosni Mubarak ordered the Libyan contras to halt their political activity.¹⁰ Then the NFSL moved to Ndjamena, where it was spliced to the NLA.¹¹

Israel, in its familiar role as Washington's covert partner, lent trainers and considerable enthusiasm to the operation.¹²

5. *Africa Confidential* (London), January 6, 1990.

6. *Libya: Steps to Freedom, Extracts from Newsletters published by the National Front for the Salvation of Libya: 1982-1987*, 1987, pp. 129-32. No place of publication given for this paperback, only a postal address: "Al-Inqad—323 S. Franklin Box A-246, Chicago, Illinois 60606-7093, USA."

7. *Daily Telegraph* (London), May 19, 1989, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS-NES), is a CIA-owned and operated entity monitoring daily broadcast and print media worldwide.

8. Bob Woodward, *Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981-87* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), p. 95.

9. Mark Tessler, "Libya in the Maghreb," in René Lemarchand, ed., *The Green and the Black* (Bloomington, Indiana: I.U. Press, 1988) pp. 77 and 81. Moroccan aid ended when Libya and Morocco signed a unity pact in 1984.

10. *New York Times*, June 8, 1989.

11. *Guardian* (London), December 10, 1990.

12. *Africa Confidential*, January 6, 1989.



Associated Press

Ndjamena, Chad, June 16, 1982. Guerrilla leader Hissène Habré relaxes after taking power in an elaborate CIA-orchestrated coup involving U.N. Peacekeeping forces. (See: CAIB Number 36, "CIA Coup in Chad.")

Israel favors such joint operations as a way of fostering closeness and indebtedness on the part of the U.S. Israel also encourages U.S. hostility toward Libya, which threatens Israeli interests in Africa and, if it ever teamed up with Egypt, could present a serious military challenge.

Be All You Can Be?

The NLA's 700 contras were recruited from among approximately 2,000 Libyan prisoners of war taken by Chad during its Aouzou Strip border skirmishes with Libya between 1983 and 1987. The contra-masters succeeded in recruiting POW Col. Abdoulgassim Khalifa Haftar and made him NLA commander.¹³

A U.S. military source said that the NLA guerrillas were Libyan prisoners of war who had initially agreed to maintain Libyan weapons seized by the Chadian army and were then gradually turned over to a group of 30 U.S. military advisers for training in "commando" and "terrorist operations."¹⁴ Even if that were true, it is illegal under the Geneva Conventions to recruit POWs to fight against their own government. They must first be set free and then interviewed by the ICRC with no witnesses present. Despite years of efforts to gain

access to POWs in Chad, the ICRC said it had only succeeded in registering fifty-three.¹⁵

In the spring of 1989, the NFSL claimed it had a force of thousands poised for action and was inspiring rebellion in cities across Libya.¹⁶ But one journalist described as "unimpressive" Margariaf's photographs "of about 100 rebels training in desert camps."¹⁷ There was also a report of an attempt to recruit western mercenaries from an office set up in Kinshasa, Zaire.¹⁸ After Habré's defeat, the French news agency reported the NLA had laid mines and staged some attacks in southern Libya.¹⁹

According to *Africa Confidential*, the NLA was also intended for use against Sudan and other countries.²⁰ Soon after Idriss Déby entered Ndjamena, he shut down an office of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) near Ndjamena airport. The office had previously been described as a U.S.-Chadian operation.²¹

"To The Best of My Knowledge..."

When word of the contra operation first surfaced in the western media, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman Cohen tried to present it as a Chadian effort. The Libyans, he said, "actually joined a military force working with the government of Chad."

I can't talk about our relationship with them. As you know we had a military defense relationship with the Chadian military just as the French did. And as these people were an adjunct of the Chadian military we obviously worked with them as well. I think that to the best of my knowledge these folks never actually went into combat in Libya. They were always kept in reserve by the Habré government.²²

In 1989 it was reported that the "nerve center" of the anti-Libyan operation was in suburban Ndjamena in a villa belonging to the head of Chad's secret service, the DDS, and "staffed by U.S. personnel."²³ The Bush administration finally admitted that the NLA was a U.S. operation in March 1991, after twelve senators including Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) exposed the affair in a letter to Secretary of State James Baker. The senators were angry that the administration had rewarded Kenya for taking in the remnants of the contra force by releasing \$5 million of Kenya's military aid.²⁴ Congress had frozen the aid to protest Kenya's human rights abuses. "We

13. *Los Angeles Times*, February 16, 1989.

14. Agence France Presse (AFP), cited by AP, December 8, 1990.

15. *Middle East International* (London), December 21, 1990.

16. Woodward, *Veil*, p. 367, *Los Angeles Times*, February 16, 1989.

17. *Daily Telegraph*, *op. cit.*

18. *Africa Confidential*, January 6, 1989.

19. AFP, cited by AP, December 7, 1990.

20. *Africa Confidential*, December 21, 1990.

21. *Ibid.*, July 7 and 28, 1989.

22. BBC Television, "Twenty-four Hours," 0517 Universal Coordinated Time (UCT), December 9, 1990.

23. *Africa Confidential*, January 6, 1989.

24. AP, March 11, 1991.

compromised our human rights policy in Kenya somewhat..." remarked a senior State Department official.²⁵

Ripple Effects

Just as the secret war against Nicaragua affected all of Central America, the war against Libya involved other countries in the region. Israel took advantage of its close ties with Cameroon's intelligence organizations and sent instructors to run NLA training centers near Kaélé and at Djoum.²⁶ The U.S. apparently had a major supply base at Yoko, in central Cameroon. An Israeli base at Ndélé in northern Central African Republic was reportedly used to train 30 Libyans, including 18 pilots, in airborne operations. Gabon took 37 of the Libyans to train at the presidential guard training camp at Wonga-Wongue, south of Libreville.²⁷

Chad was the main base for the operation, much as Honduras was in the war against Nicaragua. The very first covert operation of the Reagan administration's CIA was providing paramilitary support for Hissène Habré's fight to gain control of Chad. Then, in 1982, the CIA set up a "security- and intelligence-assistance" operation to buttress him.²⁸ Despite France's predominant role as Chad's former colonist, the CIA and Israel trained Habré's secret police, the DDS and his presidential guard, the SP.²⁹ Habré reportedly hired former U.S. marines and Israelis as bodyguards.³⁰ The U.S. also set up a top-secret base 56 miles north of Ndjamená.³¹ In the capital, a DDS torture center and the office of the U.S. Agency for International Development co-existed across the street from one another.³²

French Dissatisfaction

The French, who have consistently sought to normalize Libya's situation, envisaging Tripoli as a reliable trading partner, had never been happy with the U.S. presence in Chad. The U.S.—and Israel—were always conniving to block French-brokered solutions to Chad's ongoing struggle with Libya over the Aouzou border area.³³ Last year, France became fed up with Habré's "blatant playing-off of French

against U.S. interests"³⁴ and began urging him to make concessions so that Libyan-Chadian relations could be normalized.³⁵ Negotiations always seemed to wilt at the point of breakthrough.

Officially, France insisted it had neither helped nor hindered Déby.³⁶ It had simply followed its new policy, established early in the year when civil disturbances shook Gabon

"We compromised our human rights policy in Kenya somewhat..." remarked a senior State Department official.

and Côte d'Ivoire, of employing its troops only to protect French interests. But according to one report, "French intelligence services in close collaboration with their Libyan counterparts, [had] for several months been preparing the arrival in power of Idriss Déby."³⁷ In the late summer France and Libya were also increasing their economic and political cooperation.³⁸

Gulf War Quid Pro Quo

In telephone interviews, knowledgeable sources on Capitol Hill agreed it was quite likely the Bush administration offered not to frustrate France's objectives in exchange for French cooperation in the war against Iraq. As the MPS consolidated its hold on Ndjamená, the U.S. Embassy there said it had been assured by France that Déby was "not a Libyan agent."³⁹

Idriss Déby had been Habré's liaison with the NFSL. When he fled Chad in April 1989, convinced that Habré was about to turn against him, Déby provided Qaddafi with intelligence on the organization. In return, he received some weapons.⁴⁰ The MPS seized 60 percent of their weapons from Habré's forces, maintained French Defense Minister Jean-Pierre Chevènement.⁴¹ Déby has left no doubt that he intends to have the good relations with Libya that geography dictates.

25. *New York Times*, March 12, 1991.

26. *Intelligence Newsletter* (Paris), November 30, 1988 and September 13, 1989. See also: *Israeli Foreign Affairs* (Sacramento, CA), October 1986, July 1987, January and July 1989, March 1990.

27. *Africa Confidential*, January 6, 1989.

28. Woodward, *Veil*, pp. 97, 157-8, 310. "Egypt, and, quite likely, Saudi Arabia" also contributed money and arms to Habré, according to William J. Foltz, "Libya's Military Power," in Lemarchand, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

29. *Africa Confidential*, January 6, 1989 and September 14, 1990. SP is the acronym for *Securité Présidentielle*. Kamina is the base the CIA uses for supporting UNITA, the anti-Angolan guerrillas led by Jonas Savimbi. Ndjamená Domestic Service reported training at the Kotakoli [Zaire Special Commando Unit] training center (1845 UCT, May 26, 1984, FBIS-MEA).

30. *Africa Confidential*, December 7, 1990.

31. *Op. cit.*, March 3, 1989.

32. *Guardian* (London), December 7, 1990. See box: p. 25.

33. *New York Times*, August 24, 1983, November 17, 1984; *L'Express* (Paris), October 7, 1983; *Los Angeles Times*, August 11, 1987; *Christian Science Monitor*, August 17, 1987; Foltz, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

34. *West Africa*, September 11-17, 1989; *Africa Confidential*, July 7, 1989.

35. *Africa Analysis*, April 20, 1990. France signaled a turnaround on Libya in 1989, when it recommenced arms sales to Libya. See also: *New York Times*, July 2, 1989.

36. AFP, 0217 UCT, December 4, 1990, FBIS-AFR.

37. *Intelligence Newsletter* (Paris), December 19, 1990, which says that a radio specialist from the French DGSE had accompanied Déby during the march to Ndjamená.

38. *Africa International* (Paris), October 1990.

39. Reuters, *Jerusalem Post*, December 3, 1990.

40. *Africa Confidential*, July 7 and 28, 1989, December 21, 1990.

41. AP, December 4, 1990.

With Déby anxious to have the Libyan contras gone, U.S. officials scurried to remove them discreetly. But the disposal operation was a long and messy one, making tracks across Africa and finally ending in New York. Only the odyssey of the first hundred contras—reportedly flown out of Chad on November 30 with commander Khalifa Haftar—escaped notice.⁴² Several days after Déby's arrival in Ndjamena, jour-

**...two burly U.S. "diplomats"
kept the Red Cross
representative with them in a
locked car and refused his
requests to interview the
prisoners...**

nalists got wind of the evacuation. They were promptly barred from the NLA camp and the airport.⁴³

Spin, Spin, Spin Control

Assistant Secretary of State Herman Cohen insisted that the departing Libyans had "been observed and supervised by the [ICRC]. Nobody who wanted to stay was forced to go."⁴⁴ Spokespersons at ICRC headquarters in Geneva said that when its representative went to witness the loading of about 200 Libyans onto a U.S. Air Force C-141 Starlifter transport plane on December 7, two burly U.S. "diplomats" kept him with them in a locked car and refused his requests to interview the prisoners and to have a list of their names. The following day the ICRC representative eluded his chauffeurs but was blocked from approaching the aircraft, which was taking on another 400 or so Libyans. When he tried to talk to them through a megaphone, the pilot revved up the motors. He was told there was a need for haste and a danger of Libyan rocket attacks.⁴⁵

Getting the Libyan contras out of Chad was only the beginning. Libya raised hell, demanding an emergency U.N. Security Council meeting to deal with the Bush administration's "piracy."⁴⁶ Nigeria, where the Starlifter unloaded the contras, was embarrassed.⁴⁷ "Our decision to accept the dissidents was by ignorance...because we felt they were normal refugees," said Deputy Minister of External Affairs Alhaji Zakari Ibrahim. But when Nigeria understood the situation, he said, "we immediately invited the American

authorities to evacuate them."⁴⁸

The next stop was Zaire, where the contras were taken around December 15. According to one report, after a December 12 visit by the Libyan foreign minister—reportedly offering \$1 billion worth of oil and deficit relief—Libya requested that the contras be taken to Zaire.⁴⁹ Zaire, long a CIA haven, is also reported to have refused to permit the fleeing Hissène Habré's plane to land, leaving him to seek asylum in Senegal.⁵⁰

In Zaire the ICRC got access to the Libyans who were camped near Lubumbashi, close to the border with Angola.⁵¹ Some applied for refugee status and a number decided to go home.⁵² In February, the contra cavalcade moved on. The remaining 354 Libyans flew to Kenya where they were hidden in a secret location under guard by the Kenyan military.⁵³

But there was no rest for the contra-masters who apparently got wind that Sen. Kennedy and his colleagues would soon go public with their protest to Baker. On March 12, the day before the senators' letter became public, the *New York Times* ran a story in which administration officials anonymously and selectively described the secret war against Libya.

Along with the rueful *mea culpas*—"We waited beyond their period of usefulness and let ourselves get trapped," said one official, and the whining plaint that the debacle was a "propaganda victory" for Qaddafi—came another dose of spin control.⁵⁴ The anonymous officials claimed Libya had coerced some of the NLA men to return home and that others were afraid to return.⁵⁵ Cathy Policier of the ICRC in Geneva agreed with a BBC interviewer that no harm had come to those who had returned to Libya.⁵⁶

Administration officials also swore that the NLA had been disbanded.⁵⁷ But two weeks later Prince Idris al-Sanusi, the exiled heir-apparent to the Libyan throne, announced he had assumed responsibility for the contras' welfare. The prince vowed to order the NLA into combat against Qaddafi.⁵⁸

But that was not to be. The U.S. turned to the ultimate "disposal" solution. On May 16, officials acknowledged that

48. *Democrat* (Lagos) quoted by AFP, 1341 UCT, February 3, 1991, FBIS-AFR.

49. UPI, December 14, 1990; EFE, December 19, 1990; AFP, cited by *Guardian* (London), December 15, 1990.

50. BBC "African News," 0434 UCT, December 12, 1990. For more on Zaire's growing friendship with Libya and Libya's rising fortunes in Africa, see Jane Hunter, "Gulf War Spinoff: Breathing Space for Africa," *CAIB*, Number 36, pp. 32-39.

51. *Newsweek*, March 25, 1991.

52. Pan-African News Agency (Dakar), 1547 UCT, January 29, 1991, FBIS-AFR.

53. *Newsweek*, *op. cit.* *CAIB* has learned that the U.S. is funneling a passel of new aid and/or loans to Kenya, apparently in reward for the Kenyan acceptance of the contras. Because of its human rights record, Kenya technically cannot receive U.S. aid. This money is going under the guise of environmental protection funding.

54. *New York Times*, March 12, 1991.

55. *Ibid.*

56. BBC, *Focus on Africa*, 1709 UCT, February 12, 1991, FBIS-AFR.

57. *New York Times*, March 12, 1991.

58. *Ibid.*, March 29, 1991.

42. *Africa Confidential*, December 21, 1990.

43. *New York Times*, December 9, 1990.

44. BBC "Twenty-four Hours," *op. cit.*

45. *Middle East International*, *op. cit.*

46. *Los Angeles Times*, December 11, 1990.

47. *Guardian* (London), December 10, 1990.

the U.S. had flown the 350 Libyans from Kenya to New York where they were being granted formal refugee status.⁵⁹

Apparently seeking to avoid creating a community of exiled mercenaries, as happened in the Miami area with the CIA's Bay of Pigs veterans during the 1960s, U.S. officials announced that the Libyans would be dispersed to scattered, undisclosed locations. More than a few Cubans had gravitated into such specialties as bombing and drug-dealing. Not that it was necessarily a bad thing, in the official view. Some would again work as CIA contractors, notably in the Iran-contra operation.

No Right-wing Fantasy This Time

In November 1981, a U.S. Army tank rumbled north on Connecticut Avenue in downtown Washington in the middle of an otherwise ordinary working day in the capital. Heavily armed Marine snipers in combat dress stood on the roof of the White House in clear view of passersby. This ominous militarization of the normally sedate city was part of the Reagan administration's notably successful propaganda effort to prepare the public for a direct attack on Libya. The tank and the snipers were protecting the President from a non-existent "Libyan terrorist hit squad" sent by Qaddafi to assassinate Reagan.⁶⁰ Fake composite drawings of the imaginary villains—like those used to identify suspects—were widely circulated to police agencies and in the U.S. media. Ten years later, millions of tax dollars have been expended to kill untold numbers of Libyans, and those who were to do the killing are coming to the U.S. These are genuine terrorists, and they're here at Washington's behest. ●

59. Associated Press, May 17, 1991; *Washington Times*, May 17, 1991, p. A2; *New York Times*, May 17, p. A8.

60. This hoax was first broken by Jack Anderson, who eventually denounced the whole affair as a CIA disinformation campaign. See William Schaap, "Deceit and Secrecy..." *CAIB*, Number 16.

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Concerning the Treatment of Prisoners of War

Of the 2,000 plus Libyan prisoners of war in Chad, only 700 or so agreed to be recruited into the U.S. war against their country. To undertake such a risky, and presumably repugnant task, prisoners would clearly need persuasion. The opportunity to eat nourishing food again was probably one of the bribes. Libya was said to be funneling money for the prisoners' upkeep through Kuwait, but the emaciated condition of prisoners upon release lent credence to a report that most of the funds had gone into Habré's secret police, the DDS.

The International Commission for the Respect of the African Charter, which monitors compliance with the Organization of African Unity's human rights accords, charged that the Habré government executed several hundred of the POWs, many just prior to Habré's flight from Chad.

Across the street from the Ndjamenas offices of the U.S. Agency for International Development was a DDS torture center. Gali Gata Ngothe, a minister in the new Déby government and a former inmate of the facility, told journalists that prisoners, crammed about 80 to a cell, died of suffocation if they didn't die of torture.

One technique he described, the *Arbatach*, consisted of forcing prisoners to drink enormous amounts of water, binding their arms and legs, then hoisting and dropping them. Said Ngothe, "People died of choking or they broke their necks."

In its December 13, 1990 update, Amnesty International said prisoners were tortured in a converted swimming pool. A BBC reporter who toured the center said "What we saw was beyond belief. There was the torturers' slab and the electric chair. There were the tape recorders, clubs and truncheons..."

Amnesty International charged that Habré's presidential guard, the SP, executed more than 300 political prisoners shortly before Habré fled to Cameroon.

Sources: *New York Times*, Amnesty International, FBIS-AFR, *Guardian* (London).

Iran: Unholy Alliances, Holy Terror

Salaam Al-Sharqi

*We think Iran has conducted itself in a very, very credible way throughout this crisis...*¹

— Secretary of State James Baker

As the U.S. deployment to Saudi Arabia grew and grew, Muslims everywhere expected to see the Islamic Republic of Iran lead a worldwide Islamic uprising. The massive and totally dominating invasion of “non-believers” into the holy land was an insult to Islam. An Algerian newspaper commented, “Everybody’s attention is focused on Iran but after ten days of the war...[Iran’s] neutral position has disappointed many nations...”² Doubt about Iran’s intentions ended when thousands of Pakistani volunteers were denied permission to enter Iraq through Iranian territory.

When Iraqi forces had completed their retreat from Kuwait and the tragedy of the Kurds had begun, Iran was actually calling on the U.S. to invade its Muslim neighbor. Iranian foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati complained about the early U.S. refusal to shoot down Iraqi helicopters. It was “not too late” he declared, for a U.S. intervention.³

The disastrous uprising that followed the cease-fire is a result of Iranian collusion with the U.S., Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Iran’s active participation in the incitement of the dissidents is part of an historical pattern most people expected to end with the Iranian revolution of 1979. The reappearing pattern is a measure of just how little has changed since the fall of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Understanding this latest war is impossible without a close look at the Iranian revolution and its aftermath.

Colonialism on the Defensive

Anti-colonial nationalism blossomed in many subjugated nations during and after World War II. Iran’s nationalist movement galvanized in 1951 with the rise to Prime Minister of Dr. Mohammad Mossaddeq, a lawyer and political economist who advocated nationalizing Iran’s petroleum, then controlled by the British. He was not a “dictator,” the “butcher” of any city, or the perpetrator of “naked aggression.” He was not a “godless communist,” nor even anti-American. He

actually paid a visit to President Truman in 1952 to ask for help. Rather, he was a popular and effective leader who represented the desire of a majority of Iranians for independence. It was for this reason that he was violently overthrown by the United States in 1953.

In August 1953, days before the CIA-led coup against Mossaddeq, the Shah fled to Iraq on a trip he believed was the beginning of a permanent exile. At the time, Britain was the dominant external influence in Iraq as well as Iran. The Shah was well-received in Baghdad and, two years later, would join Iraq in a military alliance which included the U.S., Britain, Turkey, and Pakistan — the Baghdad Pact.

Naturally, the CIA coup delighted the Shah. But another important Iranian was also pleased: Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, future founder of the Islamic Republic.

Naturally, the CIA coup delighted the Shah. But another important Iranian was also pleased: Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, future founder of the Islamic Republic.

Khomeini supported Mossaddeq during the 1951 oil nationalization but turned against him when he asked the Shah to honor Iran’s 1906 constitution, in which the monarch is clearly only a figurehead.⁴

After the Shah exiled him in 1963, Khomeini decided monarchy was incompatible with Islam. But Mossaddeq was a threat to Khomeini as well because his secular bourgeois nationalism meant the end of clerical influence. In a major speech following the revolution, Khomeini said Mossaddeq did not listen to Islam (meaning the Mullahs) in 1953, there-

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1. *Washington Post*, February 7, 1991, p. A24.

2. *Al-Messa* (Algiers), January 28, 1991.

3. “The Today Show,” NBC-TV, New York, April 5, 1991.

4. See: Kermit Roosevelt, “Countercoup: The Struggle for Control of Iran” (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979) p. 151. Roosevelt says that Ayatollah Abolqassem Kashani (Khomeini’s spiritual mentor) and the other mullahs had turned against Mossaddeq. See also, *CAIB* Number 7 (December 1979-January 1980) for a critical review of this book.

fore "he was slapped." That is, Khomeini interpreted the CIA coup as a "divine punishment." What followed the coup was not at all divine, but clearly was a punishment.

Jesse J. Leaf was the CIA's chief Iran analyst from 1963 through 1972. In his last year, he described the Shah as "thirsty for power and a megalomaniac." A superior told him the CIA could not sanction his report. "This was obviously not the United States line and [didn't he] know better?"⁵

The Shah's "thirst" was best slaked by SAVAK, his political police. According to Leaf, the CIA organized SAVAK in the 1950s. "We set them up, we organized them, we taught them everything we knew...extreme interrogation techniques...including torture."⁶ Some methods were "based on German torture techniques from World War II...I know that the torture rooms were toured and it was all paid for by the U.S.A."⁷ Kermit Roosevelt, then head of the Middle East division of the CIA and key player in the 1953 coup, strongly suggests that Mossad, the Israeli intelligence service "joined the CIA in organizing the new Iranian security service."⁸

Khomeini transformed a revolution into a counterrevolution.

As reward for the coup, the Shah permitted Iran's oil to be handled by a consortium of U.S. and European oil companies. With the advent of the "Nixon Doctrine," in 1971, the Shah became regional *Gendarme*. In 1972, Nixon named 25-year CIA veteran, Richard Helms ambassador to Tehran,

5. Seymour M. Hersh, "Ex-Analyst Says CIA Rejected Warning on Shah," *New York Times*, January 7, 1979, p. 3; Nico Haasbroek, "CIA ignored agent's warning," *In These Times*, February 21-27, 1979, p. 11.

6. *In These Times*, *ibid*.

7. Seymour Hersh, *op. cit*.

8. Roosevelt, *op. cit.*, p. 9.



Associated Press

Twenty-five year CIA veteran Richard Helms, Nixon's new ambassador to Iran, presents his credentials to the Shah at one of his four palaces in Tehran.

where he remained until November 1976.⁹

In 1958, a nationalist coup in Iraq led by Abdul-Karim Qassem effectively ended the Baghdad Pact. After prodding by the British and U.S., the Shah, who had been peaceful toward the ousted monarchy, became bellicose about the Shatt al-Arab waterway—Iraq's only access to the Gulf. There were constant tensions, border clashes and harassment of vessels navigating the Shatt al-Arab, until Qassem's overthrow in 1963. The waterway has been the source of such disputes many times in this century, often because of the manipulations of outsiders.

The Rise of a Mullah

The overthrow of the Shah in February 1979 marked the first popular national uprising after World War II which resulted in a regime allied with large landowners and business interests, and opposed to separation of church and state, women's rights, and all socialist ideals. It is fair to say that Khomeini transformed a revolution into a counterrevolution, turning his power base into a theocracy.

Banished by the Shah, Khomeini had spent the sixties and seventies exiled in Iraq, where he cultivated a network of rightwing clerics and dreamed of establishing an Islamic empire from Indonesia to Spain. His disciples considered him *valee faquih*, the religious representative of the hidden Twelfth Imam of the Shiites. His political inspiration was the

9. Thomas Powers, "The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA," (New York: Knopf, 1979) pp. 267-68.

Ottoman Empire, which he considered the closest in modern times to a "true Islamic government."¹⁰

As a mullah Khomeini's Shiite fundamentalist ideology was characterized by rigidity; as a politician his policies were marked by expediency and pragmatism. Caviar, for example, is a forbidden food for Muslims. The caviar industry, however, is a state-controlled monopoly. So when he was told that banishing that delicacy meant millions of dollars in lost export earnings, he decided there were no religious grounds for prohibiting it.

On a more serious level, Khomeini chose not to spread the Islamic revolution to Saudi Arabia as many observers thought he would. Instead, seeing that Iraq's secular regime was losing favor in Washington, and was hated by Israel, he chose the more vulnerable Iraq as his target.

Ideology alone would make Khomeini staunchly anti-Israel, yet his Shah-built, U.S.-supplied air force began receiving spare parts via Tel Aviv in late 1979—well before the Iran-Iraq war.¹¹ And, according to Iran specialist, University of Pittsburgh professor Richard Cottam, Khomeini accepted the CIA's help in overthrowing the Shah while living in exile in France in the Fall of 1978.¹²

Although Madani, "the butcher of Iran's Arabs" was favored by the CIA, Bani-Sadr won by a landslide.

When the Shah fled Iran, Khomeini's religious fanaticism and political pragmatism combined in his "true Islamic government." He immobilized women by enforcing Islamic law, including the requirement to wear the *chador*, which covers the entire body except the feet and eyes. Women were driven out of most workplaces and lost their economic and legal rights. Emphasis on the sacredness of ownership set the working class back many years.

Dreams of "Islamic unity" justified aggressive destabilization programs in Muslim Soviet Republics, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the PLO, Lebanon, and most importantly Iraq, the only other Muslim nation with a Shiite majority.

In mid-1979, a new constitution was prepared which ignored the original revolutionary demand for a secular democracy. According to Khomeini's new constitution, supreme leadership is reserved exclusively for the mullahs. They en-

forced it with armed bands of the *Hezbollah* (Party of God). The functional heirs of SAVAK, these gangs inspired fear at any gathering of dissenters. With the notorious Shah-built Evin prison already filled to capacity, the only hope remaining was the December referendum on the constitution.

On November 4, 1979, the U.S. embassy was overrun by the self-proclaimed "Students following the line of Imam." To the surprise of his associates, Khomeini supported the action. The stated reason for the takeover was the Shah's admission to the U.S. for cancer treatment, but the immediate result was the passage only days later of an unpopular, counterrevolutionary constitution. Voters were explicitly told that a "no" vote meant saying "yes" to the U.S. Under the guise of ousting the Great Satan, all political parties, newspapers, publishing houses, and many bookstores were closed. Demonstrations, freedom of speech and association were banned. Freedoms and rights won in the bloody struggle against the Shah were stolen in the furious confusion of the hostage crisis.

Before the revolution, there were heated debates in the Carter administration about Khomeini. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's national security adviser, championed Khomeini because, the Imam was, in Brzezinski's view, "a strategic ally."¹³ After all, he was anticommunist and pro-business. Mehdi Bazargan, the first prime minister of the Islamic Republic said that late in the summer of 1979, Brzezinski told him that Khomeini was "enormously popular" in the U.S.¹⁴

A Postrevolutionary Coup

In the Spring of 1980, Iran held presidential elections—the first ever. There were two final candidates: Abolhassan Bani-Sadr and "Dr. Admiral" Ahmad Madani, known among Iranians as "the butcher of Iran's Arabs." Although the CIA favored him, Bani-Sadr won the election by a landslide.¹⁵

Khomeini and the *bazaaris*—the trader bourgeoisie, who control Iran's import-export markets, as well as its system of distribution—quickly grew dissatisfied with Bani-Sadr. The traders disliked him because he intended to nationalize Iran's foreign trade, a move which they feared would cost them billions of dollars. Khomeini didn't like Bani-Sadr because the newly-elected president was not repressive enough. Khomeini sent a signal of his displeasure to Bani-Sadr's enemies by savagely criticizing him in public on May 27, 1981.

Without Khomeini's support, Bani-Sadr rapidly lost political power. Just over a year after his election, he charged that a coup was in progress. "...Oh, Islam," he declared in his final public statement, "what crimes they do in your name." On June 21, the rubber-stamp Parliament illegally ousted Bani-

10. See: Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, *Islamic Government*, (New York: Manor Books, 1979).

11. Transcript, "Frontline," PBS, May 16, 1989, p. 26.

12. *Iran Times* (Washington, DC), October 20, 1989, p. 8.

13. *CAIB* interview, May 17, 1991 with Professor Mansour Farhang, first Iranian ambassador to the U.N. after the revolution, Vladimir Andreyovich Kuzichkin, in "Inside the KGB: My Life in Soviet Espionage" (New York: Pantheon, 1990), says the Soviet leadership believed Khomeini "was a natural ally of the West...was surrounded by Iranians...dispatched by the CIA...[and] began to look upon Khomeini as a protégé of the United States." p. 240.

14. *CAIB* interview with Professor Richard Cottam, April 30, 1991.

15. Transcript, "Frontline," PBS, April 16, 1991.

Sadr by a vote of 177 to 1. The following day, Khomeini announced, "I have dismissed him."¹⁶ Bani-Sadr went into hiding, then fled to Paris. On the day of his dismissal, U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig expressed relief that the Islamic Republic was finally "consolidated."

In June 1982, Vladimir Kuzichkin, a Soviet diplomat posted in Iran defected to Britain, and took with him a list of the (pro-Soviet) members of the Tudeh (communist) Party in the Iranian armed forces and bureaucracy. Through a "friendly channel," British intelligence provided the list to Khomeini. This revelation resulted in dozens of executions, and in the torture and imprisonment of hundreds of Party members and sympathizers, even though Tudeh was pro-Khomeini.¹⁷ In the mid-1980s, when four Iranian Air Force personnel landed in Paris requesting political asylum, they were forced to endure long interrogations in which the most oft-repeated question was: "Who are the other dissidents in the Air Force?"¹⁸ Another list for the "strategic ally?"

The Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988

In Khomeini's years of exile in Iraq, he had cemented strong ties to the leading reactionary party of Iraq, *al-Dawa*, which opposed Saddam's secular regime in Baghdad. After returning to Iran in 1979, Khomeini established a well-financed support system for the Iraqi Shiites and called on them to get rid of their "infidel communist regime." He stepped up border clashes and violations of airspace to a level not seen since 1975.

Border clashes were carried out by members of the so-called Revolutionary Guard, which Iranian leftists early on nicknamed the "Guards of Kapital." In the summer prior to Iraq's invasion, such provocations "...were taking place almost daily."¹⁹ During that period, Iraq registered in vain more than 100 official complaints with Iran.

In early September 1980, Iran shelled several Iraqi border towns. For the Iraqis, this attack by Iran was the real start of the war. On September 22, Saddam Hussein made a foreign policy error of grave proportions: he invaded a revolution. Iranians saw the occupation of Khorramshahr not as a warning to Khomeini but an attack on Iranian nationalism.

Although it was unclear when and where they would break out, hostilities between the two countries had been probable for years. Relations had been in a decline since a temporary respite in 1975 when they signed the Algiers agreement pledging non-interference in one another's internal affairs. Immediately following the overthrow of the Shah, Khomeini,

determined to export his brand of revolution to Iraq, publicly repudiated the Algiers accord and denounced Saddam Hussein and "his infidel Baath Party" as among his foremost enemies.²⁰

Six days after the invasion, Saddam offered a cease-fire and peace talks which Khomeini rejected because the war was a *baraka* — a blessing. Khomeini's response was welcome news for Israel, which considered Iraq a serious threat. Israel's hostility was demonstrated to the world by its unprovoked June 8, 1981 aerial bombing of the Osirak nuclear reactor. Asked about Arab reaction, Prime Minister Menachem Begin barked, "I don't care about the Arab world. I care about our lives."²¹

In 1982, Iraqi forces were driven out of Iran. Iraq again offered to have peace talks. Even Saudi Arabia tried to entice Khomeini by offering to pay Iran for the damages it sustained. Most ranking Iranian officials — including then-Parliament Speaker Hojjatolislam Hashemi Rafsanjani — urged Khomeini to accept the offer of a cease-fire. Khomeini went into a week of seclusion. Whom he consulted, if anyone, remains a mystery. But once he emerged, he rejected peace, proclaiming: "Saddam must go," "war, war till victory," and "the liberation of Jerusalem through Karbala" (a town south of Baghdad with central significance to Shiites worldwide).

**"Great Satan's" emissaries came
to Tehran during Ramadan,
carrying a Bible signed by
Reagan, and a chocolate layer
cake topped with a brass key.**

Prior to the war, declining living standards and increased repression precipitated an all-time low in Khomeini's popularity. But the war allowed him to tighten his grip by "...rallying Iranians to a common cause and by justifying greater internal repression by the Revolutionary Guards. The Guards made it possible for Khomeini to destroy the opposition inside Iran..."²²

Eight years of war left more than one million Iranians and Iraqis dead, and tens of thousands permanently disabled. Four million had become refugees, and millions of homes were destroyed. Property damage in Iran alone is estimated at over a half-trillion dollars, and is probably equalled in Iraq.

16. "Bani Sadr Voted Incompetent By Iran's Parliament," Reuters, as reported in *Washington Post*, June 22, 1981, p. A1; "Khomeini Dismisses Bani-Sadr," Reuters, as reported in *Washington Post*, June 23, 1981, p. A1.

17. Another result of the list, and other information apparently delivered by Kuzichkin, was that Tudeh was outlawed, and 18 Soviet diplomats expelled. See: Agence France Presse, May 4, 1983, and *New York Times*, May 5, 1983, p. A1.

18. Author's interview with one of the pilots, 1988.

19. Nita M. Renfrew, "Who Started the War?" *Foreign Policy*, Number 66, Spring 1987, pp. 98-108.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 99.

21. William Claiborne, "Israeli Planes Bomb Major Iraqi Nuclear Facility," *Washington Post*, June 9, 1981, p. A1.

22. Renfrew, *op. cit.*, p. 99. Appearing before the U.N. Human Rights Commission in Geneva in 1982, the Iranian Ambassador to the Vatican, Seyyed Hadi Khosroshahi, denounced what he called the "imperialist myth of human rights." *Amnesty International Newsletter*, September 1982, p. 7.

Violence and Sorrow: the History of the Kurds

The 20 million Iranian, Syrian, Turkish and Iraqi Kurds share not only a common language and culture, but also a common struggle for cultural and political autonomy within their respective countries. These distinct but linked Kurdish groups also share an historical legacy with the nation-states under whose yoke they live: both the Kurds and the countries of the region have been divided by outside forces and cynically used as pawns in larger quarrels.

In Iraq in 1970, the new Baath regime announced a major settlement granting Kurds an autonomous province. In neighboring Iran, which had for decades oppressed its own Kurds, the Shah feared the threat of a good example. He recruited and armed naive and/or criminal members of the Iranian Kurdish population known as *Delavaran-e Kurd* or Kurdish Valiants. Their assignment was to terrorize Iraqi civilians—both Kurds and non-Kurds—in the border villages in order to destabilize the Baath regime and discourage any Iranian Kurds with dreams of autonomy.

Iraqi Oil Nationalized: 1972

With the 1972 nationalization of Iraq's oil, including that of autonomous Kurdistan, the settlement collapsed. Fighting between Iraq and its Kurds lasted until 1975 with Israel's Mossad and the CIA backing the Kurds.

The heavily-suppressed "Pike Report" of 1976 gives a clear account of how the U.S., Israel, and Iran mobilized and armed Mullah Mustafa Barzani's Kurdish Democratic Party of Iraq against the Baathists "as a favor by President Nixon to the Shah of Iran...who had cooperated with U.S. intelligence agencies and who had come to feel menaced by his neighbor."¹

"The President, Dr. Kissinger and the foreign head of state [the Shah]," read the report, "hoped our clients [the Kurds] would not prevail. They preferred instead that the insurgents simply continue a level of hostilities sufficient to sap the resources of our ally's neighboring country [Iraq]. This policy was imparted to our clients, who were encouraged to continue fighting. Even in the context of covert action, ours was a cynical enterprise."² Confronted by the committee Kissinger remarked: "Covert action should not be confused with missionary work."³

In March 1975, Saddam and the Shah signed an agreement ending the war. In exchange for half of the Shatt al-Arab waterway, the Shah ended his backing for the revolt.⁴ The war

killed thousands of Kurds, over 100,000 soldiers, and created at least as many refugees. After Barzani's death in 1979, his son, Massoud took over and in the view of one observer, is "leading the Kurds into fruitless battle again."⁵

Khomeini Declares Holy War

Although Khomeini never declared a *jihād* against the Shah's regime or Iraq, he did so on August 19, 1979 against the Kurds in Iran. Once *jihād* is declared, all males over 15 must join the fight, the enemy's property is open to confiscation, enemy women are considered legitimate spoils of war, and some Islamic jurists recommend burning of all trees. In a series of armed assaults featuring extensive aerial bombing called "cleansing operations," hundreds of Kurdish villages in Kurdistan and West Azerbaijan provinces were burned to the ground. Thousands of Kurds were killed.

Some Iraqi Kurds sided with Khomeini. In 1986, Iraqi Kurdish leaders Jalal Talabani and Massoud Barzani declared that the Iraq-based Iranian opposition groups—including the Iranian Kurds—would be prevented from mounting any anti-Khomeini operations. The warning turned ugly on July 14, and again on October 7, 1986, when Iraqi Kurds massacred fifteen Iranian revolutionaries in the same location where, three years earlier, another massacre had occurred. "The (Iraqi) Communists still smart," wrote the *Nation*, "from a May 1983 attack on party headquarters by troops under Talabani's command in Pesht Ashan, in which sixty-two party loyalists were reportedly killed. The Communists have also long suspected the leading Kurdish groups of being on the payroll of the CIA."⁶ Barzani, father and son, have worked with the Agency and betrayed both their own people and Turkish Kurds.⁷

The persecution of the Kurds is part of a consistent policy supported by the Shah, Khomeini, successive Turkish regimes, and when expedient aided and abetted by the CIA. All generals under the Shah required CIA endorsement. One of the most important, General Mohammad Vali Gharani was complicit in the CIA-inspired coup against Mossaddeq and became Khomeini's first chief of staff. This former CIA favorite conducted a scorched earth campaign against the Kurds. After Gharani's assassination, his successor, General Fallahi, enthusiastically continued the massacres.

Once again with the Gulf War the Kurds have become pawns in a regional, and international, game and once again like their chess counterparts, they have been sacrificed to serve the interests of the more powerful pieces. ●

1. Daniel Schorr, "Background to Betrayal," *Washington Post*, April 7, 1991, p. D3.

2. "The Pike Papers: House Select Committee on Intelligence CIA Report," *The Village Voice* (New York), special supplement, February 23, 1976, page 4.

3. William Blum, *The CIA: a Forgotten History U.S. Interventions Since World War II*, (London: Zed Books, 1986), p. 278.

4. Nita M. Renfrew, "Who Started the War?" *Foreign Policy*, Number 66, Spring 1987, pp. 98-108.

5. Schorr, *op. cit.*

6. Stephen Hubbell, "The Iraqi Opposition," *The Nation*, April 15, 1991, p. 478.

7. Massoud Barzani said that from 1961 to 1988, his party controlled the frontier to Ankara's satisfaction. After the Gulf War, he pledged to police Turkish Kurds and keep them from pursuing their struggle for autonomy using Iraqi border bases. (*Washington Post*, February 17, 1991, p. A43.)



Associated Press

Kurdistan, 1980. Iran's Revolutionary Guards conduct one of many mass executions of Kurds and their supporters.

While the economic and human costs of the war were high for both Iran and Iraq, the war brought huge financial and strategic dividends to Tel Aviv.²³ Despite the hostage crisis and the theoretical U.S. arms embargo, Iran didn't have to worry about maintaining its arsenal. Israel provided a steady, dependable supply. "Israel, in terms of its own strategic thinking, sees Iran as an ally," said Israeli Professor Benjamin Hallahmi. "Israel has been supplying Iran with arms since 1979; this has never stopped." Asked if the U.S. was sanctioning the arms sales to Khomeini, Zvi Rafiah, an Israeli lobbyist, responded "I think that Israel as a matter of policy wouldn't do anything that [would] be against the laws or the rules of the United States. We are partners, if we are friends and allies, we have to coordinate and work together. And I think it is in Israel's interests not to do anything to jeopardize the United States' interests."²⁴ The arms merchants of 42 nations did at least \$40 billion worth of business, many of them selling to both sides at once.²⁵

In addition, the Israelis gained an ally in their struggle with the PLO. Prior to the war, Khomeini tolerated a diplomatic

relationship with the PLO because of its popularity. After the war, the PLO refused to condemn Iraq as the aggressor, and pressed for negotiations between Tehran and Baghdad. Khomeini, in concert with Washington and Tel Aviv, called for an alternative to the PLO. "Our strategy," according to a top-ranking Iranian intelligence official "is a two-fold, two-stage approach. First, have Saddam Hussein removed and on the ruins of the Baath party power structure establish an Iraqi Shiite Republic. Second, turn Jordan into an Islamic republic, where power will be shared by the original Jordanians: fundamentalist Palestinians."²⁶

At the same time as the U.S. was arming Iraq, it was secretly supporting Iran as well. Although the U.S. wanted to eviscerate the revolution, a long and debilitating war which weakened both sides was not only in U.S. interests, but in those of Israel as well.

25. James F. Dunnigan and Albert A. Nofi, "Dirty Little Secrets: Military Information You're Not Supposed to Know," (New York: William Morrow, 1990) p. 352.

26. David H. Halevy, "Tehran's New World Order?" *Washington Post*, March 24, 1991, p. C2. The article also cites U.S. intelligence officials as saying "a large number of Iranians are actively involved in the bloody uprising in Iraq."

23. PBS transcript, "Frontline," May 16, 1989.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 27.

Satanic Rapprochement

From Washington's standpoint, there were substantive reasons to actively support or at least wink at Khomeini's emergent domestic police state and his aggressive thrust outside Iran's borders. He was making great progress toward the neutralization of Iran's working class and its political vanguard—probably better than U.S. Embassy personnel could do.

Thanks to Khomeini's aggressive regional destabilization, the Saudis gradually stepped up petroleum production as a defense measure—lowering Khomeini's oil income and strangling Iran's economy. The U.S. economy (the largest energy market in the world) benefited as the price of oil began to decline. While the war dragged on, the global petroleum market became more and more glutted, and a barrel of oil dropped from a high around \$30 to under \$12. The Imam's war to create an Islamic empire crushed the aging U.S. oil drilling industry, plunging Texas, Oklahoma and Louisiana into economic depression.

Texas may have been squeezed, but U.S. weapons makers were jubilant. The Kuwaitis, the Saudis, and the Bahrainis all rushed to buy weapons as never before. U.S. subsidiaries around the world found Iran to be a great new customer more than willing to pay top market prices, especially for military spare parts.²⁷ The demand for war materiel was so huge, it pulled the British balance of trade out of a serious deficit.

In December 1980, with hostage-crisis hysteria in the U.S. at fever pitch, the Reagan transition team was already busy arranging with the Israelis to resume arms shipments to Iran.²⁸

Although he intensely disliked what he considered Carter's meddlesome "human rights" foreign policy agenda, Khomeini was pragmatic as ever and evidence is mounting that in June 1980, months before the U.S. presidential election, he may have cut one of the political deals of the century with representatives of the Reagan/Bush campaign. The Imam understood who his friends were, and even as he suckered Carter for some weapons, he was apparently guaranteeing himself a long-term supply through what came to be known as the "October Surprise." By the simple expedient of withholding the hostages until after the election, Khomeini wrote Carter's political obituary. More importantly, he handed Reagan, someone he was distinctly able to do business with, a glowing inauguration and reinforced his image as the self-made, morally upright, can-do leader of a "resurgent America."

27. Josh Friedman, "A Residue of Distrust for U.S.," *Newsday*, March 20, 1991, p. 6.

28. Christopher Hitchens, "Minority Report," *Nation*, October 24, 1987. After the Shah's overthrow, Iranians waited for the release of the presumably huge collection of documents spanning the Shah's 35 years of secret cooperation with U.S., European, and Israeli intelligence services. Even in the case of the so-called "spy nest" documents found during the U.S. Embassy takeover, the "student captors" released only those buttressing Khomeini's counterrevolutionary agenda. For the most part, the strategic secrets remain just that—secret.

Although Reagan retained his teflon armor, some of his close associates were not so fortunate. In November 1986, the Lebanese newspaper *Al-Shiraa* broke the sensational story that senior U.S. national security figures had made a series of secret visits to Tehran. The story identified former national security adviser Robert McFarlane, and said that he was attempting to exchange missiles and spare parts for hostages.²⁹ Among others with him on these Reagan-approved visits were aide Lt. Col. Oliver North, 23-year CIA veteran George Cave,³⁰ Israeli special envoy Amiram Nir, and former SAVAK agent, Manuchehr Ghorbanifar. All but Ghorbanifar traveled under false Irish passports and pseudonyms.³¹

For Iranians, the revelation that the "Great Satan's" emissaries were in Tehran at all, let alone during the sacred Muslim month of *Ramadan*, carrying a Bible signed by Reagan, and a chocolate layer cake topped with a brass key, was very controversial indeed. Disturbed, eight members of Parliament submitted a formal question to the executive branch asking who had permitted the Americans in, and why. At first it was widely believed that Khomeini was innocent and that this betrayal of principles was an act of the "moderate, pragmatic" Rafsanjani. However, Khomeini strongly recommended to the eight that they withdraw their questions. His position was clear and they complied.

August 1990: Mullahs Hit the Jackpot

For ten years the Islamic Republic was maintained with a combination of fervor, pragmatism and unsheathed brutality. The invasion of Kuwait provided Iran with extraordinary political and diplomatic opportunities.³²

An Asian diplomat in Tehran summarized Iran's position on the war as follows: "Iran's leaders want a short, sharp war... But if the fighting drags on, it gives Rafsanjani a problem on policy. The radicals will say, 'Why are we siding with the Great Satan against our Muslim brothers?'" What was Rafsanjani's goal when he opted to support a "short, sharp" war? "Rafsanjani has indicated that Iran is prepared to become the policeman of the Gulf, a role once filled by the U.S.-backed monarchy of the late Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi."³³

29. *Al-Shiraa* (Beirut), November 3, 1986. President Ronald Reagan was soon to refer to it as "that Lebanese rag."

30. Because he had served two tours of duty with the CIA in Tehran under the Shah, Cave was wearing a disguise.

31. Jane Mayer and Doyle McManus, "Landslide: The Unmaking of the President, 1984-1988," (New York: Houghton-Mifflin, 1988) p. 230. Oliver North's personal diary was one of the key pieces of evidence in the Iran-contra investigations. On September 20 and October 8, 1986, North, echoing Khomeini, wrote: "—Saddam Hussein must go..." (Photocopy of North's diary, National Security Archive, Washington, DC).

32. Internally, it was bad news for the opposition. While the world's attention was focused on the crisis, the "moderate" President Rafsanjani took advantage of the situation, sending more people to the torture chambers and the firing squads, including seven officials of the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran. (Human Rights Watch, New York, "World Report 1990.")

33. *Washington Post*, December 28, 1990.

On September 22, 1990, (the tenth anniversary of Saddam's invasion of Iran) Syrian President Hafez al-Assad traveled to Tehran carrying a message from the U.S. The Associated Press reported the substance of Assad's special news: the U.S. had released \$200 million of the Iranian assets seized during the hostage crisis more than a decade earlier.³⁴

Officially, Iran took a "neutral" position during the Gulf crisis, but in fact it continued its hostility to Baghdad. *Le Monde* reported in October that Iran would not accept any land concessions to Iraq by Kuwait.³⁵ The same month according to the *New York Times* Iran received its first World Bank loan since the revolution and Reuters reported that the World Bank was encouraging private Western banks to extend loans to that country as well. According to the *Times* story, the Bush administration had sent several friendly messages to Rafsanjani asking Iran to join the international sanctions against Iraq.³⁶ Iran accepted readily despite the fact that the sanctions directed against Iraq's non-combatant population were a direct violation of Islamic law. In January, the World Bank announced a \$250 million loan to Iran. That loan, according to Reuters, was in appreciation for the Islamic Republic's support for the war on Iraq.³⁷

The Fruits of "Neutrality"

The facade of Iranian neutrality was further eroded soon after the December 24, 1990 vote by the U.N. Security Council authorizing the use of force against Iraq. In a rather bizarre demonstration of "neutrality," the Islamic Republic announced its intention to carry out military maneuvers along the Iraqi border. AP reported: "Iran said today that its forces will launch month-long maneuvers in Western provinces in mid-January, coinciding with a U.N. deadline for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait..." According to the Iranian Army spokesperson, "...the operation will be the largest ever to be held jointly by the air force, army, Revolutionary Guards Corps and volunteers known as Basij." His reason for this enormous operation was, "defending the interests of the Islamic Republic in case the belligerent forces intend to use Iranian territory for inflicting blows on each other."³⁸

The speciousness of this justification was revealed when, according to several Radio Jordan broadcasts, coalition aircraft repeatedly violated Iranian airspace to reach targets in northern Iraq. On January 30, two U.S.-fired Tomahawk missiles hit Iranian territory near the city of Khorramshahr in Khuzestan province.³⁹ Iran did not once complain about any of these incursions.

The maneuvers were very helpful for the U.S. At an especially tense period for Iraq, they were pure and simple psy-

chological warfare. Iraq had to keep a large number of its soldiers guarding the border, because Iran still has territorial claims over some parts of Iraq. Concomitantly, Iraqi radar had to try to distinguish between "maneuvering" and aggressive intentions on the part of Iranian aircraft.

There was further harmony in U.S. and Iranian psychological warfare operations. On August 8, 1990, George Bush launched his Adolf Hitler analogy, which resonated with extraordinary speed and effectiveness in U.S. and world opinion: "As was the case in the 1930s, we see in Saddam Hussein an aggressive dictator threatening his neighbors."⁴⁰ Just a few days later, Khomeini's son, Ahmad, chimed in: "Saddam is even worse than Hitler." Further, immediately after the U.S. launched "Operation Desert Storm," the National Security Council of Iran held an emergency meeting. At the meeting's end, Rafsanjani emerged and told reporters that a *coup d'etat* in Iraq would be a quick way to end the war.

Immediately after the U.S. launched "Operation Desert Storm," Rafsanjani said that a coup in Iraq would be a quick way to end the war.

While some characterize Iran's new position comfortably in bed with the Great Satan as political prostitution, Mohammad Javad Larijani, Rafsanjani's foreign policy adviser called it "maturity." He explained: "While Iran demands publicly that the United States get out of the Persian Gulf, it is now 'mature' enough to work out a compromise with America if it, in turn, accepts Iran as a major regional power."⁴¹

The regime's "maturity" surprised some observers. The *Washington Post* exclaimed: "The pace and scope of Rafsanjani's diplomatic initiatives have amazed many Western experts."⁴² The British have restored diplomatic relations, while Germany and France are engaged in substantial new trading with the regime. The U.S. has lifted a ban on purchases of Iranian oil,⁴³ but despite expanding bilateral relations, diplomatic ties have not been renewed.

The fruits of "neutrality" have been more than just economic. At the Middle East Institute's 44th annual conference, held in Washington on October 12, 1990, former Middle East correspondent Robin Wright recommended that the U.S. augment Iran's military capabilities. "On a regional level,"

34. Associated Press, reported in *Iran Times*, September 28, 1990, p. 1.

35. *Le Monde* (Paris), October 8, 1990.

36. *New York Times*, October 13, 1991.

37. Reuters, as reported in *Iran Times* (Washington, DC), January 18, 1991, p. 3.

38. AP, as reported in the *Washington Post*, January 2, 1991, p. A22.

39. *La Repubblica* (Rome), as reported in *Kayhan Havai* (Tehran), February 13, 1991, p. 2.

40. Transcript of his speech from the Oval Office, *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, August 11, 1990, p. 2614.

41. *Newsday*, March 20, 1991, p. 17.

42. *Washington Post*, March 24, 1991, p. A31.

43. Simultaneously, the administration extended the U.S. embargo against Libya's oil.

she said, "the outside world once again began to understand that the foundation for stability in the Gulf is strategic parity between the two regional powers: Iran and Iraq."⁴⁴ Wright's enthusiasm was seconded by no less than former Israeli defense minister Yitzhak Rabin, who suggested that in case of a peaceful settlement, Iran's military strength must be restored to its 1980 level.⁴⁵

Rejoining the "Civilized" Nations

According to Amnesty International, more than 5,000 people have been executed in Iran since 1987, on the orders of a secret "Death Commission."⁴⁶ In June 1990, 90 people who in 1977 sent letters to the Shah and his senior aides demanding an end to despotic rule and respect for the 1906 Constitution, wrote an "open letter" to the present leadership, urging it to respect the 1979 Constitution. According to both Amnesty International and Middle East Watch, many of the signatories are now in prison and may soon face their executioners.

"Regrettably, in this delicate process of coaxing Iran back

Some characterize Iran's new position, comfortably in bed with the Great Satan, as political prostitution. Rafsanjani's foreign policy adviser called it "maturity."

into the fold, the Bush administration appeared to be playing only a passive role," commented a Middle East Watch spokesperson about the official U.S. position on Iran's massive human rights violations. "The U.S. did not join the sponsors of the 1990 U.N. resolution [condemning Iran]. Nor did it put its undoubted weight behind a similar resolution at the U.N. Human Rights Commission in Geneva. Its customary argument for lying low on these occasions—a thesis untested in the case of Iran—is that to take a lead would be counterproductive to the goals involved."⁴⁷

Final Questions

"The Americans are currently inside Iraq and very close to the Iranian border, so what happened to those revolution-

ary guards who reportedly number one million?" queried Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi in March. "Where has the Islamic Revolution gone?...Now the 'Great Satan' is very close to the Iranian borders [and] we must ask what is Iran's position in relation to American control of Iraq."⁴⁸

Qaddafi's remarks did not go unheard in Tehran. In an elliptical reply to a German reporter's question about the massive U.S. military presence in the area, Rafsanjani asserted, "One can live with an enemy in one's vicinity without being constantly worried. When in Germany you had to live with the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union in your neighborhood; were you worried?"⁴⁹

Was the regime's position on the war supported by the Iranian people? There were many anti-war demonstrations in Tehran and other major cities, and the embassies of four coalition member countries were bombed. A *Newsday* reporter recently visited Tehran and interviewed a man in a working-class community. "There is a lot of anti-American feeling in this neighborhood," he told the journalist. "It's been increasing since the war."⁵⁰

It should come as no surprise that Iranian workers are among those unhappy enough with the regime to take the dangerous step of speaking out against it. Yet another measure of the Islamic Republic's "maturity" is evident in a recent statement by Iran's Central Bank director, who said: "Mr. Rafsanjani's economic team is openly committed to privatization, liberalization and rationalization." These trendy political buzzwords are meaningless in the context of religious dictatorship, but music to the ears of western capitalism. In the view of an astute diplomat, although ten years too late, "This revolution is finally over."⁵¹

48. JANA (Libyan News Agency), March 3, 1991.

49. *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), March 25, 1991.

50. *Newsday*, March 20, 1991, p. 17.

51. *New York Times*, April 8, 1991, p. A7.



44. *Middle East Journal* (Washington, DC), Vol. 45, No. 1, Winter 1991, p. 29.

45. *Le Figaro* (Paris), January 10, 1991.

46. Amnesty International, "Iran: Violations of Human Rights 1987-1990," December 1990. Reliable independent reports from the Iranian opposition inside the country indicate that since the end of the Iran-Iraq war in August 1988, there have been over 12,000 executions of political prisoners.

47. Human Rights Watch, *ibid.*, p. 305.

Gossip as a Weapon of War

Margaret Randall

Guerrilla Prince: The Untold Story of Fidel Castro, by Georgie Anne Geyer, New York: Little, Brown and Co., 1991, 445 + xvii pp., \$22.95.

Why bother review a book like this one? Georgie Anne Geyer, a foreign correspondent since 1964 whose syndicated columns appear in some one hundred newspapers in the U.S. and Latin America, is a vastly self-inflated ego, writing pointedly irrelevant gossip about Fidel Castro and the Cuban revolution. Her overblown tract is transparent in its service to neo-conservatism—with all the elitist, patriarchal, and subservient elements which such ideology imposes. Her writing is rife with class, race, gender, and other cultural biases that reduce her to a kind of Louella Parsons of revolutions.

While the jacket notes claim the volume “is historically, politically, and psychologically definitive,” the book is often undocumented and clumsily written. Even direct quotes are not footnoted, and the Source Notes at the end list books, brochures, pamphlets, interviews, oral histories and the like in an undifferentiated block for each chapter, without linking any of these to frequently outrageous assertions. *Guerrilla Prince* basically rehashes and serves anew the extreme Right’s tired old “theories” about Fidel, the man and leader.

I bother to write about Geyer’s book for several reasons, the most important of which is the current marked increase in official U.S. antagonism toward Cuba. If it weren’t abundantly clear after Grenada, Nicaragua, and Panama, the Gulf massacre renders Bush’s “New World Order” obvious even for those who don’t generally make the connections. Against a background of profound upheaval in the Soviet Union and changes in Eastern Europe, Cuba is increasingly alone in its defense of socialism. More than three decades of U.S. government hostility, only slightly lessened during the Carter years, continues obstinately along a path of disgraceful overkill. The Cuban revolution is one of a small core of opponents the U.S. has thus far not been able to defeat, and Cuba is certainly a priority target of U.S. weaponry right now.

Margaret Randall lived in Cuba from 1969 to 1980. She published two books on Cuban women. Her most recent book is *Walking to the Edge: Essays of Resistance* (Boston: South End Press, 1991). She recently taught as Distinguished Visiting Professor of Women’s Studies at the University of Delaware.

This book assumes a comfortable place in that arsenal. The disinformation Geyer serves up follows a familiar pattern of official U.S. demonization of those world leaders it seeks to eliminate. Fred Landis’ 1983 observation about Geyer remains accurate: Her books are “explicitly offered to the public so that her career may serve as a model.”¹

Her writing is rife with class, race, gender, and other cultural biases that reduce her to a kind of Louella Parsons of revolutions.

If Georgie Anne Geyer isn’t on salary for her poor rantings, the authors of U.S. disinformation are getting a good deal.

Upholding the Myth of U.S. Omnipotence

Two main themes run through *Guerrilla Prince*. The first is Geyer’s U.S.-centric idea that nothing happens in this world unless the United States wants it to happen. This notion that every other country’s aspirations, struggles, errors, and achievements come about in response to or are dependent on U.S. government policy hinders the journalist’s ability to look at a people’s history, culture, personality, and invention in any realistic way. This particular myopia is not rare among journalists, but Geyer takes it farther than most.

When describing the Cuban revolutionary war, Geyer actually attributes the victory’s impact on the world to the efforts of the U.S. journalist who interviewed Castro in the mountains, rather than to the Cubans themselves: “[Herbert] Matthews’ long story, the first of three, appeared in the *New York Times* on February 24, 1957, and the world was never quite the same again.” (p. 169) [Emphasis added.]

1. Fred Landis, “Uncle Sam’s Georgie Girl,” *CAIB*, Number 19 (Spring-Summer 1983), p. 28.



Terry Allen

Geyer signs a copy of *Guerrilla Prince* for U.S. Ambassador to Nicaragua Harry Shlaudeman, first in line at a book signing in Washington, DC.

Geyer's "analysis" of the Bay of Pigs is that since the U.S. government did not provide adequate support for the invasion, its own political stupidity—and not Castro's intelligence, military prowess, and popular support—was responsible for the failure of the attack. Operating within this false logic, she renames what Castro called "the first defeat of Yankee imperialism" in Latin America, "the first self-defeat of Yankee 'imperialism' in Latin America." (p. 275)

Underlying her misinterpretation of Castro and the nation's struggle against the United States is Geyer's vision of Cuba as an insignificant little island unreasonably and petulantly upset with its powerful northern neighbor. She sees a relationship in which the two countries have for "three centuries known and for half a century been tied to one another in sickness and in health, in friendship and in enmity, in love and in hate..." (p. 228) Perhaps the metaphor of bourgeois marriage is not so far off the mark when describing the prerevolutionary relationship between the United States and Cuba. The U.S. fit the image of the dominant male, while Cuba was forced to play the role of the submissive, oppressed female.

Geyer, however, ignores the history of the Cuban people's exploitation by their own strongmen and by U.S. interests. She portrays Castro's search for national autonomy as a display of willful antagonism—arising out of some ahistoric, almost mythologized, animal instinct—against a country which has done it no harm. Castro's commitment to social programs, which have resulted in housing, education, health care and literacy standards higher than those of some U.S. cities, becomes simply a series of bribes to keep an oppressed people quiet.

The Sex Life of Fidel

The second theme is Fidel Castro as "celebrity." Early in the book's introduction, Geyer establishes herself as "impartial," that mythical state of the free press reporter. In fact, she describes herself as the *only* objective analyst of Castro: "while every other man or woman I knew seemed to be in thrall to Castro, I was not...I neither liked nor disliked him, but he enticingly puzzled me." And yet out of this bland, abstract puzzlement came six years of research and 500 interviews ending finally in a shallow and tiresome layperson's "psychological portrait."²

Despite the gratuitous protestation in 1983 that, "It was also strange to me that I felt virtually no sexual attraction for him at all,"³ she seems particularly intrigued with Castro's sex life and makes it one of her subtexts. She would follow him to bed much more often than she would follow his strategies or tactics for social change. And indeed, she vicariously peeps between the sheets where she amasses (pp. 333-4) a list of quotes from women who have allegedly been his

lovers: "The dancer at the Tropicana...said he read while he made love. The French actress said he smoked. The European woman complained he never took his boots off. The young American woman...complained he sat there for three hours and only talked (surprising) without stopping (not surprising) about agricultural reform." Is this what we really want to know about Fidel Castro, an extraordinary man who has for more than thirty years changed the lives of his people, shaped world politics, and successfully resisted cooptation?

Not Only a Philanderer, But Also a Killer

When she finally does leave the bedroom, one almost wishes she would return, such is the excited spectacle Geyer presents of Castro the revolutionary leader. In one lurid paragraph, she serves up descriptions of Castro as "a Third World Napoleon, the head of the first Fascist Left regime in history, a psychopathic caudillo, a socialist caudillo, Jesus Christ on earth, an aging pimp, the Lone Ranger, a socialist huckster, everydictator, everyprince, everyrevolutionary, a thwarted democrat, a Communist, a Gallego *cacique*, Machiavelli's Prince, Francisco Franco's classic guerrilla, an inquisitorial bishop, a Caribbean Proteus, a new kind of actor on the world stage, a dynastic Communist, the vicar of the complexes of the Third World, a classical opportunistic son-of-a-bitch..." (p. 391)

2. Geyer had no shame when it came to sources for material which would denigrate Castro. She doesn't hesitate to rely on a May 31, 1960 *Confidential* magazine story about Castro "spreading his arms like a Messiah, look(ing) at the heavens, and saying 'I am Cuba.'" (p. 224)

3. Georgie Anne Geyer, *Buying the Night Flight* (New York: Delacorte Press, 1975), p. 81.

Predictably, Geyer's version of the Cuban leader is the stereotypical story of a paranoid dictator who killed off his friends as well as his foes.⁴ Among his comrades, she has him causing, or at the very least welcoming, the deaths not only of Ernesto "Ché" Guevara, but of Frank País, Jose Antonio Echeverria, and Camilo Cienfuegos. He was also supposed, according to Geyer, to have compiled a Nixonian enemies list which included John F. Kennedy.

"That Castro often casually risked others' lives and never mourned them" (p. 176) is "substantiated" by the author through irrelevant descriptions of how much he allegedly ate after hearing about a fallen friend, or the fact that her informants could not see what they interpreted as grief or any other emotion in his face.

While Geyer misses no opportunity to deride Fidel and his comrades—even comparing him to Adolf Hitler, Benito Mussolini, and Genghis Khan (pp. 41-42 and 131-32)—she describes Venezuela's Romulo Betancourt as "democratic and humanistic" (p. 220). But then, her friends are not always the most savory. In Chile, she found the certified Nazi war criminal Walter Rauff, inventor of the gas chamber on wheels, "a charming and a cultured man."⁵

Techniques of Disinformation

Geyer's mishandling of history and her twisting of facts to bolster her equivocal views betrays her as unforgivably ignorant, pathologically naive, or as an outright liar. *Guerrilla Prince's* portrayal of prerevolutionary Cuba flies in the face of every analysis made of the period. "[D]espite the years of turmoil and the revolutionary sabotage of the last year," she writes, "the Cuba that Fidel Castro took over was a flourishing national enterprise. Far from being an 'underdeveloped' country, Cuba's national income in 1957 was \$2,311,200,000, topped in Latin America only by that of the much larger countries of Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela."

"Cuba's national *per capita* income in the crucial year of 1952, when Batista took over," she goes on, "was nearly 30 percent above the average of all the other Latin American countries." (p. 211) Whether technically accurate or not, these statistics drastically misrepresent the lives of the majority of Cubans who suffered brutal repression and gross maldistribution of wealth in those years. Money, privilege, and even health tended to concentrate in the hands of Mafia bosses and Cuban elites.

Aside from this kind of distortion, there is so much that is simply untrue in Geyer's version of contemporary Cuba that one could easily go on for pages listing points that are factually and/or politically inaccurate. In some cases, the misinformation Geyer presents is simply indicative of sloppy

journalism,⁶ others are more clearly a result of bias. She describes the U.S. Information Agency's virulently anti-Castro Radio Martí⁷ as "fair and objective news...finally made available to the Cuban people, hour after hour after hour, and week after week." (p. 372) Actually, Washington has stood by impotently as the Cuban government has successfully jammed much of the programming. What does get through is mostly blatant propaganda and/or irrelevant.

Geyer's mishandling of history betrays her as unforgivably ignorant, pathologically naive, or as an outright liar.

Geyer's views are shaped not only by anticommunism, ethnocentrism, and ignorance, but also by a profound racism. She views African-Americans as separate from their own history of struggle, dependent on outside influence for their ideas and actions. She points to the January 1966 Tricontinental meeting as "...Castro's first really serious attempt to subvert black America and to influence the young in America who had become so alienated by the Vietnam war. Before it was over, twenty-five hundred young Americans would be selected to visit Cuba in the 'Venceremos Brigade' between 1969 and 1977, and black America would be infiltrated at every most vulnerable level." (p. 320) So divorced from reality is Geyer's argument that she nowhere suggests African-Americans might have had their own reasons for visiting Cuba to see the revolutionary changes there and seek political support for their struggle. She dismisses them as "atomized, deracinated, angry outcasts searching for ways to take power through violence." (p. 319)

Still later, *Guerrilla Prince* addresses Castro's relationship to Nicaragua. Here, as with revolutions around the world, she takes pokes at leaders including Carlos Fonseca and Tomás

6. For example, Geyer has Ché Guevara and Hilda Gadea marry prior to their time in Mexico, when there is ample published documentation that they married there. (p. 144)

She has Fidel Castro changing Christmas to the "holy day" of July 26," when in fact the religious holiday never stopped being celebrated by Christians in Cuba, but the giving of toys was changed from January 6th (the day of the Three Kings) to June 6th (International Children's Day). (p. 331)

She has Castro telling the people about the failure of the ten million ton sugar harvest on July 26, 1970, when in reality he disclosed that painful information a full month earlier as Cuban fishermen who had been kidnapped by CIA-backed counterrevolutionary forces were returned safely to their home. (p. 332)

7. Begun in May 1985 after considerable lobbying by the Cuban-American National Foundation and at the behest of Senator Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), most Cubans (both pro- and anti-Castro) deride the provocative manner in which it was named—after José Martí—Cuba's national hero.

4. Geyer concocts evidence early and often to suit her pop-psych approach. She transforms common procedures such as the compartmentalization of rebel cells in times of clandestinity into proof of "Fidel's customary secrecy...ever more obsessive." (p. 140)

5. Geyer, *Night Flight*, op. cit., p. 108.

Borge. At the same time she praises CIA agents, torturers, and bankrupt politicians of the bourgeois "democracies." She rewrites history by eliminating the 1984 elections in which the Sandinistas were elected and claims that Daniel Ortega *et al.* only agreed to the 1989 elections because "they would *finally* legitimize Sandinista rule before the world." [Emphasis added.] Although the \$17.5 million the United States pumped into the opposition campaign has been widely documented, and indeed boasted about by the U.S. government, Geyer tries to make her readers believe that the UNO opposition "had no money." (p. 387)

Her political confusion was evident again when she called Grenada's Bernard Coard—who directed the 1983 overthrow of the country's popular leader, Maurice Bishop—"a kind of Caribbean Trotsky." (p. 373) A kind of Caribbean Stalin might have been closer to the truth.

Better Read than Dead

Geyer's transparent biases and contradictory reasoning become more frequent as one makes one's way through this book. For if her description of Fidel's early childhood,⁸ education, and political development are rife with cheap sexual innuendoes and pseudo-psychology, her later attempts to talk about revolutionary Cuba are sabotaged by her inability to understand either the country or its place in the world.

A portrayal as sickly misleading as Geyer's fuels the ignorance that rallies people to war.

As someone who has raised four children in Cuba (1969-1980), I feel well informed and able to speak of that country's educational system. Of course there were problems. There still are. But there was so much that was extraordinary about those excellent schools, available free to every child. One of the most interesting and positive aspects of the Cuban educational process is the way in which manual and intellectual work are combined in the curriculum. Some schools are organized much like in the U.S.: the kids study, come home each night, and do 45 days of field work in the summer. At others, the *becas*, field or factory work is combined with classroom study and recreation on weekdays, and students go home on weekends.

8. Fidel was "an unusually violent child (who let) his mind rove in school, where he invented war games for hour after hour." (p. 31).



Janis Lawin/Impact Visuals

Here is Geyer's version: "[Schools] take the girls and boys at high school and at pre-university age to the fields to do work that they had never done...In the fields alone, without their parents, with only their peers and their ideological mentors, the youngsters felt the old strict Spanish cultural norms, traditions, and taboos fall away. Massively, an entire generation lost its inhibitions in the cane fields of Cuba. Many of the girls became pregnant. The authority of the family was replaced by the authority of the government." (p. 252)

The preceding quote is typical of the ways in which Geyer uses innuendo as well as guilt by association, and of the enormous leaps she makes throughout *Guerrilla Prince*. Not only is she intent upon ridiculing and defaming an important Latin American political leader; she manages to distort a variety of social practices and cultural phenomena.

In sum, *Guerrilla Prince* is one more weapon in the United States' policy of destabilization of its enemies through "low-intensity warfare," propaganda, covert interventions, kidnapping, aid embargoes, manipulations, and—when those tools fail—invasion. Rewriting history is basic to the destruction of our collective memory. A portrayal as sickly misleading as "Gee Gee" Geyer's of Fidel Castro fuels the ignorance that rallies people to war.

We have only to look at how the mainstream media presented Saddam Hussein in the months and weeks leading up to Washington's war in the Gulf. Insistently parroting Bush's carefully orchestrated campaign, they dutifully compared Saddam to Hitler. This vilification made it easier for U.S. citizens to support "whatever it takes" (including assassination) to rout him from Kuwait. When we see this kind of a hatchet job done on a leader like Fidel Castro, we may do well to be concerned for his life—especially in light of the U.S. invasion of Panama and kidnapping of Noriega.

Guerrilla Prince appears (and from a major publisher) at a time when Cuba is increasingly threatened by Bush's "New World Order." Trivial though it is as either analysis or history, the book must be taken seriously because it accurately reflects the official view. We are warned. ●

The Company I Didn't Keep

John L. Hess

Daniel Schorr put us all on the spot years ago when he acknowledged that as a foreign correspondent for CBS he had routinely swapped intelligence with the CIA (*New York Times*, January 5, 1978). It then behooved every journalist to come in out of the cold, I thought. I've waited a long time to take my own advice, but I think my experience tells something about the history of U.S. involvement in the Middle East. It also tells something about journalism and the CIA.

The Company, as we often refer to it with careless sophistication, apparently categorizes journalists as *witting contacts*, *unwitting contacts*, *witting assets* and *unwitting assets*. I suspect that the agency, if in fact it did use me once or twice, put me down as an unwitting liability.

In the eight years I wrote for the *New York Times* overseas, I never met anybody I recognized as working for the CIA. I knew journalists who had been approached, and I met many who would, like Schorr, occasionally call on a station chief for a briefing. Not I.

I had never cultivated or used such contacts. I was struck by this once, at a Franco-American conference of journalists, when a compatriot complained that the *Quai D'Orsay* kept only two officials available to serve the entire English-speaking press corps. I wondered why, with 50 million French citizens to talk to, he needed more diplomats, but then he was a "diplomatic correspondent." But I have known reporters abroad who would not file a story before checking it out at the U.S. Embassy. They give it away in their dispatches: "according to Western diplomatic sources..." They could cover the scene just as well from the State Department in Washington, which gets the same reports.

Schorr himself, in recounting how he exchanged information with the CIA, seemed insensitive to the possibility that it loaded his reportage. His agency informants may indeed have been "generally more knowledgeable and objective than their diplomat counterparts," but as he agreed, they only told him what they wanted known. In light of what we now know about the CIA, it takes an act of faith to believe that they never slipped him any disinformation.

"As long as my sole purpose was getting a story and my employers were aware of what I was doing," Schorr wrote, "I felt ethically secure."

After 24 years with the *New York Times*, John L. Hess left to do broadcast and print commentary.

Langley Calling?

The CIA never made an overt approach to me, nor I to it. Publicly, and in my writing, I disagreed with nearly all aspects of U.S. foreign policy in those years (1964-1972). However, there was one move by Washington that I did approve of — the now almost forgotten Rogers Plan, which may have been the most benign effort of the Nixon administration.

In early 1970, Nixon and his National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger, were handling all the "major" foreign policy matters involving Indochina, Chile, and Europe. They let the nominal Secretary of State, William P. Rogers, take responsibility for the Middle East, where the situation appeared hopeless. A war of attrition between Israel and its Arab neighbors was taking lives daily along the Jordan river and the Suez canal. The Israelis refused to negotiate until the Arabs came to them without conditions. The Arab states refused to negotiate unless the Israelis agreed to withdraw from the territories seized in 1967.

Rogers proposed a cease-fire, accompanied by an agreement to negotiate a peace based on U.N. Security Council Resolution 242. This document called on Israel to withdraw from occupied territories and for the Arab states to recognize Israel's right to exist. Both sides, required to back down from previous positions, greeted it with growls.

It was in this context that the CIA may have used me to convey a message or two.

An acquaintance in Cairo claimed to be the correspondent for a small European radio station. At a social occasion he took me aside and showed me the text of a U.S. *aide memoire* (confidential diplomatic communication) to Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad, assuring him that the U.S. understood Egypt's insistence on the return of virtually all the occupied territories. The U.S., according to the document, would press Israel to agree to return land. The correspondent asked that I not reveal my sources, because an Egyptian official responsible for the leak would be gravely compromised if it could be traced to him.

I trusted my informant not at all, of course, so I did what reporters often do in such circumstances. I went to a U.S. diplomat who had often declined comment but was not known to have lied to us, and asked him something like this: "If I were to file a report along these lines, would I fall on my face?" He said no.

To protect my source, I flew to Beirut and filed from there,

asking New York not to use my byline or a Mideast dateline. The desk went me one better and folded the story into a dispatch from Washington.

Months later, a colleague with good CIA relations told me what followed. The Egyptian Foreign Ministry complained to the State Department that while Cairo had been compelled to keep quiet, Washington had leaked news of the possible agreement. This was an obvious assumption, because of the Washington dateline. Secretary Rogers denied it, asserting that the *Times* had obtained the story through a correspondent in Cairo, who had filed it from Beirut. My colleague and his informants thought this diplomatic embarrassment an excellent joke on the CIA.

A more portentous story was to follow. One weekend in mid-July, my young informant advised me that Gamal Abdel Nasser had been persuaded by Moscow and Washington to accept the Rogers Plan, and would in a few days announce a cease-fire on the Suez. I checked this one not only with the U.S. Embassy but also with a well-informed Egyptian, and filed the story on July 18, 1970, datelined Cairo.

On the day I filed the story, Israeli fighter-bombers were raiding Egyptian anti-aircraft positions near the Suez. In Washington, Kissinger had just held a backgrounder in which he spoke of expelling the Russians from Egypt. In a television interview, Nixon asserted that the Arabs "want to drive Israel into the sea" and that a shift in the balance of power against Israel would mean war. Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco was talking tough as well, and it looked as if Secretary Rogers, the dove, was being pushed aside.

It is unclear why the CIA (assuming it was the CIA) was willing to scoop Nasser on his announcement of a cease-fire. Washington may have feared that Nasser would change his mind and decide to hang tough. The leak then might have been a "nudge." It may also have been designed to restrain Israeli aggressiveness on the Suez front — clearly a danger to Arab acceptance of the peace plan.

Like most such exclusives, this story reflected little real credit on the reporter. Unfortunately, some of my competitors took it as a reflection on themselves. Replying to "rockets" from their home offices, they cabled that the *Times* story was a hype. They filed dispatches to that effect, and they repeated it loudly in the Nile Hilton restaurants.

Continuing attacks on Washington and Tel Aviv in the Cairo press seemed to support their view. My own dispatches in succeeding days fleshed out details of the coming agreement and my editors, bless them, ran my copy. But as the week advanced, I began to get a little uneasy.

On Thursday, July 23, Nasser addressed a party assembly, and for 40 minutes, he berated Israel, the U.S. and the Rogers Plan. Around me in the press box, others were punching out bulletins about Nasser's rejection of the plan, and occasionally glancing at me with pitying smiles. In a glaring *non sequitur*, Nasser concluded by saying that, silly and hopeless as it was, he would give the Rogers Plan a whirl.

The wire service bulletins' new leads all said Nasser had accepted the plan "conditionally," and my own desk, which had backed me bravely until then, now cautiously inserted that qualification into my own dispatch. In fact, despite the bluster, Nasser had put up no reservations, and his letter of acceptance to Rogers actually used the adjective "unconditional." I am persuaded that the grudging treatment by the U.S. press of Nasser's bold gesture contributed, in a small way, to the plan's eventual failure.

Although none of the coverage I saw made a point of it, it was the Israelis who balked at peace. In the Knesset on June 29, Golda Meir had criticized the plan, holding that a three-month cease-fire was not enough, that the Egyptians should come to the Israelis directly and that it should be made clear that not all the occupied territories could be returned.

Another Peace Scare Successfully Ended

In the end, the Suez cease-fire was the only positive achievement of the Rogers Plan. Negotiations for a peace agreement were never begun. Instead, cease-fire followed temporary cease-fire. The Palestinians, for whom no explicit provisions were made, rejected the plan from the beginning. While shooting stopped on the Suez front, commando raids continued across the Jordanian and Lebanese frontiers. Against Arafat's opposition, PLO hardliners extended the warfare to travellers, culminating in the synchronized hijacking of four airliners. One was blown up in Cairo in defiance of Nasser, and the other three were blown up in Jordan. There were no casualties. In Jordan, King Hussein responded with his tanks and crushed the PLO there. Nasser, exhausted by his effort to halt the strife, died on September 26.

A joke in Cairo the next year went: "Name a suave, handsome man whose hobby is extending cease-fires." Anwar el-Sadat not only extended the cease-fires, he expelled the Soviets and resumed relations with the U.S., but he failed to get any movement toward a settlement. On the contrary, with an election approaching, Nixon undercut any hopes for peace by waffling on his earlier commitment to U.N. Resolution 242's call for pre-1967 borders.

In a later interview in Washington, Assistant Secretary Sisco said that the Rogers Plan could not be called a failure, because nobody had been shot along the Suez since mid-1970. The shooting resumed on Yom Kippur, in October 1973. It cost more than 10,000 lives to reinstate the cease-fire and move the front a few miles across the canal. Then came the civil war in Lebanon, clearly a byproduct of the impasse, followed by Sadat's daring deal for the Sinai, his assassination, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, and still no peace.

Looking back I'm struck by the transitory nature of the scoops that, if my colleague is right, the CIA fed me. The really big stories, of course, are the ones the Company would protect with its life: its intelligence failures, its role in the civil wars, the politics behind the turn away from Rogers and the victory of the Hawks. ●

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